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MAP MANEUVERS 



. . . AND . . . 

TACTICAL RIDES 

. . . BY . . . 

FARRAND SAYRE 

Captain and Adjutant, 8th Cavalry 

(Formerly Instructor, Department of Military Art, 
The Army Service Schools) 



THIRD EDITION 



Adopted for Use in 

THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS 



THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 






COPYRIGHT, 1908—1910 

— BY — 

FARRAND SAYRE 



iCl,A268cSH9 



\ 



"The whole loft of the house from end to end 
makes one undivided chamber; here are set forth 
tables on which to model imaginary countries in 
putty or plaster, with tools and hardy pigments; 
a carpenter's bench; and a spared corner for pho- 
tography, while at the far end a space is kept for 
playing soldiers. Two boxes contain the two 
armies or some five hundred horse and foot; two 
others the ammunition of each side, and a fifth the 
foot-rules and three colours of chalk, with which 
you lay down, or, after a day's play, refresh the 
outlines of the country; red or white for the two 
kinds of road (according as they are suitable or 
not for the passage of ordnance), and blue for the 
course of the obstructing rivers. Here I foresee 
that you may pass much happy time." 

— "T/ie Ideal House'\ Robert Louis Stevenson. 



AUTHORITIES CONSULTED 



Das Kriegsspiel, Von Altrock (1908). 

Anleitung zum Kriegsspiel, Meckel, revised by Captain 
Count von Eynatten (1904). 

Das Regiments Kriegsspiel, Immanuel (1903). 

Das Kriegsspiel, Anregungen, Erlahrungen und Beispiele 
(Anonymous) published by R. Eisenschmidt, Berlin (1903). 

Einfiihrung in den Betrieb des Kriegsspiels (Introduction 
to the Conduct of the War Game) Von Litzmann, Director of 
the German War College (1905). 

Anlage und Leitung von Kriegsspielen, Hans Oberlin- 
dober (1904). 

Offlziers Taschenbuch, Von Wedel (1906). 

Foreign War Games, from the Revue Militaire de L'Et- 
ranger, August and October, 1897, (Translated by Major H. O. 
S. Heistand). 

Simplified War Game (Translation of Beitrag zu Kriegs- 
spiel), Von Verdy du Vernois (1876), by Major Eben Swift. 

American Kriegsspiel, Livermore (1898). 

Kriegsspiel, Major C. W. Raymond (1881). 

Provisional Instructions for Maneuvers, General Staff, U. 
S. Army (1904). 

The Maneuver and the Umpire, Major Eben Swift (1906), 

Maneuvers and Kriegsspiel, Major Barth, Vol. XIII, 
Journal M. S. I. 

Rules for the conduct of the War Game on a Map (British 
Government Publications — 1896 and 1899). 

Combined Training (British Field Service Regulations) 
(1905). 

Circular Concerning the Practice of the War Game, French 
Minister of War, April 30, 1900. 

Instruction Ministerielle du 20 F6vrier, 1895, concernant 
les Travaux et Exercices des Officers du Service d'Etat Major. 

Instruction des Offlciers au Moyen du Jeu de la Guerre, 
Captain Messel (1906). 

Jeu de Guerre et Manoeuvre sur la Carte, Revue Mili"' 
Generale, Jan. 1907. 

Une Manoeuvre sur la Carte, Revue Militaire Generale, 
Mars, 1907. 

Le Jeu de la Guerre en France, Henrionnet (1898). 

Le Jeu de Guerre dans les Corps de Troupe (1901). 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I. 

UTILITY, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 

Utility — Origin, war chess — War Game — Rigid Kriegs- 
spiel — Map Maneuvers — Modern German Kriegs- 
spiel— Introduction in other armies — Naval War 
Game— Recent Developments — The Game Fea- 
ture—The Title - - - - - 1-30 

CHAPTER II. 

MAPS AND MATERIAL 

Classification -American Maps— Foreign Maps — Guide 

Maps— Table— Blocks — Scales— Other Accessories 31-53 

CHAPTER III. 

HOW CONDUCTED 

Methods — Preliminary Instruction — One Side Maneu- 
vers—Two Side Maneuvers — Problems — How 
Initiated — Accessories — Director's Assistant — 
Decisions — Progress of the Maneuver — Use of 
Blocks — How Far Carried — Playing Open — Dura- 
tion—Spectators —Discussion — Two Maps — Three 
Maps — Siege Maneuvers — Naval War Game — 

i Strategic Maneuvers .... 54-104 

CHAPTER IV. 

PROBLEMS 

Preliminary Exercises — One Side Maneuvers — Two 

Side Maneuvers .... 105-159 

CHAPTER V. 

TACTICAL RIDES 

One Side Exercises — Two Side Exercises— Discussions 

on the Terrain— Staff Rid^s -General Remarks 160-172 

APPENDIX. 
Fire Losses - - - - - - 173-183 



PREFACE 



The first three chapters of this work originated 
in a series of lectures given to the class in the Army- 
Staff College in 1906-7; the fourth chapter consists 
chiefly of problems which have been used in the 
Army Service Schools; the fifth chapter is a revision 
of a lecture given in the Army Staff College in June, 
1909. 

The first edition was published in 1907 for use in 
the Infantry and Cavalry School (now School of the 
Line). Map maneuvers were to be introduced in that 
school for the first time; some printed matter on the 
subject was thought necessary for use in preliminary 
preparation, and there was then nothing available 
which would serve the purpose. 

This matter was published in book form at the 
instance of Major D. H Boughton, General Staff, 
U. S. Army, who was then Senior Instructor, De- 
partment of Military Art, Army Service Schools. If 
the book is thought to have any value, it is attributed, 
in a great measure, to assistance and encouragement 
from his successor. Major John F. Morrison, General 
Staff, U. S. Army. 

Fort Robinson, Nebraska, 
June 17, 1910. 



vu 



INTRODUCTION 



The soldier, unlike other professional men, has 
no opportunity, ordinarily, to practice his profession. 
Modern wars are short and infrequent, but involve 
enormous cost in blood and material resources. The 
outbreakof war must find the soldier already familiar 
with his work. There will not be time enough after 
the outbreak of war for him to learn his duties before 
military operations begin; and the cost of permitting 
him to learn by experience derived from his own 
blunders, is too great to be considered. 

A man can acquire familiarity with his work only 
by experience; theoretical instruction alone does not 
suffice. As wars have become more infrequent, the 
necessity of giving soldiers practical training in the 
operations of war in time of peace has increased. It 
was formerly supposed that a knowledge of the art 
of wa^ could be gained only in war; but experience 
has shown that armies can be trained more effective- 
ly in peace than in war. Modern armies are com- 
posed of peace trained soldiers. The most efficient 
armies of the world are composed of men who have 
never engaged in war. The effectiveness of modern 
armies is judged by the efficiency of their field ma- 
neuvers. 

' 'It has long been recognized that mere 'barrack 
yard drill' is not a sufficient preparation for war; and 
it is a mere statement of an axiom to say that troops 
should be assembled as often as may be practicable 
in large bodies and required to act under conditions 
assimilated as nearly as possible to those of campaign 
and battle. There are many things that cannot be 



learned by the most intelligent and diligent student 
of books, which are readily acquired in practice on 
the field. The formulation of orders, the arrange- 
ments for marches, scouting and reconnaissance, and 
the deployment of forces for battle can be conducted 
in peace maneuvers almost exactly as they would be 
in the serious business of actual war." (Report of 
Maneuvers of 1903, by Colonel A. L. Wagner.) 

In a field maneuver, troops are handled in ac- 
cordance with the requirements of a military situa- 
tion which is more or less imaginary. A state of war 
is assumed to exist; bodies of troops are placed in 
designated positions, and their commanders are given 
missions and information of the enemy and support- 
ing troops which make the performance of military 
operations incumbent upon them. A single body of 
troops may be maneuvered against an enemy who is 
wholly imaginary or is only partial^ represented; or 
two bodies of troops may be maneuvered against each 
other. 

But the time, troops and maneuver grounds nec- 
essary for field maneuvers cannot be obtained often 
enough to give officers all the practical experience 
they need, and additional expedients are employ/ v^d to 
extend the amount and variety of this practice. 
Officers are sometimes designated to command imag- 
inary bodies of troops with other officers as their staff 
officers or their subordinate commanders. The im- 
aginary troops are then conducted over actual ground 
by means of such orders and messages as would be 
used if the troops were real, a record being kept of 
the supposed positions of the imaginary troops by 
means of pencil notes. Exercises of this kind are 
called staff rides or tactical rides; they may take a 
greater variety of forms than field maneuvers, for 
the reason that there are fewer actual conditions to 
hamper them. 

When the use of actual ground is not practicable, 
on account of bad weather, lack of transportation, or 



other causes, the ground may be supplanted by a 
map, and maneuvers may be conducted on the map 
in much the same way as field maneuvers and tactical 
rides. These exercises are called map maneuvers or 
war games. Map maneuvers do not constitute an 
art or science apart from the art of war. The ma- 
neuvers conducted by this method could be carried on 
in the field with troops if time, troops and ground 
were available. We merely substitute a map for the 
ground and blocks or pins for the troops; nor is any 
special knowledge— except of map reading— essential 
in order to conduct maneuvers on a map, which is 
not also essential in conducting field maneuvers. 

It is apparent that by this means opportunities 
for practice in maneuvers may be greatly extended. 
Maneuvers with troops are restricted to certain sea- 
sons of the year; they give practice in forming deci- 
sions and issuing orders to a few officers only; and 
restrictions in regard to the ground and troops avail- 
able often limit the number and value of the lessons 
which can be drawn from them. Map maneuvers, 
on the contrary, may be carried on at all seasons; 
may be extended and varied so as to give many 
officers opportunities to exercise command; present 
no difficulties in employing any number or kind of 
troops; and may be conducted on any ground of which 
we possess a suitable map. 

On first taking up exercises of this kind, a doubt 
may exist in the minds of some as to whether the 
operations of war can be represented on a map with 
sufficient accuracy to enable military students to de- 
rive lessons of practical value from them. Represen- 
tations of military operations on a map may be made 
more faithful in some respects than those conducted 
on actual ground with troops. We hesitate, in our 
field maneuvers, to require the men to undergo the 
fatigue and other hardships incident to war; and our 
maneuvers are usually conducted either on military 
reservations where normal conditions do not exist, or 



on ground which we are not permitted to use as we 
would do in war. In map maneuvers, on the other 
hand, we dig trenches, blow up bridges, burn towns, 
march troops over private grounds, and require them 
to make the exertions, undergo the hardships, and 
suffer the losses that must be expected in war. 

The effect of fire can be taken into account more 
accurately in map maneuvers than in field maneuvers. 
For instance, it may happen in a field maneuver that 
a battalion of infantry, advancing in column of 
squads, is fired on at 2500 yards by a battery which 
has learned the range, and the battalion continues to 
advance in this formation— not knowing that it has 
been fired on— and thus gains ground to the front too 
quickly. Such incongruities can be avoided in map 
maneuvers and a reasonable allowance can always be 
made for the effect of fire, because the director is 
better informed and has more perfect control of the 
exercise. 

Field maneuvers with troops form an indispen- 
sable part of an officer's training; they cannot be en- 
tirely replaced by exercises without troops; but officers 
who have had the most experience in handling troops 
are most readily interested in map maneuvers and 
are able to derive the greatest benefits f/om them, 
while officers who have seen troops handled but little, 
find difficulty in conducting map maneuvers and even 
in participating in them as commanders. 

Tactical rides do not impose so great a strain 
upon the imagination as map maneuvers and have 
the advantage of requiring a study of actual ground; 
but they are at the mercy of the weather and cannot 
be conducted so easily and rapidly as map maneuvers. 



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CHAPTER I 
UTILITY, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 



UTILITY 

Every operation of war, from patrolling to the 
conflicts of great armies, can be represented on a 
map, and map maneuvers are of the greatest value 
to the practical military student: — 

1. In supplementing field maneuvers and tacti- 
cal rides, thus giving officers increased opportunities 
for practice in conducting maneuvers and in forming 
the decisions and in issuing the orders incident to 
the command of troops. They afford opportunities 
for continuing the practical training and instruction 
of officers during the winter season and in inclement 
weather. For this purpose exercises are conducted 
by a director or umpire, officers being designated to 
command opposing bodies of troops, in accordance 
with a pre-arranged situation, and in a manner simi- 
lar to a field maneuver. In some cases one force 
only is represented, the enemy being outhned or 
imaginary. 

2. Map maneuvers draw upon all sources of 
military knowledge. They promote theoretical study 
— com.pel, and even give zest to the study of the 
dryest details of military art. By using problems 
suggested by events of actual battles and campaigns, 
they arouse an interest in the study of mihtary 
history, and impress upon the mind the lessons to be 
gained from it. 

3. Map maneuvers are useful aids in devising 
tactical problems and in preparing solutions of them 



— 2— 

by affording a means of analyzing military situations 
and testing the tactical measures suggested by them. 
One or two officers can "try out " a problem and a 
solution in this way by working continuously at the 
map, keeping all troops of both opposing forces 
represented, and dispensing with an umpire. 

4. As a rapid method of conveying instruction 
in tactics, the instructor may propose problems and 
then solve them himself in the presence of students, 
the movements and positions of troops being repre- 
sented on the map. The opinions of the students 
as to the measures which should be taken may be 
invited, and instruction may be given by means of a 
conversation in which all the students take part. 
This method is well exemplified in an article entitled 
"Une Manoeuvre sur la Carte " in the March, 1907, 
number of the Revue Militaire Generale. 

5. These methods of representing the move- 
ments of troops on a map are useful as an aid in the 
study of military history. They are used in the de- 
tailed studies of epochs of military history v/hich are 
conducted in the Army Staff College. This method 
is exemplified by the ' * Studies of the Battles of 
Colombey-Nouilly and Gravelotte," by Sir Lonsdale 
Hale. 

6. Map maneuvers also afford practice in map 
reading and in computations of the elements of time 
and space involved in military operations— practice 
of the greatest benefit to all officers. 

7. Map maneuvers furnish an excellent means 
of familiarizing officers with military geography. It 
is a significant fact that most of the war game maps 
used by the Germans are of their frontiers— the ones 
most used being of the country bordering on France. 

To the the Germans is due the credit of having 
originated map maneuvers and the German army has 
made greater use of them than any other. Their 



— 3— 

Field Service Regulations say: "The war game, 
tactical problems, lectures, winter essays, and tacti- 
cal rides all contribute to the mental training of 
officers. The war game and tactical problems awaken 
interest in the study of regulations, of tactics, and of 
military history, and afford opportunities for practice 
in forming decisions rapidly. In order to be bene- 
ficial, however, they must be conducted skillfully — 
by an officer specially fitted for it, selected without 
regard to length of service." (Par. 11, Introduction, 
F. D. 0., 1900.) From the fact that the war game 
is here mentioned first among the factors of an 
officer's mental training, Meckel argues that it is 
regarded as the. most important. 

8. As a practical means of keeping the com- 
manders of large bodies of troops informed of the 
military situation, and of the location of all parts of 
their commands, the methods of map maneuvers 
have a practical application in field maneuvers and in 
war. A hundred years ago Napoleon Bonaparte 
worked out the details of the concentration and 
deployment of his armies by maneuvering colored 
pins over a map of the theater of operations; and 
successful generals of the present day, notably the 
Japanese, are said to have used similar methods. 

Som^of the large business houses of this country 
keep in the office of the manager a large map of the 
United States on which are blocks bearing the names 
of their travehng agents, the blocks being moved 
daily to show the location of the agent; when the 
manager wishes to have business. attended to in any 
part of the country, he has only to glance at the map 
to get the address of his nearest agent and can tele- 
graph instructions to him without delay. * 

All are familiar with the method by which train 

*A system of state maps showing railroads, and colored tacks to show 
the location of traveling salesmen is sold by John W. Iliff, 171 B. Randolph 
Street, Chicago, Illinois. 



dispatchers keep informed of the location of trains— 
a method which is said to be used by the Army- 
Transport Service to show the location of transports. 

The recent development in the efficiency of our 
signal corps indicates that in future a commander 
will be able to communicate with all parts of his 
army m_ore directly and more promptly than has 
hitherto been thought possible. In order to derive 
the full benefit from this improved means of com- 
munication, the commander must keep himself con- 
stantly informed of the location of his troops. In 
the case of large forces this can be done only by 
representing troops on a map— by some such method 
as those used in map maneuvers. 

9. The greatest benefit to be derived from map 
maneuvers lies in the training which officers receive 
in forming decisions promptly, in issuing orders, and 
in writing messages and reports. Young officers 
may obtain through map maneuvers instruction and 
practice of this kind which they would not get in any 
other way. "The power of rapidly grasping a situ- 
ation, of being able quickly to come to a decision and 
at once issue clear and easily executed orders, more 
than the possession of any other faculty, brings suc- 
cess to a commander in the field. The development 
of this faculty ought to be the main objective of the 
training of combatant officers in peace." (Haig.) 

To officers who have spent years in subordinate 
grades without opportunities for exercising in- 
dependent command, map maneuvers may bring an 
increased interest in their profession and a higher 
respect for it by giving them opportunities to handle 
on a map the three arms combined in contact with 
an enemy. 

Maneuvers should go hand in hand with theoreti- 
cal military instruction. Purely theoretical instruction 
applies only to general cases— its rules and principles 



are only indications, totally insufficient for special 
and exceptional cases. In maneuvers an officer has 
opportunities to apply principles which he has learned 
and test their value. Theoretical instruction in mil- 
itary art has but little value if the student cannot 
utilize it; and it is only by the practical application 
of such knowledge that he can gain facility in its 
use. 

ORIQIN==WAR CHESS 

The game of chess is the oldest form of war 
game, and modern map maneuvers have grown out 
of the game of chess by a long process of evolution. 

In 1664, Christopher Weikhmann invented at 
Ulm a modification of the game of chess which he 
called "King's game". Each player was given 30 
pieces, as follows: 1 king, 1 marshal, 1 colonel, 1 
captain, 2 chancellors, 2 heralds, 2 chaplains, 2 knights, 
2 couriers, 2 adjutants, 3 body guards, 3 halbardiers 
and 8 private soldiers. The pieces had fourteen dif- 
ferent kinds of moves. The author stated that it 
was not designed to serve merely as a pastime but 
that it would furnish any one who studied it properly 
a compendium of the most useful military and politi- 
cal principles. This game was played for many years 
and was very popular among the German nobility. 

In 1770, a similar game appeared at Prague, in- 
vented by Hochenberger, which lived through several 
editions, the last appearing in 1814. 

In the latter part of the eighteenth century war 
was taught in Prussia as an exact science— a branch 
of applied mathematics resembling geometry. Von 
der Goltz says, ' 'A true strategist of that epoch did 
not know how to lead a corporal's guard across a 
ditch without a table of logarithms" (page 287, Ros- 
bach et Jena, V. der Goltz). 

In 1780, Helvng, a master of pages at the court 
of Brunswick, invented a m.odincation of the game 



of chess for the purpose of illustrating the principles 
of war. The pages under his charge were young 
noblemen destined for military service, and the game 
was invented as a m.eans of interesting and instruct- 
ing them in military science. Helwig said of it in a 
letter written in 1781: ''Numbers of military men, 
profound in the theoretical and practical science of 
their profession examined it ; ... they recognized 
in it a very efficacious means for attracting the at- 
tention of young men destined for military service, 
creating in them a taste for the service, and lessen- 
ing the difficulties of instruction." 

The game was played on a board divided into 
1,666 small squares tinted in various colors to repre- 
sent different kinds of ground, villages, lakes, etc. 
Troops were represented by pavv^ns similar to those 
used in chess; all the pieces represented either bat- 
talions of infantry or squadrons of cavalry. They 
moved and fought according to fixed rules similar to 
those of chess. Squares in opposite corners of the 
board represented fortifications, and the object of the 
game was to capture the fortress of the adversary. 

Helwig's game was a great success ; it attracted 
favorable comments everywhere and was introduced 
into France, Austria and Italy. A number -of imita- 
tions or variations of it appeared, among which may 
be specially noticed one invented in 1798 at Schleswig, 
by Georg Venturini, a writer on the science of war. 
Venturini's game was intended primarily for use in 
military schools and a revised edition of it appeared 
in 1804. Venturini was the first to break away from 
the chess board and make use of maps. The moves 
of the pieces were made to resem_ble the ordinary 
marches of troops, and the configuration of the 
ground was taken into account. In his edition of 
1804 Venturini says: "One should not call this 
officers' exercise a game,'- Of it Yon der Goltz says: 



-7— 

"It resembles very closely the game of 'poste et de 
voyage', in vogue a few years ago, in which, upon 
making an unlucky throw of the dice, one tumbles 
into a swamp, or breaks an axletree, or experiences 
some other such mishap. . . , This war game is a 
bad product of the refined military education of the 
period, which had piled up so many difficulties that 
it was incapable of taking a step in advance." 

Other inventors of war games during this stage 
of development were: Giacometti (1793), Rohrbek 
(1804), Opitz a806), Hoverbek (1806), Von Gloden 
(1817 — this was a sort of checker game with 128 
pieces on a side), Perhuhn (1818), Von Pilsach (1820 — 
a fortress game) and Plannen, a lieutenant in the 
Austrian army (1822). 

All of the war games of this period may be des- 
ignated as war chess. They probably illustrated the 
science of war, as taught at that time, better than it 
could have been represented on a map or on the 
ground. 

WAR GAME 

The credit of originating the war game is com- 
monly given to the Prussian War Counselor* von 
Reisswitz, a civilian, who in 1811 invented a game 
conducted on a terrain modeled in sand, troops being 
represented by blocks of wood. This game attracted 
the attention of the king (Frederick William III) and 
Von Reisswitz made for him an improved form of it, 
in which the terrain was modeled in relief in plaster, 
scale 1:2373— woods, villages, roads and water courses 
being shown with colors and the troop blocks made 
of porcelain. The king was greatly pleased with it 
and matches at this game were quite popular at his 
court. 

The honor of originating the war game should, 
however, be given to Lieutenant von Reisswitz, of 

*Kriegs undDomanenrat, war and state adviser. 



the Artillery of the Prussian Guard, a son of the von 
Reisswitz previously mentioned. This officer con- 
ceived the idea of adapting the game devised by his 
father to the details of actual military operations, 
thus making practical utility to military men its pri- 
mary object. 

With the assistance of other officers, he framed 
an elaborate system of rules, which were published 
in 1824 in a work entitled "Instruction for the Rep- 
resentation of Tactical Maneuvers Under the Guise 
of a War Game". It was a great step forward in 
that the exercises were to be conducted on maps, and 
that any military situation could be represented. 

This game was received with marked favor by 
the most distinguished Prussian officers. It is told 
that in 1824, Von Mueffiing, then Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff, consented to witness an exhibition of the 
game. He received the players somewhat coldly, but 
as the operations expanded on the map, the old gen- 
eral's face lit up, and at last he broke out with en- 
thusiasm: "It's not a game at all, it's a training 
for war; I shall recommend it most emphatically to 
the whole army." 

He kept his word, and a letter written by him 
which appeared in the "Militar Wochenblatt" in 
March, 1824, may be said to be the formal introduc- 
tion of the war gam_e to the Prussian army. Among 
other things he said: "Whoever understands the art 
of war can, in this game, perform the functions of a 
commander of troops . . . even if he ... has never 
seen the game played. By practicing on good maps 
representing a real terrain, and changing them, it 
becomes the more instructive, because it permits a 
variation in the dispositions to be made and the orders 
to be given. I shall endeavor by all means at my dis- 
posal to increase the number of maps now existing." 
The king directed that each regiment be supplied 



— 9— 

with one of these games and Lieutenant von Reiss- 
witz was employed to superintend the preparation of 
the new maps. The maps which he used were on a 
scale of 1:8000 and were as complete in details as 
they could be made, but shov/ed only four square 
miles of ground. The troops were represented by 
blocks cut to the scale of the map and painted, red 
for one party and blue for the other, and showing by 
conventional signs the strength and arm of service 
of the organizations represented. Only the troops 
supposed to be seen by the enemy were shown by 
blocks. 

The exercises were begun by giving to the com- 
manders general and special situations in writing, 
and requiring them to prepare written orders. It 
was carried on in "moves" of two minutes each, but 
when the opposing parties were not in contact the 
director could order several moves to be made at 
once. 

It is apparent that this exercise had many ex- 
cellent features and, no doubt, reflected the more 
rational views of the art of war which followed the 
Napoleonic era. Its weakness lay in its numerous 
and detailed rules, which demanded long preparation 
on the part of the director and confined the operations 
within narrow hmits. All decisions were made with 
the aid of dice, from which it resulted that the most 
carefully planned combinations would fail if the dice 
did not favor them. The remarks of Von Reisswitz 
on this subject are worthy of note: "It is not a 
question of winning or losing as in cards or chess, 
. . . the approbation of one's comrades is the only 
possible reward. Whoever follows out his plan best, 
adopts the simplest and most natural means to the 
end, and departs least from the general idea of the 
operation, will have won the match, even though he 
may have lost more pieces than his adversary. . . . 



—10— 

The advantages they will derive from it will be to 
acquire skill in reading maps, in the selection of 
movements best suited to the different arms of the 
service, in the choice of positions, etc. The interest- 
ing discussions which are sure to follow a match will 
be of incontestable value in the study of the military 
art." 

The war game retained in its main features the 
form given it by Von Reisswitz for half a century, 
and many of the changes made during that period 
were not improvements. 

Von Reisswitz'* game did not escape hostile 
criticism. The objection most frequently made was 
that young officers would be so spoiled by allowing 
them to com.mand brigades and divisions, even on a 
map, that they would lose their taste for company 
duty. 

In spite of the interest with which it was at first 
received and the favor with which it was regarded 
in the highest military quarters, it did not soon at- 
tain the popularity which was expected. It was 
not in general use in the Prussian army until 1860, 
though it was kept up by clubs in some of the larger 
garrisons. The members of the Magdeburg Club (of 
which Von Moltke was manager), of the Berhn Club, 
and the officers of the artillery of the Prussian 
Guard are mentioned as being specially expert during 
this period. 

In 1828, Von Moltke, then a lieutenant, was an 
industrious player, and later, v/hen he became chief 
of staff of the 4th Corps in 1840, exerted his efforts 
to promote the game, which he considered the best 
means of imparting military instruction. When he 
became Chief of the General Staff in 1857 he took 
steps to extend it throughout the army. 

*The attention which Von Keisswitz received excited the jealousy of 
other officers, and this resulted in his being transferred from the Guard and 
sent to a frontier fortress [TorgauJ. Disheartened by this injustice, he 
committed suicide there in 1827, 



—11- 

The prominent defect of the game was the slow- 
ness and difficulty with which it was conducted, 
owing to the great number and complicated character 
of the rules and tables employed, which destroyed 
interest in the exercises. Not only did they render 
the game difficult, but there was a tendency to ex- 
tend the application of general rules to cover par- 
ticular cases, which often destroyed the value of the 
exercises. Several able works on the subject 
were pubHshed during this period— notably those of 
Decker and Witzleben and one published by the 
Berlin War Game Club in 1846, Rules relating to 
the estimation of the effects of fire were completed 
and assumed greater importance; the rules became 
more numerous and complicated and the practice of 
the game became more difficult. 

The work of Von Tschischwitz which appeared 
in 1862 made some improvements in the way of less 
complicated rules and more practical methods of 
computing losses. The work of Von Trotha, which 
appeared in 1869, added a number of new rules and 
increased the difficulties. 

No war game rules of this period give the data 
upon which they are founded, but there is reason to 
beheve that the tables are almost purely theoretical 
and not based on the results of experience. 

At the conclusion of the wars of 1866 and 1870-71, 
German officers qualified by experience to form 
opinions on such a question agreed that the war 
game as then conducted did not represent the vary- 
ing circumstances of warfare in a satisfactory man- 
ner. The rules were already far too voluminous for 
convenient use, yet would demand great extension in 
order to obtain correct results. 

Meckel says: "After the war, when military 
ideas ran into more practical channels, when a gen- 
eral desire for practice and training in troop leading 



—12— 

existed, and the war game was encouraged by im- 
perial decree, it received a new, extraordinary, and 
universal enthusiasm — which, however, is not to be 
attributed to the old systems with their compHcated 
rules, but which rather existed in spite of them. It 
is a question whether in the German army there was 
a war game played in strict conformity with the 
rules. The exercises, under the leadership of officers 
of high rank who had no liking for the old systems, 
cut loose more or less from the cast iron rules and 
assumed, under a free leading, the form of serious 
exercises in the leading of troops." (Anleitung zum 
Kriegsspiel, Meckel, revision of 1904.) 

RIGID KRIEGSSPIEL 

Efforts to eradicate the defects of the game took 
two different directions, and resulted in two varieties 
of the game, called "Rigid" and "Free," respec- 
tively. Those who followed the "Rigid" method 
studied and tabulated the results of experience- 
particularly from the records of the wars of 1866 and 
1870-71. They endeavored to make the rules and 
tables accurate, and then to systematize them so that 
they could be more readily used. 

Perhaps the best known of them is Captain 
Naumann, whose work entitled "Das Regiments- 
kriegsspiel " appeared in 1877. His work contained 
some marked improvements in the mechanism of the 
game, but his system was still so complicated that 
few would have the patience to put it in practice. 
Captain Naumann originated the idea of selecting a 
standard case and deducing from it, by applying a 
suitable multiplier, the result to be expected in any 
particular case. An explanation of his method is to 
be found in our "Provisional Instructions for Maneu- 
vers (1904— Par. 40). 

The work of Colonel Livermore, U. S. Corps of 
Engineers, called "The American Kriegsspiel," is 



—13— 

based mainly on the system of Naumann, but it is a 
great extension of that system and in many respects 
an improvement upon it. Many more influences are 
taken into consideration by Colonel Livermore, and 
the game is thus rendered more flexible and a closer 
approximation to the conditions of war. Tables ex- 
pressing the value of these influences are more 
logically and compactly arranged and a more rapid 
method of computation devised, in which logarithms 
are used to facilitate the numerous processes of 
multiplication required. Dice are used to fix the 
value of influences which are uncertain or concern- 
ing which no data can be obtained. 

Colonel Livermore also devised an ingenious sys- 
tem of blocks, which not only represent troops to the 
scale of the map, but also show the condition of each 
unit in regard to fatigue and the losses which it has 
sustained — and thus obviate the necessity of keeping 
the cumbrous records which were formerly thought 
indispensable. 

It may be confidently stated that Colonel Liver- 
more's system is the best of its class; but it cannot 
be readily and intelligently used by any one v/ho is 
not a mathematician, and it requires, in order to be 
able to use it readily, an amount of special instruc- 
tion, study and practice about equivalent to that 
necessary to acquire a speaking knowledge of a 
foreign language. 

MAP MANEUVERS 

The evolution of modern map maneuvers from 
the old war game may be dated from the publication 
of three important works in Germany— through 
which a new system was continuously and progres- 
sively unfolded. 

These were "War Game Studies", by Lieutenant 
Meckel, an instructor in the war school at Hanover, 



—14— 

published in 1873; "Instructions for the War Game, " 
by the same author, published in 1875; and "A Con- 
tribution to the War Game," by Colonel von Verdy 
du Vernois, then Chief of Staff of the 1st Army 
Corps, published in 1876. 

Meckel's "War Game Studies" consists in great 
part of a demonstration of the usefulness of the war 
game as a means of imparting military instruction; 
and is a spirited plea in its favor, pointing out the 
necessity for a change in the manner of conducting it. 

His "Instructions for the War Game" emancipate 
the director from rules in conducting the exercise, but 
require him to consider the effect of fire— to be de- 
termined by the use of tables and dice. A revision 
of this work by Captain von Eynatten has appeared 
recently (1904) in which the tables of fire losses are 
omitted. 

It was Meckel's intention to follow the "Instruc- 
tions for the War Game" with a description of a con- 
crete case, illustrating his view as to the manner in 
which an exercise should be conducted: but Von 
Verdy 's "Contribution to the War Game" appeared 
shortly afterward, containing a description of a con- 
crete case which met Meckel's view so fully that he 
gave it his unqualified approval and did not complete 
his own. 

Von Verdy's work has been known in this coun- 
try since 1897 through the translation by Major Eben 
Swift, U. S. Army, entitled "A Simplified War 
Game."* Von Verdy made a more radical departure 
from the old methods than Meckel had done. He 
abandoned entirely moves of set length and the use 
of tables and dice— leaving the conduct of the exer- 
cise and all decisions to the judgment of the direct- 
or. 

It is apparent that by this system great responsi- 

*Published by Franklin Hudson Pub. Co., Kansas City, Mo. 



—15— 

bility is thrown upon the director, and the difficulty 
of obtaining sufficiently qualified directors has been 
urged as an objection to the system. Major C. W. 
Raymond, Corps of Engineers, U.S.A., says: "I 
think its inherent weakness is indicated in a sentence 
on the first page of Von Verdy's 'Contribution to 
Kriegsspiel' ; a book written with the avowed purpose 
of advocating its employment. Having remarked 
that in spite of the general recognition of the utility 
of Kriegsspiel the attempt to carry it on is often 
abandoned, the writer says, in seeking a reason for 
this, that he has in most cases received the answer, 
'There is no one here who understands how to con- 
duct it rightly'. If this be true as regards the old 
Kriegsspiel with its tables and copious instructions, 
what must be the case when the director is thrown 
upon his own knowledge for guidance in his decisions. 
However possible such an exercise may be in Ger- 
many, it will certainly be found generally impracti- 
cable in our own country. In Berlin, where there 
are officers of the General Staff, who devote their un- 
divided attention to the study of the art of war, it 
may be possible to obtain competent directors * * 
but in this country * * only in a few exceptional 
cases would it be possible to obtain a director, the 
superiority of whose experience and attainments 
would be so undoubted that his decisions would re- 
ceive unhesitating acceptance. * * * My own ex- 
perience as a director has convinced me that * * * 
the director, after he has conducted a few exercises, 
finds inevitably that he is acting in accordance with 
rules which he has consciously or unconsciously 
formed. Thus the choice we have to make is not be- 
tween rules and no rules, but between rules based 
upon the careful study of all available data, which 
have stood the test of practice and the fire of criti- 
cism, and rules extemporized by a single authority. 



—16— 

to be accepted without demonstration, and to be 
varied by every new director." (Kriegsspiel, by 
Captain C. W. Raymond, C.E.) 

Major Barth says of Free Kriegsspiel, "Where 
competent umpires can be obtained, this system will 
do passably well. But, to fill the position acceptably, 
the umpire should have had extensive experience in 
modern war and should have mastered its teachings 
so as to apply them in making his decisions. It at 
once becomes apparent that men whose dictum would 
be received without question are few in number in 
any country, and especially so in our own. * * * As 
it is admitted that fire action will be the leading fac- 
tor in deciding encounters of every kind except cav- 
alry charging * * *, every effort should be made to 
ascertain what the resulting losses will be." (Ma- 
neuvers and Kriegsspiel, Vol. XIII, Journal, M.S.I.) 

The opinions of these able officers, based as they 
are on study and experience, compel respect. But 
Rigid Kriegsspiel has been found by the Germans, 
who have given it a thorough trial, to be too great a 
strain upon the patience; and we have less patience 
than the Grermans. Efforts to introduce Rigid Kriegs- 
spiel into our army have not been attended with 
success. Von Verdy's system has stood the test 
of practice for many years and is the only system in 
general use today. Recent publications on this sub- 
ject by German, French, and British authorities 
follow Von Verdy in all essential particulars. 

The officers of foreign armies derive both plea- 
sure and profit from maneuvers on the map— con- 
ducted by this method; and, since a more general 
interest has been aroused in the study of military art 
by our garrison and service schools, it is believed 
that such exercises will prove interesting to our 
officers as well, and that less difficulty will now be 
found in obtaining competent directors. Difficulty 



—17- 

also exists in obtaining- good umpires for our field 
maneuvers, but no one supposes that field maneuvers 
will be ' discontinued on that account, or that the 
methods of Rigid Kriegsspiel should be used in them. 

We have many officers who are able to conduct 
field maneuvers in such a manner as to make them 
interesting and instructive to all concerned; and the 
same officers (if familiar with map reading) would 
make excellent directors in map maneuvers con- 
ducted by the Von Verdy method. Even if the 
director should make decisions, as to the effect of 
fire, etc., which appear erroneous, the exercise is not 
necessarily rendered unprofitable. 

In Rigid Kriegsspiel the value of the undeter- 
mined factors is fixed in each particular case by 
throwing dice. Suppose that in -an exercise at Free 
Kriegsspiel the director decides an attack to be 
repulsed when a more thorough examination of the 
conditions shows that it would probably succceed: the 
same decision might have been reached by the 
methods of Rigid Kriegsspiel if the dice did not 
favor the attack. The decisions of a director cannot 
be more erratic and' unexpected than are the actual 
events of war. 

Map maneuvers, as well as field maneuvers, 
should always be followed by a full discussion; by 
this means erroneous decisions will usually be de- 
tected and their evil effects eradicated. 

In an essay (1906) on the subject of "Maneuvers 
and the Duties of Umpires," Colonel Livermore 
recommends that umpires at field maneuvers should 
use tables and computations similar to those to be 
found in his work, ' ' The American Kriegsspiel ' ' ; 
and, indeed, it does appear that they are quite as 
necessary to field maneuvers as they are to map 
maneuvers. On this point Colonel Wagner's report 
of the field maneuvers of 1903 at West Point, Ky, , 



—18— 

and Fort Riley, Kas., says: "A table of losses was 
carefully prepared for the use of the umpires. 
Such tables, while very valuable in a game of kriegs- 
spiel,* are of but little account in maneuvers in the 
field. * * * In most cases the action moves so 
quickly that the umpire is compelled to make his 
decisions instantly, without time for referring to 
a table, and the best that can be done is to endeavor 
to rectify any mistakes that may thus be made when 
the problem is finally discussed. " 

The objections here stated to precise computa- 
tions of losses apply also to map maneuvers; for the 
delay caused by such computations would rob the 
maneuvers of their interest; and, since the time 
available for these exercises is always limited, would 
often prevent them from being carried far enough to 
be instructive. 

Free and Rigid Kriegsspiel have tended to ap- 
proach each other in recent years. In the last edition 
(1898) of Colonel Livermore's work, he says, — "It 
cannot be too strongly stated that * * * computations 
not only need not, but must not be made in every case. 
They are intended to facilitate and hasten the game, 
and should not be so perverted as to retard it. The 
reduction in the rate of march can almost always be 
estimated; only the important factors should be con- 
sidered in modifying the effect of fire; unimportant 
fires should be neglected; the fatigue may be neg- 
lected until the players show a disposition to force 
the troops; * * * and the loss of ammunition need 
only be expressed when there appears to be difficulty 
about replenishing it. ' ' (p. 26, American Kriegsspiel). 

Major Raymond says, — "We find the writers on 
Free Kriegsspiel occasionally admitting that rules and 
tables may sometimes be useful; and on the other 
hand, the advocates of Rigid Kriegsspiel generally be- 

*The Kriegsspiel referred to here is, of course, Rigid Kriegsspiel. 



—19 - 

gin with the statement that these rules and tables 
are intended to be merely of an advisory character 
and that the director should proceed without them 
whenever his personal knowledge suffices for the 
occasion. The distinction between the two systems 
is, indeed, largely one of degree; yet it is sufficiently 
marked to justify its recognition. " (p. 3, Kriegsspiel). 
Data in regard to the effect of fire, rates of 
march, etc., etc., are of great interest and value to all 
officers, especially to those who expect to act as um- 
pires at maneuvers, but the practice of referring to 
such data during the progress of a maneuver— either 
in the field or on the map— has been universally dis- 
continued. 

MODERN GERMAN KRIEGSSPIEL 

The Germans have maintained a leading place in 
the production of literature relating to the war game. 
The most notable modern German works on the sub- 
ject—those which are of importance to the military 
student of the present day— are the following: 

Taktische Aufgaben ftir Kriegsspiel, E. Zoellner, 
(1898); 

Winke und Ratschlage ftir die Leitung des Regi- 
ments Kriegsspiel, Von Zimmerman (1901); 
-r Das Regiments Kriegsspiel, Immanuel (1903); 

Das Kriegsspiel, Anregungen, Erfahrungen und 
Beispiele, Anonymous (1903); 

Taktische Aufgaben, Immanuel (1904); 

Anleitung zum Kriegsspiel, Meckel, revised by 
VonEynatten (1904);- 

Anlage und Leitung von Kriegsspielen, Oberlin- 
dober (1904); 

Einfiihrung in den Betrieb des Kriegsspiels, Von 
Litzmann (1905); 

Das Kriegsspiel, Von Altrock (1908). 

Only one of these works has been translated into 
Enghsh. A translation of Immanuel's Das Regi- 



—20— 

ments Kriegsspiel, by Lieutenant Krueger, U. S. 
Army, appeared in 1908 under the title of ' 'The Reg- 
imental War Game", published by the Franklin Hud- 
son Pubhshing Company, of Kansas City, Mo. 

In the German army these exercises are carried 
on at the headquarters of each regiment and detached 
battalion under the name of the "regimental war 
game" (das regiments kriegsspiel); they are obliga- 
tory and one evening per week during the winter 
months is devoted to them. The regimental war 
game is conducted on maps of scales from 1:5000 to 
1:8000 (12 to 8 inches to the mile) and includes ma- 
neuvers in minor tactics and the operations of detach- 
ments composed of all arms up to the strength of a 
brigade. The older officers of a regiment and the 
lesser staffs (corps and division) carry on tactical ma- 
neuvers called "Great Kriegsspiel" in which maps of 
a scale of 1:10,000 (6 inches to a mile) are ordinarily 
used and v/hich include the operations of mixed bri- 
gades, divisions and larger forces. In addition a 
"strategical war game" is carried on by the General 
Staff, which is intended mainly for the instruction 
and training of staff officers; — for this, the general 
staff maps, scale 1:100,000 (about § inches to 1 mile) 
are used. 

INTRODUCTION IN OTHER ARMIES 

After the war of 1866 the war game was cultiva- 
ted extensively in Austria, and the war of 1870-71 
opened the eyes of all Europe to its importance. In 
1872 Captain Baring of the Royal Artillery prepared 
for the British service a set of rules based mainly on 
the work of Von Tschischwitz. In his preface Cap- 
tain Baring says: "The increased importance which 
is now attached to the game may be, in some meas- 
ure, due to the feeling that the great tactical skill 
displayed by the Prussian officers in the late war had 



—21— 

been, at least partially, acquired by means of the in- 
struction which the game affords." The work of 
Captain Baring was used as a guide in this country 
for many years, notably at West Point where the 
game was played a great deal. 

Captain Shaw conducted in England in 1877 a 
war game on a terrain modeled in relief in plaster on 
a large scale (1:720). The war game was officially in- 
troduced into the British army by the Duke of Cam- 
bridge in an order dated October 3, 1883. A pamph- 
let entitled "Rules for the Conduct of the War Game 
on a Map," was published officially to the British 
army in 1896. A later edition of these "Rules" was 
published in 1899. Rules for the conduct of the war 
game are now incorporated in the British Field Ser- 
vice Regulations (Combined Training). The war 
game is not miade compulsory by orders from the War 
Office, but orders with reference to it, prescribing 
the character of the exercises and the frequency with 
which they are to be held, are issued by the comman- 
ders of military districts. War gamiCS involving the 
employment of large forces are conducted on maps 
whose scale is one inch to one mile; sm.aller exercises, 
involving only tactical questions, on maps six inches 
to one mile. 

Since the whole of Great Britain has been 
mapped on both of these scales the problems may be 
laid in any part of the country. Each military dis- 
trict has its own war game maps, and exercises are 
often begun with large forces on the one inch scale 
map, arranging the problem so that hostile contact 
will take place within reach of the garrison. De- 
tails are then followed out either on the six inch 
maps as tactical war games or on the actual ground 
as tactical rides. War games are sometimes held for 
the purpose of illustrating certain phases of military 
history, and sometimes to familiarize officers with 



—22— 

certain tracts of country. The naval war game is 
used a great deal in England; it is conducted by ex- 
cellent methods which have been originated by Brit- 
ish naval officers. 

The war game was first introduced in our army 
in 1867, shortly after the conclusion of the civil war. 
It was kept up voluntarily at a number of garrisons 
—notably at West Point. Interest in it was promo- 
ted by the organization of the Infantry and Cavalry 
School at Fort Leavenworth in 1881; exercises were 
carried on voluntarily there by officers on duty at the 
school. A knowledge of the game was extended by 
the publication of Colonel (then Major) Livermore's 
' 'American Kriegsspiel, ' ' which first appeared in 1883 
and ran through several editions, the last appearing 
in 1898, 

Upon the organization of the Army Staff College 
at Fort Leavenworth in 1904, the war game was 
made a part of the course of instruction in that Col- 
lege. It was made a part of the course of instruction 
in the Army School of the Line in 1907. It now forms 
an important part of the work of the Post Graduate 
Schools at a great number of army posts. 

The war game has been kept up in the Austro- 
Hungarian army since 1866 and was made obligatory 
at an early date. Orders from the War Office direct 
that all officers and cadets of the Austro-Hungarian 
army receive instruction in the war game. This in- 
struction is given from about the middle of Novem- 
ber to about the 1st of March in each garrison, under 
the supervision of the senior officer present or of a 
specially selected officer. About three hours a week 
are devoted to this work. 

In Italy, instructions, based mainly on the work 
of Von Trotha, were published by the General Staff in 
1873, under the designation "Maneuvers on the Map" 
as they are officially called, Map maneuvering is a 



—23- 

part of the professional examinations for the grade of 
captain and field officer. Preparation is made for 
map maneuvers by instruction in map reading, calcu- 
lation of the time required for different movements 
of troops, and by map problems. In the War College 
map maneuvers are held about forty evenings of the 
third (and last) years course. It is used as a means 
of instruction in logistics and in the work of General 
Staff officers. In the Great General Staff (corpo di 
stato maggiore) officers who are expected to act as 
intendents, commanders of bases, and to fill various 
staff positions in case of war are trained in the du- 
ties pertaining to these positions by applicatory map 
maneuvers. Tactical and staff rides and discussions 
on the terrain are frequently held. 

Kriegsspiel was introduced in France in 1874 and 
for a time acquired a certain vogue in several army 
corps; at the garrison of Besancon two war games 
were kept up during the winter of 1874-5 and at Paris 
war games were frequently held. They were defi- 
nitely taken up as a means of instruction at the 
French War College in 1889. Ministerial instructions 
relating to map maneuvers (Exercices sur la Carte) 
were issued February 20, 1895, but did not make 
them obligatory except in the staffs. Major Ch. 
Henrionnet, writing in 1898, says that after a few 
years of half-hearted and isolated efforts the war 
game had fallen into disuse in the line of the army 
and was then scarcely known in France outside the 
War College and the staffs. Map maneuvers were 
made obligatory in regiments and garrisons in April, 
1900, and improved methods of conducting them, de- 
veloped by experience at the War College, have been 
extended throughout the army. 

Early efforts to conduct map maneuvers in France 
were hampered by a lack of suitable maps. The ma- 
neuvers were conducted, until recently, on the etat= 



major map, scale 1:80,000, which does not show the 
configuration of the ground in sufficient detail to 
permit the movements and formations of troops to be 
accurately considered. In 1905, a map was specially 
prepared for map maneuvers, called the "Commercy- 
Metz" map; its scale is 1:10,000 and it is merely an 
eight-fold enlargement of a portion of the etat-major 
map. 

In Russia, war games form part of the course of 
instruction of officers during the winter months. By 
War Department Orders No. 28 of 1875 and No. 71 of 
1876 the systematic instruction of officers was to be 
taken up by means of written exercises and lectures 
on tactics under the direction of regimental and bat- 
talion commanders. War games were to be held in 
conjunction with this instruction whenever sufficient 
time, rooms and other facilities were available. 
When commanding officers required assistance in 
conducting war games, general staff officers from the 
staffs of divisions, corps, and military districts were 
to be sent to them for this purpose. By means of war 
games officers were to be taught map reading, tacti- 
cal formations, the attack and defense of positions, 
the quartering, protection and marching of troops. 
War Department Orders No. 259 of 1882 and No. 62 
of 1903 relate to the same subject. In 1903 a war 
game map, scale 1:8400, was made by General 
Scheweljew. In the large garrisons and at the head- 
quarters of general officers, great war games or fort- 
ress war games are conducted by the older officers 
each year. At St. Petersburg, naval war gam.es are 
held. A scarcity of good directors has been noted 
and consequently, since 1903, in addition to general 
officers and general staff officers, line officers have 
been trained to perform this duty; but not m_ore than 
fifteen evenings in a winter are devoted to war games. 
War games are also used for the purpose of testing 



—25— 

the fitness of officers for promotion. The results at- 
tained have not been all that was desired, and it is 
stated in War Department Orders No. 85 of 1903 that 
the causes of this failure are: — the inability of the 
directors to arouse interest in the games; too much 
adherance to fixed models; a scarcity of good direc- 
tors; a lack of interest on the part of the higher com- 
manders; and insufficient familiarity of the partici- 
pants with the tactical handling of the three arms. 

The Russians are now trying hard to remedy 
these defects, and, since the war in Manchuria, the 
higher officers have taken greater interest in the war 
game. 

In Turkey war games are prescribed by Par. 11 
of their Field Service Regulations, but are actually 
held in only a few garrisons where they are directed 
by officers educated in Germany. 

The war game was introduced in the Japanese 
army by General Meckel. Japanese translations of 
the works of Meckel and Von Verdy are used by the 
Japanese officers. Great stress is laid on the value 
of the war game as a means of instructing officers 
throughout the Japanese army — especially in the Jap- 
anese War College. 

NAVAL WAR GAME 

The naval war game antedates the war game for 
land forces by many years. The theater of opera- 
tions in a naval battle m.ay be regarded as a plane 
surface and may be represented by a black board or 
a sheet of paper. The tactical naval game was con- 
sequently not hampered in its development in the 
same way as was the tactical game for land forces, 
which did not attain real value until maps were pro- 
duced which showed the configuration of the ground. 

In the strategical naval game, maps are used 
which are of smaller scale than can be profitably used 



—26— 

for land forces; this greatly extends the area that 
can be considered, and operations in widely separated 
parts of the world are sometimes handled in the same 
game. 

In the development of the naval game British 
authorities have taken the lead, as was to be expected 
of a people possessing the greatest navy in the world. 
The naval war game was introduced in this country 
in 1886, and is now an important part of the work of 
our Naval War College. 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 

Von Verdy's system aroused a great deal of oppo- 
sition at the outset, but it has steadily gained ground 
until it has replaced all others. The general features 
of his system have not changed, but map maneuvers 
have undergone more rapid development as a mili- 
tary exercise in the last twenty years than in any 
other period of equal length in their history. 

It came to be realized that the old war game 
maps, which were maps of battle fields — intended to 
illustrate certain situations— did not give sufficient 
scope for maneuvers; and that "ideal" maps produced 
one-sided situations and gave an air of unreality to 
the exercises. As a result, maps have been made 
specially for map maneuvers, which have added 
greatly to their value. These are topographical 
maps of tracts of real ground made on suitable scales, 
large enough to give freedom of action to the troops 
represented, and of sufficiently varied ground to 
illustrate any situation or operation of war. 

Tactical rides, as conducted in the German army, 
have had an important influence upon the conduct of 
the war game. Von Verdy attributes the origin of 
his method of conducting the war game (Free Kriegg- 
spiel) to his experience in tactical rides. These are 
exercises in which officers carry on the operations of 



—27— 

imaginary bodies of troops over actual ground, writ- 
ing the orders and messages that would be required 
if the troops were real. Since dice, moves of fixed 
length, formal rules and tables were not used in 
these exercises and troops were not represented, it 
became apparent that dice, etc, were not necessary 
in map maneuvers, which are similar exercises con- 
ducted on a map; and that blocks, while useful in 
illustrating situations, were not indispensable. 

Thus while greater importance is attached to the 
excellence and variety of the maps used, less impor- 
tance is attached to the other accessories of the game, 
—blocks, dice, tables, rules, etc. 

In tactical exercises the ponderous three-map game 
has nearly disappeared and now, as a rule, but one 
large-scale map is used by all the participants. In 
addition each of the participants is usually provided 
with such small scale maps of the theater of opera- 
tions as they would be likely to be provided with in 
war; and, as a rule, are permitted to see the large 
scale map (which takes the place of the ground) only 
while situations are being explained and while they 
are issuing orders. Commanders are not, as a rule, 
permitted to move the blocks representing their 
troops, and the "move" (zug) of uniform length has 
been abandoned. Tables and fixed rules, as part of 
the mechanism of the exercises, have entirely dis- 
appeared. Dice are still used by some of the older 
officers in Germany but are losing ground. The pre- 
sentation of military situations, the formation of 
military decisions, and the issue of military orders 
are the predominant features of the exercises. 

More attention has been given to the selection of 
problems with a view to systematic and progressive 
instruction, and the exercises have become in reahty 
what Von Muefifling divined in 1824— a serious means 
of preparation for war. 



—28— 
THE GAME FEATURE 

Although map maneuvers owe their origin to a 
game, the game feature is no longer an important 
element of them. A predominance of the game idea 
has alwaj^s been an obstacle to the proper develop- 
ment of these exercises as a means of military in- 
struction and training. Through the influence of 
the game idea, the exercises have often been car- 
ried farther than was necessary or profitable. In 
order to ascertain which of two parties of players 
would be the winners it was necessary to push an 
engagement through to a decision; and in order that 
no injustice might be done to either side, computa- 
tions of losses were made, and accurate records kept 
by a definite and uniform system. The dice, tables 
and rules served to secure fairness to the players and 
to clear the director of suspicion of bias; but when 
the idea that the map maneuver is a sort of game — in 
which one merely plays to win— is set aside these con- 
siderations lose their importance. 

The game idea manifests itself at field maneu- 
vers as well as in'those conducted on the map. At the 
conclusion of a field maneuver those interested are 
heard to ask, "Who won, the Blues or the Browns?" 
and it seems to be a general impression that the prin- 
cipal function of the umpire is to award the palm of 
victory to one side or the other. 

The questions which we should keep uppermost 
in maneuvers are, — What principles of the art of 
war are illustrated? Have the troops been handled 
to the best advantage? What other dispositions 
might have been made? The question as to which 
side has the advantage at the close of the maneuver 
is relatively unimportant, and may be due to un- 
foreseen circumstances. Maneuvers do not alwayi 
result in a combat and it is often possible for both 
parties to execute their missions successfully. The 



—29— 

movements of troops prior to the establishment of 
contact and those made during the early stages of 
an engagement are often more instructive than the 
subsequent course of the maneuver. 

If it is desired to continue a field exercise after 
close contact has been established, a decision must 
usually be made as to the conduct of the troops — as, 
for instance, that one party or the other must retire, 
that one or both cannot advance until reinforced, 
etc. ; but an estimate of the probable losses is useful 
only as a guide in rendering such a decision. After 
close contact has been established, however, a field 
maneuver generally loses resem.blance to an opera- 
tion of war and ceases to be instructive. This is not 
true of map maneuvers to the same degree, for the 
reason, as previously stated, that the director has 
the exercise under better control and is better able 
to determine the probable effect of fire. But the 
time which can be devoted to a single maneuver on a 
map is limited and does not often permit the maneu- 
ver to be carried through to the total defeat of one 
of the parties. In order to give a needful variety of 
instruction, too great a proportion of the available 
time should not be devoted to the consideration of 
the closing stages of battles. 

A few hundred years ago battles were fought by 
common consent of both armies, and the art of war 
was limited to the battle field. But at the present 
day the most important movements of troops gen- 
erally take place out of sight of the enemy, and 
these we can feel sure of representing faithfully on 
a map; but we cannot feel so sure of representing 
correctly the latter stages of a combat, for no one 
can tell with certainty the manner in which future 
battles will be fought. 

THE TITLE 

The idea that a map maneuver is a kind of game 
has always been harmful to this class of military ex- 



—30— 

ercises. As already pointed out it leads to a multi- 
plicity of technical rules which obscure the real 
purpose. The term "war game" probably has 
something to do with this misconception and has led 
many to believe that it is a form of amusement. 

The originator of the war game (Von Reisswitz) 
disliked the name and realized its unsuitability. It 
had been applied to the "war chess" games which 
existed before his time, and he retained it only be- 
cause he could not at that time find one more suit- 
able. The designation "map maneuvers," used in 
France and Italy, describes more aptly the nature 
and aim of these exercises. 

It has been hoped by some enthusiasts that map 
maneuvers would prove so attractive and entertain- 
ing that they would gain a footing as a popular form 
of amusement among our officers;* but in the forty 
years which have elapsed since their introduction 
into our army, it does not appear that any notable 
progress has been made in that direction. The 
armies which derive any considerable benefit from 
them regard them as a military duty. 

*Meckel entertained this opinion in regard to German officers. In his 
" Instructions for the War Game " (1875) he says: " It is recommended that 
the practice of the war game be not made compulsory. A sense of duty will 
impel the superior officers to take up the game with enthusiasm, and the 
practice of the game will extend on account of the pleasure they find in it." 



CHAPTER II 



MAPS AND MATERIAL 



CLASSIFICATION 

The most important accessory of a map maneuver 
is the map: upon it the character and success of the 
maneuver, in a great measure, depend. 

The map is to the map maneuver what the ground 
is to the field maneuver, and, to some extent, the 
same considerations apply to both. For instance, 
Meckel says: "The most instructive situations are 
to be found on maps showing a varied terrain with 
numerous hills, villages, farms and small woods. A 
map showing nothing but a level piece of country, or 
forest only, or merely rough high hills, is unsuitable. 
A map which embraces a large tract of country nat- 
urally off ers variety, " etc. (Anleitung zum Kriegs- 
spiel, 1904.) 

The development of map maneuvers in the past 
twenty years has been marked chiefly by the im- 
provement in the maps used. The maps formerly 
used were maps of battlefields— prepared for histor- 
ical purposes. They were only large enough to show 
certain phases of the battle and were too limited in 
extent for maneuvers. "Ideal" maps showing imag- 
inary tracts of ground were also formerly used.* 
The new maps are prepared especially for map ma- 
neuvers and show large tracts of actual ground; they 
have entirely supplanted the old maps in all European 

*Meckers early works were accompanied by an "ideal" map; the map 
which accompanied Col. Livermore's "American Kriegspiel" was of the 
same kind, 

31 



—32- 

armies. The new maneuver maps are free from the 
checker board squares with which the old maps 
were covered, and seem to have lost nothing of 
value by discarding them. 

As the value of the maneuver is dependent upon 
the excellence of the map, the character of the ma- 
neuver is controlled by its scale. The most natural 
classification of map maneuvers therefore is that 
based upon the map used. Meckel divides map ma- 
neuvers into three classes: 

1. The regimental war game, embracing ma- 
neuvers in minor tactics and tactical exercises from 
the conduct of patrols to the operations of detach- 
ments of all arms less in size than a division; for 
these he considers maps of scales from 1:5000 to 
1:6250 (12 to 10 inches to one mile) the most suitable. 
The name "regimental" is due to the fact that exer- 
cises of this character are carried on at the head- 
quarters of each regiment (and detached battalion) 
in the German army. 

2. The great war game— devoted chiefly to the 
operations of divisions. As the division is the small- 
est independent unit— complete in all arms and ad- 
ministrative staff — its operations, transportation, 
supply, etc., may embrace a wide range of military 
problems. For the great war game he considers 
maps of a 1:10,000 scale (about 6 inches to 1 mile) 
most suitable. These maneuvers are carried on by 
the older officers in each regiment and by the lesser 
staffs (corps and division), 

3. The strategic war game embraces the opera- 
tions of armies, and is conducted on the General Staff 
maps, scale 1:100,000 (about § inch to 1 mile) by the 
General Staff at Berlin. This exercise is intended 
chiefly for the instruction and training of general 
staff officers. Battles are not carried into details, 



-33— 

but are considered incidentally— chiefly with a view 
to their results. 

No systematic division of map maneuvers has 
been made in our army, but the following seems to 
be suitable: 

1. Maneuvers in Minor Tactics — embracing tac- 
tical exercises from patrolling to the operations of 
small detachments of all arms, for use at army posts 
and the Army School of the Line — maps on a scale 
of twelve inches to a mile, with contours at a vertical 
interval of five feet. 

2. Maneuvers in Grand Tactics — embracing the 
employment of large detachments of all arms and of 
divisions, for the older officers at the larger posts and 
for the Army Staff College— maps on a scale of six 
inches to a mile, with contours at a vertical interval 
of ten feet. 

3. Strategic maneuvers — embracing the opera- 
tions of armies, for the Army War College — maps of 
the U. S. Geological Survey, scale 1:62,500 (about one 
inch to 1 mile). 

In general, the more minutely we wish to con- 
sider the details of mihtary operations the larger 
should be the scale of the map; but it is believed that 
the foregoing arrangement would meet our needs 
without unnecessary multiplication of scales. 

In maneuvers in minor tactics it is often desir- 
able to represent the fronts of units in line and their 
depth in column by blocks, pieces of cardboard, etc., 
cut to correspond to the scale of the map used, in 
order to indicate accurately the space covered by 
them. This can not be conveniently done in the case 
of small units when the scale of the map is less than 
twelve inches to a mile. 

On maps whose scale is twelve inches to a mile 
the smallest units may be represented — down to the 
individual soldier; contours may be drawn at a verti- 



-34- 

cal interval of five feet without unduly crowding the 
map, thus permitting nearly all folds of the ground 
which are of tactical importance to be shown; and 
nearly all natural and artificial features of tactical 
importance can be shown to scale, thus avoiding 
much of the distortion of conventional signs. 

Maneuver maps should be original, that is, drawn 
directly from the ground and not merely enlarge- 
ments of smaller scale maps; for the process of en- 
largement multiplies errors, adds nothing to the in- 
formation which the map contains, and leaves the 
map scant of needful information which the scale 
permits. 

Maneuver maps should not be too small. In using 
a small map it sometimes happens that when one 
force has taken up a position the other cannot appear 
on the map without creating abnormal situations such 
as opposing batteries taking first positions within 
1000 yards of each other, or a force gaining an ab- 
normally strong defensive position by merely resting 
a flank on the edge of the map. Small maps offer 
little choice of measures in forming decisions, and 
give but little freedom of movement. 

The continuous use of the same map is objection- 
able, as it leads to an abnormal familiarity with dis- 
tances, features of tactical importance, etc., and 
makes it difficult to provide that variety in the exer- 
cises which is necessary to sustain interest. Besides, 
any one map is likely to favor unduly a particular 
arm and to lead to conclusions which may be correct 
in some instances but which are not of general appli- 
cation.* 

AMERICAN MAPS 

The oldest maneuver map of American ground— 
made especially for map maneuvers— is a map of the 

*See p. 157, "Duties of the General Staff", Von Schellendorf, 4th edi- 
tion (1905) , British translation. 



—35— 

vicinity of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, compiled in 1906 
from surveys made by student officers of the Army 
Staff College. It embraces a tract about four miles 
in width and six miles in length; the scale is 12 
inches to one mile and the contour interval is ten 
feet. It shows a diversified terrain and can be used 
for a variety of tactical exercises. Copies can be 
obtained by application to the Secretary of the Army 
Service Schools, A charge of 80 cents for the map 
unmounted, or $1.75 mounted on muslin is made to 
cover the cost of materials. Printed reproductions 
of this map reduced to a scale of four inches to one 
mile may also be obtained from the Secretary of the 
Army Service Schools. A two inch scale map show- 
ing a tract about eighteen miles long and twelve 
miles wide in the vicinity of Fort Leavenworth can 
also be obtained from him and is suitable for use as a 
guide map. 

The "Oskaloosa" and ''Kansas City" sheets of 
the Geological Survey map of Kansas, scale 1:125,000, 
are also available for use in connection with the 
"Fort Leavenworth" maneuver map; but a larger 
scale map (about one inch to the mile) of the country 
within ten miles of Fort Leavenworth is now being 
prepared by the U. S. Geological Survey. It is the 
intention of the Department of Military Art of the 
Army Service Schools to have this map reproduced on 
a scale of twelve inches to the mile and made com- 
plete in ail essential details for use in map maneu- 
vers. 

Twenty sheets of this map, showing ground east 
of the Missouri river, have been completed and can 
be obtained from the Secretary, Army Service 
Schools. It is expected that thirty-six more sheets 
will be completed during the present year. Each 
sheet is eighteen inches square and covers a tract 
one and a half miles square. The map is sold for 5 



—36- 

cents a sheet unmounted, 9 cents a sheet mounted on 
muslin, and 13 cents a sheet mounted on card board. 

A still larger and in many respects preferable 
maneuver map, scale twelve inches to one mile, is 
being made at the Army Service Schools. This is a 
map of the country in the vicinity of Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania; twenty sheets of it have been com- 
pleted and it is expected that sixty more will be 
completed during the present year. It is proposed 
to extend this map southward into Maryland. It will 
cover a diversified tract of typical American terrain, 
comprising a gently rolling agricultural region, hilly 
country, and a chain of mountains with numerous 
forests; it will provide our army with a maneuver 
map of our own terrain superior to any that we now 
possess; will enable us to represent almost every kind 
of warfare, and will, moreover, provide facilities for 
the detailed study of the history of the Antietam and 
Gettysburg campaigns of 1862 and 1863. 

A photographic reduction of this map, scale 
three inches to one mile, is also being made. This 
will be very useful in framing problems for the 
larger map and in following the movements of bodies 
of troops which are widely separated or cover large 
areas. 

The most suitable guide map for use with this 
maneuver map is the U. S. Geological Survey map, 
scale 1:62,500; the "Gettysburg" and "Fairfield" 
sheets of which have been recently completed. 

It will be observed that, instead of making a 
large number of small maneuver maps, two large ones 
are being made. This course will provide maps 
which will give freedom of action to commanders, 
and will enable us to represent large armJes or 
widely dispersed forces, while, for small forces, a 
variety of terrain may be secured by using differ- 
ent portions of the map. 



. —37— 

A large scale map (about thirteen inches to one 
mile) has been made of the country in the vicinity of 
Washington by the Coast and Geodetic Survey, which 
may be used in map maneuvers. All features of the 
ground are shown in great detail; the contour interval 
is five feet. Fifty-eight sheets of this map, each 
representing one square mile of ground, have been 
completed. The map can be purchased from the 
Superintendent, U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 
at a price of 10 cents per sheet. A special map of 
the vicinity of Washington, scale 1:62,500, made by 
the U. S. Geological Survey, could be conveniently 
used with it as a guide map. 

A map of the Chickamauga National Park, pre- 
pared by the Park Commission in 1896-1901, scale 
eight inches to one mile, contour interval ten feet, 
shows in great detail a tract about three miles wide 
and four miles long. It has been used as a maneuver 
map, though its size restricts" its use to problems in 
minor tactics, and the fact that the greater part of 
the park is covered by forest limits its value. Copies 
can be obtained from Julius Bien & Co., 140 Sixth 
Avenue, New York. The "Ringgold" sheet of the 
Geological Survey map of Georgia, scale 1:125,000, 
can be used with it as a guide map. 

A detailed topographical map of the battlefield of 
Gettysburg, showing a tract about five miles square, 
was made in 1867 under the supervision of Major 
General G. K. Warren. The original map is in four 
sheets, drawn on a scale of 200 feet to one inch (over 
twenty-six inches to a mile) and the contour interval 
is four feet. It was reproduced in 1883 on a scale of 
1:12,000 (5.3 inches to the mile), but the value of the 
reproduction as a maneuver map is greatly reduced 
by its being crowded with representations of troops 
at different phases of the battle. Copies of the re- 
production can be obtained from the Chief of Engi- 



-38^ 

neers, U. S. Army. The original map has been 
recently reproduced by the Military Information 
Division of the General Staff for the use of the Army 
School of the Line on a scale of twelve inches to one 
mile, conveniently divided into twenty-five sections; 
it shows a diversified tract of typical American 
ground in great detail and is well adapted to a variety 
of exercises. 

Maps of the battlefields of Gettysburg, Antietam, 
and Shiloh— prepared by Battlefield Commissions— 
and the map of the Chickamauga National Park have 
been reproduced by the 2d (Military Information) 
Division of the General Staff on a scale of twelve 
inches to one mile for use in map maneuvers. 
This Gettysburg map is som.ewhat longer (north and 
south) than the one made by General Warren, but it 
is about a half mile narrower (east and west) and the 
contours are at an interval of twelve feet. The value 
of the Shiloh map is reduced by the heavy forest which 
practically covers the whole tract shown by it. The 
Antietam map shows an open country covered with 
cultivated farms (Sharpsburg and vicinity), but its 
extent is only 3 by 4i miles and parts of this area 
are not shown in detail. 

No suitable guide maps for the Antietam or 
Shiloh maps are obtainable. 

Other American maneuver maps are as follows: 
the map of the maneuver ground at West Point, Ky., 
made in 1903, scale 2| inches to a mile; of the Man- 
assas maneuver ground, made in 1904, scale 3 inches 
to 1 mile; of the vicinity of Fort Riley, Kansas, pre- 
pared in 1903, scale 3 inches to 1 mile; of the maneu- 
ver ground near Austin, Texas, scale 3 inches to a 
mile; of the Mt. Gretna, Penn., maneuver ground, 
scale 4 inches to 1 mile; the map of the American 
Lake, Washington, maneuver ground, scale 3 inches 
tol mile; Atascadero, California, 3| inches to 1 mile; 



—39— 

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, 8.08 inches to 1 
mile; and the Crow Creek Forest Reserve near Fort 
D. A. Russell, Wyoming, 3 inches to 1 mile. The 
Mt. Gretna map is quite small and only a part of the 
ground is shown in detail. The greater part of the 
Austin map shows forest destitute of roads. 

A variety of interesting maneuvers can, how- 
ever, be conducted on these maps; though, on account 
of the smallness of the scale, troops cannot be repre- 
sented to scale and minor details cannot be worked 
out. 

It would be desirable to prepare at every mihtary 
post a topographical map of the ground on which 
field maneuvers are usually conducted by the garrison 
—drawn on a scale of 12 inches to a mile and with 
contours at 5 foot intervals. The preparation of the 
map, if distributed among the officers of the garrison, 
would serve to prepare them for map maneuvers by 
giving them the best sort of training for map reading; 
and the map would be useful in devising and testing 
tactical problems, in reviewing and discussing field 
maneuvers, and for use in map maneuvers. 

Maps of tracts of ground which is familiar to 
the participants are advantageous for the use of be- 
ginners. 

FOREIGN MAPS 

There are a great number and variety of foreign 
maneuver maps. The largest of these is the map 
prepared by Captain Feistle of the Bavarian army, 
representing a tract about fifty-five miles long and 
thirty miles wide, of the country in the vicinity of 
Metz, on a scale of about ten inches to a mile (1:6250). 
It consists of 326 sheets, grouped in five sections. 
The map is completely contoured but slopes are also 
shown by brown hachures. The prevailing color of 
the map is consequently brown which makes it a 



—40— 

pleasant one to use under electric light. The sheets 
are sold unmounted at about 18 cents per sheet but, 
for use, are usually mounted separately on card board. 
The map thus admits of a wide range of military 
operations and only a few sheets need be actually 
used at a time. A special guide map, one meter 
square, scale 1:100,000, has recently been prepared 
for use with this map, which is published by Hubert 
Kohler, Bluthenstrasse No. 13, Munich. The price 
of the entire map unmounted is about $50.00. This 
map is much used at the U. S. Army Staff College. 

The general staff maps (scale 1:100,000) and the 
plane table survey maps (scale 1:25,000) of the coun- 
try in the vicinity of Metz are almost indispensable 
adjuncts of the Feistle map; a space which repre- 
sents on the Feistle map one minute of march repre- 
sents on the 1:25,000 map four minutes, and the same 
space on the 1:100,000 map represents sixteen min- 
utes. The sheets of the general staff map used with 
the Feistle map are the 568 Metz, 569 St. Avoid, 584 
Soigne and 585 Chateau Salins sheets. The corres- 
ponding sheets of the 1:25,000 scale map are desig- 
nated 3551 Gravelotte, 3552 Metz, 3553 Bolchen, 3562 
Ars a.d. Mosel, 3563 Verny, 3564 Remilly, 3575 Lorry 
and 3576 Soigne. A 1:200,000 scale map of the same 
region is also useful, especially in devising problems. 

Maps of any part of the German Empire, scale 
1:100,000 or 1:200,000, can be obtained fromR. Eisen- 
schmidt, 70 Dorotheenstrasse, Berlin. 

The "Verny," "Gravelotte," "Metz," and "Ars 
a. d. Mosel" sections of the plane table survey map 
of the German Empire, scale 1:25,000, have been 
reproduced on a scale of ten inches to a mile, for the 
use of our Army War College, and copies of this re- 
production can be obtained on application to the 2d 
(Military Information) Division of the General Staff. 
A map of the "Soest" corps maneuver ground, 



—41— 

suitable for use in the "great war game", was pre- 
pared in 1903 by Captain von Eynatten, German Field 
Artillery. This map consists of 150 sheets, each 
mounted separately on card board, and each repre- 
senting 24 square kilometers on a scale of 1:10,000 or 
about six inches to a mile. It is published by Voss, 
Berlin, and is sold for about $25.00. 

The German General Staff published in 1907 a 
war game map called "Buckeburg — Springe— Han- 
nover", which is similar to the "Soest" map. It is in 
four colors and the scale is 1:10,000 (about 6 inches 
to 1 mile). It consists of 168 sheets and may be ob- 
tained, each sheet mounted separately on card board, 
through the American military attache at Berlin, for 
about $22.00. Several copies of the guide map, scale 
1:100,000, are furnished with the map. 

Other war game maps in common use in the 
German army are the "Chateau Salins" map, 96 
sheets, scale 1:8,000, and the "Gumbinnen— Darkeh- 
men" map, 70 sheets, scale 1:8,000, both made by the 
Royal Prussian Survey for the use of the army and 
not generally for sale. The "Chateau Salins" map is 
contiguous to the "Metz" map, and the "Gumbinnen- 
Darkehmen" map represents a portion of the Russian 
frontier. These two maps are merely twelve and a 
half fold enlargement of portions of the General Staff 
map and consequently are hachured maps with no 
contours. The process of enlargement has multiplied 
the distortion of the roads, hachures and conventional 
signs. 

The Bavarian war game map called "Dachau", 
scale 1:8,000, consists of 56 sheets; it maj^ be obtained 
from Hubert Kohler, Bluthenstrasse No. 13, Munich, 
Bavaria, for about $12.00; the guide maps are sold 
for 25 cents. This is also an enlargement from the 
General Staff map but the enlargement has been ac- 
complished without the distortion noticeable in the 



—42— 

"Chateau Salins" and "Gumbinnen— Darkehmen" 
maps. 

A map called "North Front of Paris", scale 1: 5,000, 
in 77 sheets, price with guide map $24.00, is sold by 
Voss, Berlin. It is especially adapted to siege ma- 
neuvers (the fortress war game) but is also well suited 
to maneuvers in minor tactics. A map called "Sedan", 
scale 1:6,250, is also sold by Voss, Berhn, for about 
$8.00— it consists of 25 sheets. 

For the strategic war game, German officers use 
the general staff maps of the German Empire, scale 
1:100,000. 

The maps of frontier districts, which have been 
chiefly used by the Germans until recently, have been 
found to lead to a monotony in the problems suggested, 
practically limiting the field of instruction to frontier 
warfare, and it is noticeable that the latest German 
war game maps are not of frontier regions. The 
smallest of their old maps ("Schweidnitz", "Landshut", 
etc.) have been discarded and have been replaced by 
new maps which are much larger. 

There are six maneuver maps in use in the Austro- 
Hungarian army, named Trautenau, Poisdorf, Jicin, 
Wisokow, Grodek and Goerz. The scale of the four 
first named is 1:7500 (about Sh inches to 1 mile) and 
of the others is 1:12,500 (about 5 inches to 1 mile). A 
peculiar feature of the "Grodek" map is that all 
names are omitted from it; this seems logical, for the 
maneuver map is to be regarded, not as a map, but 
as the maneuver ground, and this arrangement com- 
pels officers to refer to their guide maps to learn the 
names of localities. The "Jicin" map has 126 sheets, 
and the "Grodek" map 48 sheets; the others are 
smaller. The "Jicin" (Gitschen), "Trautenau" and 
"Wisokow" (Nachod) maps are especially interesting 
as they represent the scenes of important engage- 
ments between the Prussian and Austrian forces in 



—43— 

1866. All of these maps are published by the Aus- 
trian Military Geographical Institute at Vienna, which 
also publishes a price list of them and of war game ap- 
paratus. The maps are sold at about twenty cents 
per sheet and can be obtained through the American 
military attache at Vienna. 

The maneuver map in most common use in the 
French army is the "Commercy— Metz" map, scale 
1:10,000, which is an eight-fold enlargement of a por- 
tion of the etat— major map, scale 1:80,000. It was 
published in 1905 by the French General Staff, and is 
sold to officers of the French army for 10 francs. 
The etat-major map, scale 1:80,000, covers the whole 
of France and is also frequently used in map ma- 
neuvers. An enlargement of this map, scale 1 : 50, 000, 
can also be obtained. The foregoing maps are hach- 
ured merely and have no contours on them. The 
country within a radius of 30 miles of Paris has been 
mapped in 36 sheets on a scale of 1:20,000, with con- 
tours at a vertical interval of 5 meters. This map 
and maps of all parts of France on scales of 1:50,000, 
1:80,000 and 1:200,000 can be obtained from R. 
Chapelot et Cie., 30 Rue et Passage Dauphine, Paris. 

War game maps are especially made for the 
British army by the Ordnance Survey on a scale of 
6 inches to one mile with contours at 10 foot intervals. 
Maps have recently been specially prepared of por- 
tions of each military district, so that each district 
has its own war game map. These are exchanged to 
some extent for the 'sake of varying the exercises but 
as the British combine the war game with instruction 
on the ground the most frequent use is made of the 
maps representing near-by tracts of ground. 

The British "Combined Training" (Field Service 
Regulations) of 1905 prescribes (Par. 184) that war 
game maps should represent: (a) localities within 
reach of the station at which the players of the game 



-44— 

are quartered, and should be of local interest; (b) lo- 
calities at a distance from the station, possessing 
special features; (c) countries of general interest 
where wars have taken place, or are likely to occur 
in the future. 

The "Surrey Hills" map— belonging to the Alder- 
shot district, scale 6 inches to 1 mile, has generally been 
considered to be very suitable for map maneuvers; it 
consists of fifteen sheets, each 24 inches by 18 inches, 
and is sold (sheets mounted separately on cardboard) 
for £6. A war game map, scale 6 inches to 1 mile, 
called the "Berkshire" map, was made in 1907; it 
consists of 16 sheets, each 40 inches by 27 inches, and 
is sold unmounted for £2 or mounted on cardboard 
for £8. These war game maps (Surrey Hills and 
Berkshire) differ from the 6-inch scale Ordnance 
Survey maps only in having the contours specially 
marked, in being more completely colored and in the 
size of the sheets. 

For the strategic war game, the Ordnance Survey 
maps, scale 1 inch to 1 mile, are used. 

The London agent for the sale of the Ordnance 
Survey maps is Edward Stanford, 12 Long Acre, 
London; from him the "Surrey Hills" and "Berk- 
shire" maneuver maps can be obtained, also the Ord- 
nance Survey maps of any part of Great Britain on 
scales of 6, 1 or J inches to 1 mile. 

British maps would be more convenient for our 
use, on account of the language and scales being more 
familiar, than other foreign maps, but the scale of 
these maps is not suited to maneuvers in minor tac- 
tics. No maneuver maps of a larger scale than six 
inches to one mile are now in use in the British army. 

GUIDE MAPS 

The maps to which we have heretofore chiefly 
devoted our attention are the large scale maps which 
do duty as the maneuver ground, 



—45- 

But each participant in a map maneuver should 
be provided with a pocket map of the maneuver ground 
and the country in the vicinity such as he would be 
expected to have in war; these are called guide maps 
and should show all roads, towns, and important nat- 
ural features in the maneuver ground and, if practi- 
cable, within a day's march of it. They are used by 
the commanders for the same purposes for which such 
maps would be used in war, i.e. in studying situations, 
framing orders, etc. They are used by the director 
in devising problems, and are more convenient for 
this purpose than the maneuver map; they may often 
also be used by him when the opposing forces are not 
in contact at the outset— in carrying the exercise 
through the stages preliminary to contact. 

In using foreign maneuver maps we find guide 
maps provided for use with them; they are merely 
portions of the military map which officers are expec- 
ted to carry in war. But in using maneuver maps of 
portions of our own country we find ourselves con- 
fronted with the question as to what maps are to be 
used in case of war on our own territory. 

The most suitable maps we have for this purpose 
are those made by the United States Geological Sur- 
vey and our military authorities are taking steps to 
have these maps corrected and brought up to date 
and certain data of military importance added to 
them. These corrected and completed maps of the 
United States Geological Survey are called the 
Progressive Military Map; no copies of it are obtain- 
able at present but it is supposed that, if needed, they 
will be available for use in war. The Geological 
Survey maps are on three scales,— 1:62,500, 1:125,000 
and 1:250,000 (about 1, i and i inches to one mile). 
They cover only a small part of the country at present, 
being in general confined to locahties where valuable 



—46— 

mineral deposits have been found, but they are being 
gradually extended. 

Those now being made are all on the 1:62,500 
scale and a great improvement is noticeable in them 
over the earlier issues. But these maps are not made 
for military use and are deficient in many details of 
military importance. For instance, the character of 
the roads, whether metalled or otherwise, is not indi- 
cated, and the maps are often so deficient in names 
of localities as to be of little use in directing the 
movements of troops. 

These maps can be obtained by application to the 
Director, United States Geological Survey, Wash- 
ington, D. C. , and are sold at five cents per sheet. 

The road maps made some years ago for the use 
of touring cyclists have been greatly extended to 
meet the needs of automobilists. These maps now 
cover the New England states (with the exception of 
Vermont and the northern part of Maine), the whole 
of New York and New Jersey, the northern part of 
Delaware, the central part of Maryland, the south- 
eastern part of Pennsylvania, the northern part of 
Ohio and Indiana, and the part of IlHnois in the vici- 
nity of Chicago. They are on a scale of one inch to 
three miles and are useful maps for most military 
purposes. They are being extended by the American 
Automobile Association and seem likely to become an 
important military factor. Copies of these maps can 
be obtained from the Automobile Road Map Company, 
1964 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 

The military map of Germany is the General Stafli 
map, scale 1:100,000 (about two-thirds inch to one 
mile). It is said that this famous map was begun by 
Napoleon Bonaparte, who ordered his engineers— im- 
mediately after the battle of Jena— to make a map of 
Germany, and ordered that the scale be 1:100,000. 
This is the oldest of modern military maps, and 



-47— 

although its scale is smaller than that of many others, 
it is the most complete in information of military im- 
portance. The character of all roads and trails is 
shown graphically; ground practicable for troops of all 
arms is shown by dotted hachures; the number of 
men that can be quartered in a village is approxi- 
mately indicated by the style of lettering of its name; 
the summits of all hills are conveniently designated 
by reference numbers showing their elevation. The 
Germans also have a contoured map, scale 1:25,000, 
but it does not extend over the whole of their terri- 
tory and it is not regarded as a military map. 

The scale of the military map of France (Carte 
de I'Etat Major) is 1:80,000 (about- three-fourths 
inch to one mile). The scale of the military map of 
Austria is 1:75,000 (about four-fifths inch to one mile). 
That of Japan is 1:200,000. 

The British Combined Training (Field Service 
Regulations) directs that maps one-half inch to one 
mile (1:126,720) be used in field maneuvers and it is 
inferred that this map is to be used by British officers 
in case of war on British territory. 

Hill slopes are shown on all of these military 
maps by hachures only. The elevations of the sum- 
mits of hills and other important points are shown 
by numbers. 

"In France, the etat-major map is a weapon with 
which officers are constantly exercised and their pro- 
ficiency in its manifold uses is considered as impor- 
tant as proficiency with pistol or saber. " (Captain 
T. B. Mott.) 

Excellent military maps were made by topog- 
raphers who accompanied Sherman's army in the 
campaign in Georgia in 1864; since that time mihtary 
map making seems to have received little attention 
in this country. 



- 48— 
TABLE 

The table on which the maneuver map is spread 
should be of soft wood if maps mounted on cloth are 
to be used. If the top of the table is seven and a 
half feet long and four and a half feet wide it will be 
of a convenient size; the top may be supported by 
trestles two feet four inches in height. There is an 
advantage in having the top easily detachable from 
its supports, because the top is sometimes used stand- 
ing on end — the map being fastened to it with thumb 
tacks— in illustrating lectures, discussions and one 
side maneuvers. Ordinary hard wood desks and 
tables may be used to support the maps; and maps 
mounted on clgth can be used on them by placing two 
or three thicknesses of blottingpaperunder the map. 

BLOCKS 

Troops are represented in map maneuvers by a 
variety of means— the most common being rectangu- 
lar blocks of type-metal, lead, ivory, bone, porcelain, 
wood, or other material, cut to the size of the space 
occupied on the map by the units which they repre- 
sent. 

"To make the exercises attractive and to stimu- 
late the imagination of beginners" (Immanuel) 
small figures are sometimes used; for instance, the 
figure of an infantryman standing represents a com- 
pany in column or line; a figure of a trooper on a 
horse represents a squadron; a figure of a gun, a bat- 
tery, etc. Each figure stands on a foot board cut to 
show the space occupied by the oganization repre- 
sented. 

It is objected to lead and type-metal blocks that 
the paint with which they are coated soon scales or 
wears off or becomes soiled by handling, and that 
they then become unsightly and are not easily recog- 
nizable. Porcelain blocks hold their color better, but 



they are so light as to be readily disturbed by draughts 
of air, or jars to the table; wood is also too light. 

Representations of troops cut from cardboard 
have been improvised at trifling expense by the De- 
partment of Military Art, Army Service Schools, 
which meet all the necessary requirements of map 
maneuvers. Blue paper is used to represent infantry 
—red, artillery — yellow, cavalry — black, engineers — 
green, hospital corps— orange, signal corps— buff, 
wagon trains, etc. ; platoons are represented by 
squares, larger units by rectangular pieces cut to 
scale, and squads by small circular discs. The pieces 
are held in place or moved by means of pins with 
colored heads — blue for the Blue army and red for 
the Red army. Cardboard blocks lend themselves 
readily to changes of organization;* and can be con- 
veniently used on a map in a vertical position — a 
great advantage in one side maneuvers and discuss- 
ions. 

* Since the use of these card board blocks was begun, changes have 
been made in the blocks representing units of artillery, the medical depart- 
ment and the signal corps. 



—50- 



The shapes and sizes of the smaller pieces are 
shown below; the larger pieces are shown by Plate 
No. 2. 



I I Infantry Company 
□ " Platoon 

(3 " Squad 

I "1 Cavalry Troop 

Q " Platoon 

O " Squad 

(Q) " Machine Gun 

O 3 inch Gun, F. A. 

Arrangements have been made by the Secretary 
of the Army Service Schools to furnish at a reason- 
able price small boxes containing sets of these card- 
board blocks together with colored pins, strings of 
beads, and card-board scales to officers desiring them. 

It is obvious that similar blocks could be made of 
metal, bone, wood, or other material if desired. It 
has been objected to the pins that they are injurious 
to the maps, but in practice it is found that the pins 
are not moved about a great deal, as but few situa- 
tions are fully represented; and that if the maps are 



—51—. 

well mounted they will wear out through other causes 
before they are seriously injured by the pins. 

The blocks in most common use in the German 
army are those devised by Col. von Busse; these are 
sold by G. Bormann Nachfolger, 39 Bruder strasse, 
Berlin, at about $7. 50 per set. A more elaborate and 
expensive set has been devised by Col. Kunde and is 
sold by Voss, bookseller, Berlin. The blocks devised 
by Meckel have recently been revised by Capt. Count 
von Eynatten and are much used; they are sold by 
Voss, Berlin, at about $7.00 per set. 

A French war game set is sold by R. Chapelot et 
Cie, 30 Rue et Passage Dauphine, Paris, at about 
$4.00. 

A set of British war game blocks, complete in a 
mahogany box, is sold by Edward Stanford, London, 
for £6 S.6. 

It is obvious that foreign blocks would be of but 
little use to us as the units represented are different 
from ours; also that blocks made in this country be- 
fore the publication of our Field Service Regulations 
(1905) are now unsuited to our use for a similar rea- 
son. 

Blocks should correspond to the scale of the map 
used; if used with maps of other scales they are likely 
to give wrong impressions. 

Officers are recommended to improvise their own 
blocks and scales; they can thus avoid unnecessary 
expense and can assure themselves that the pieces 
are cut accurately to the scale of the map they intend 
to use, and that they represent modern American 
units. 

SCALES 

The scales most frequently used are scales of 
yards and of miles. A useful scale can be improvised 
by drawing a scale of yards on a strip of paper and 



—52— 

a scale of miles and fractions of a mile on another, 
and gluing- them on opposite edges of a straight strip 
of wood of, say, eighteen inches in length. A similar 
scale made of card board is very convenient as it can 
be stood on edge on the map and bent to follow the 
turns of a road. 

Scales of minutes of march are convenient and 
save time. Such scales can be drawn on the edge of 
a piece of cardboard to represent any desired rates 
of march. It is a convenience to have several divis- 
ions of the same length placed consecutively so that 
any desired number of minutes can be laid off at one 
time. Scales of this sort arranged for the ordinary 
gaits are shown in Plate III. Two of these scales 
used simultaneously afford a ready means of ascer- 
taining practically (without computation) the time 
and place at which troops moving at different rates 
will meet or overtake one another. This problem 
arises frequently in determining the time and place 
at which messages are received. The manner in 
which it is solved by using scales of minutes is de- 
scribed in Preliminary Exercises Nos. 1 and 2, Chap- 
ter IV. 

For determining practically the length of col- 
umns, the depth of various units in column (battalion, 
squadron, battery, etc.) may be drawn on the edge 
of a card and used as a scale as shown by Plate II. 

Another convenient scale of minutes of march 
may be made by taking a piece of sheet brass and 
cutting it so as to leave projecting points at the 
proper distances apart to represent the distances 
marched at the different gaits in a certain time; such 
a scale, cut to show two minutes of march at the or- 
dinary gaits, is of convenient size for use with maps 
whose scale is 12 inches to 1 mile— a pattern is shown 
in Plate I. 



j; :^eqwo 



PLA.T, 



iB combat 
rarde* 



h 




^^ ^ 



spA ogi 

4- s.jSuh'oo 



1 



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•d ft. 



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uttjj:; 



;8qwoo qq.iA i^.^sg pioi^I 




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et 






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-^ 33 




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fe 


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2. .3 


2. 


ca 





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to 


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13 H- 


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P- 


(B fl- 








M H" 


H 



PLATE II, 



Sqtiadron wltB combat twiin 
420 jrardB. 



C +j CO 
o "d 

■POO 

ca o t-t 

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PLATE III. 



< 00 
O <N 

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w 
o 






V3 f«^, 



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^J* 


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<— 1 


</) 



Infantry or Mixed Troops 
80 yj>rds per min -2 8/11 miles per hour. 



H 



H I 1 



—53— 

Scales of minutes of march should be used only 
by the director or his assistant. Commanders should 
use their guide maps and the scales found on them 
in making the computations of time and space neces- 
sary in estimating situations and framing orders, and 
they will obtain useful practice in map reading by 
doing so. 

A useful scale can be made by cutting out Plates 
II and III and pasting them on opposite sides of a 
piece of card board of the same size. 

OTHER ACCESSORIES 

Paper and pencils are important accessories. A 
number of message blanks should also be provided. 
The only books of reference needed are the Field 
Service Regulations, the drill regulations of the dif- 
ferent arms, and the service manuals. 



CHAPTER III 



HOW CONDUCTED 



METHODS 

Map maneuvers have been conducted in a great 
variety of ways, and beneficial results have probably 
been obtained from all. 

' ' For an officer who is to conduct a war game, 
that method is best in which he has trained him- 
self." (Meckel) 

' ' The war game knows no fixed rules. * * * 
The development of personal initiative, without 
which no war game can be of real benefit, must not 
be restricted by regulations and set schemes. * * * 
Good results maj' be obtained by a great variety of 
methods. * * * The war game stands or falls 
with the director." (Immanuel.) 

The manner in which a map maneuver is to be 
conducted should depend primarily on the object to 
be attained. If it is desired to give didactic instruc- 
tion in tactics, or to explain the nature of map 
maneuvers to officers who are not familiar with them, 
the instructor may maneuver two forces on a map 
himself, illustrating, explaining and commenting on 
such situations as serve his purpose; this would be 
an illustrated lecture rather than a map maneuver. 

But if the instructor conceals one of the forces 
wholly or in part, and consults his audience in regard 
to the movements of the other, or allows the audience 
to decide its movements, while commenting upon, 
criticising and correcting their decisions if neces- 

54 



—55— 

sary, and using the concealed hostile force to demon- 
strate faults and weaknesses which he observes in 
the dispositions made— the exercise becomes a one 
side map maneuver. Exercises of this kind may be 
supplemented by discussions in which several or all 
officers present may take part , under the leadership 
of the director (instructor); they combine didactic 
instruction with practice in estimating situations, 
forming decisions, and giving orders. 

But if it is desired to heighten the interest of the 
exercise by bringing about a contest of opposing 
wills and unexpected situations similar to those which 
arise in war, different officers or groups of officers 
may be designated to command the opposing forces, 
each party given only such information of the 
forces of the other as they would be likely to possess 
in war, or such as is gained through the development 
of the exercise, and be given freedom of decision in 
commanding the forces assigned to them. The 
maneuver is then two sided; but the director may 
still retain sufficient control of it to be able to guide 
it into channels which he thinks will make it more 
interesting or instructive, or which will illustrate 
certain principles of tactics which he desires to teach. 
This control should not be exercised in such a way as 
to deprive commanders of freedom in making de- 
cisions, but by means of plausible orders from 
imaginary higher authorities, by timely information 
of the enemy, by the intervention of supporting 
troops, by decisions on the results of hostile contact, 
or by interpretations of the map. 

Under the guidance of a skillful director, the 
two side maneuver, as well as the one side maneuver, 
may be made, in a measure, an illustrated lecture, 
the didactic instruction being postponed till the close 
of the exercise. This is the highest and most beneficial 
form which the two side maneuver can assume; but 



—56— 

it requires serious preliminary preparation on the 
part of the director, no matter what his experience 
and professional attainments may be. 

If, however, the maneuver is merely intended 
to give additional training and experience in the 
handling of troops, to test the efficiency of certain 
tactical measures, to test the defensive strength of a 
certain position, or if the director has but little or no 
more instruction or experience than the commanders 
or has had little opportunity for previous prepara- 
tion; the commanders may be given full freedom of 
action after the initial situation has been imparted 
to them, the director acts merely as an umpire and 
limits his efforts to making his decisions plausible 
and impartial; the exercise should, however, always 
be followed by a discussion for the purpose of deter- 
mining upon the conclusions, if any, which can be 
drawn from it. Maneuvers of this sort accomplish 
the best results when all of the participants are well 
instructed and experienced officers. The methods 
which should be employed at the beginning are those 
which make the greatest demands upon the director. 

The kind of instruction desired also determines 
the character of the problems— whether involving in- 
struction in the tactics of a single arm, the tactics of 
the arms combined, the employment of divisions or 
larger bodies, the attack and defense of fortified po- 
sitions, in logistics, or in the duties which will devolve 
upon the higher staffs in war. The problems may be 
simple, involving the normal employment of troops 
under definite requirements, or they may be made 
more difficult with the object of taxing the ingenuity 
of the commanders. 

The maps and other facilities available must also 
be considered, for it may be necessary to adapt the 
exercise to the facilities available instead of to the 
object desired. Maps of portions of our own country 



—57— 

are to be preferred, as exercises upon them are more 
realistic and impose less strain upon the imagination. 
Large maps are to be preferred to small ones; for 
small maps restrict us to the employment of small 
units, to single phases of military operations, or to 
maneuvers in which the forces are restricted to cer- 
tain localities, for instance, in the attack and de- 
fense of a designated position. • 

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTION 

The degree of preparation or experience of the 
officers who are to take part in the maneuver must 
also be taken into consideration, in deciding upon the 
character of the problems to be used and the methods 
to be employed in conducting them. 

Lieutenant General v. Litzmann, Director of the 
German War College, in a work entitled "Introduc- 
tion to the War Game" (1905), says: 'It is essential 
to success that the director should not assume that 
he or other participants in the exercise have knowl- 
edge or skill which they do not really possess. * * * 
It is only by actual practice with tools that a mechanic 
learns to turn out good work. Beginners at the war 
game must be taught by means of preliminary exer- 
cises how to find their way about easily on a war 
game map, and how to use the blocks, scales and other 
apparatus. When they have learned this they are 
prepared to act as commanders, at first in simple ex- 
ercises and afterwards in maneuvers presenting 
greater difficulties. * * * The difficulties must be 
mastered step by step. * * * Dissatisfaction with 
the war game is generally a consequence of not hav- 
ing thoroughly mastered its technicahties. " 

To illustrate his ideas as to the manner in which 
preliminary instruction should be given. General v. 
Litzmann takes the hypothetical case of 1st Lieuten- 
ant Z, a recent graduate of the War College, who 



—58- 

has just returned to his regiment and has been as- 
signed the duty of instructing the ten youngest Heu- 
tenants of the regiment in the war game. The work 
of Lieutenant Z and his pupils during the first three 
evenings is described in detail, and the manner in 
which the instruction is to be continued is indicated. 

At the first meeting Lieutenant Z explains the 
use of the maps and the meaning of the blocks and 
then assigns the lieutenants to various tasks. Lieu- 
tenants A and B are directed to represent with blocks 
a Blue infantry division advancing on an indicated 
road with the head of the main body at an indicated 
point. When this is finished they are asked to show 
all parts of the advance guard in the positions which 
they would occupy five minutes later. Lieutenants 
C and D are assigned a Red officer's patrol and direc- 
ted to select a good point of observation from which 
the road on which this Blue division is advancing can 
be watched. This is a problem in map reading, and 
its solution brings out an explanation of a method 
of determining from the map the visibility of one 
point from another. Lieutenants E and F are direc- 
ted to show with blocks a detached Red infantry bri- 
gade with attached troops of other arms, in a defen- 
sive position at an indicated locality towards which 
the Blue division is marching. Lieutenants G and H 
are directed to prepare a plan for attacking this Red 
position with the Blue division. Lieutenants J and K 
are directed to show with blocks the outpost of a de- 
tached Blue infantry brigade having attached troops 
of other arms— the brigade being in bivouac at an 
indicated locality. 

At the end of a half-hour Lieutenant Z discusses 
these problems and their solutions pointing out errors 
and suggesting better dispositions. He then car- 
ries out on the map a small cavalry engagement, 
commanding both parties and acting as director him- 



—59— 

self— the other officers taking part only as spectators. 
He concludes the first evening's work by informing 
them that at their next meeting they are to carry out 
the attack planned by Lieutenants G and H on the 
position selected by Lieutenants E and F, and requests 
them to study certain portions of the artillery drill 
regulations. 

He begins the second evening's w^ork with a 
short discussion of the subject of orders and then as- 
signs the lieutenants to subordinate commands in the 
Blue division — taking chief command of the Blues 
and entire control of the Reds himself. The attack 
is carried as far as time admits, great attention being 
paid to the movements and positions of troops, the 
lieutenants interposing orders when it seems to them 
proper to do so. The exercise is closed with a dis- 
cussion which relates chiefly to the technicalities of 
conducting maneuvers on a map, and the lieutenants 
are requested to study certain additional portions of 
the artillery drill regulations. 

The exercise for the third evening consists in a 
deployment for attack by the advance guard of a 
Blue detached brigade of infantry having troops of 
other arms attached. The advance guard consists of 
a battalion of infantry and a battalion of artillery. 
Lieutenant Z commands the Blue brigade and takes 
entire control of the Red forces as before. The lieu- 
tenants command the battalions, companies and bat- 
teries, and one acts as assistant to Lieutenant Z. A 
measure of independence of action is given to them 
and the exercise is carried to a more advanced stage 
than the preceding one. 

It will be seen that Lieutenant Z begins his 
course of instruction with map problems on the war 
game map and follows these with an illustrated lec- 
ture and one side maneuvers. After the third evening 
the lieutenants under instruction are thought ready 



—Go- 
to take part as commanders in actual war games of 
a simple character involving the use of only small 
bodies of troops. 

In answer to a possible objection that in these 
exercises officers were given larger commands than 
their experience warranted, General v. Litzman re- 
plies: "The difficulty of leading troops does not lie 
in the numerical strength of the body employed but 
rather in the conditions under which it is used — 
these were purposely made simple." 

Captain Oberlindober recommends preliminary 
exercises before taking up map maneuvers, for the 
purpose of giving practice in forming decisions 
quickly; these exercises consist in calling officers to 
the map separately, giving them military situations 
and asking their decisions; they are virtually map 
problems with oral solutions. 

Experience at the Army Service Schools has 
shown that map problems with written solutions 
serve as an excellent preparation for map maneuvers. 

A knowledge of map reading is almost the only 
essential to the student in taking part in a one-side 
map maneuver; while to be able to take part profitably 
in a two-side map maneuver he should, in addition, 
be familiar with the handling of troops and have 
some experience in handling them on a map. 

ONE=SIDE MANEUVERS 

The simplest maneuvers are those in which no 
enemy is supposed to be in contact with the troops 
employed, and those in which the enemy is imagin- 
ary or merely outlined. Such exercises are valuable 
as a means of instruction in tactics, and map maneu- 
vers are well adapted to them. Map maneuvers in 
which but one side is represented may be made very 
interesting as well as instructive; they have never 
received the attention which they merit. 



—61 — 

"To many persons, a map maneuver (to call it by 
its French name) means necessarily the organization 
of two parties to operate against each other with 
perfect freedom, the director acting as an umpire. 
This method undoubtedly has great advantages; it 
gives opportunities for practice to a large number 
of officers; the participants take an interest in the 
contest with a real enemy, who is equally in the dark 
as to the dispositions of his adversary. This re- 
ciprocal ignorance may bring about the most un- 
expected situations, similar to those which arise in 
actual war. 

But there is another side to the question. The 
umpire cannot act until both parties have made their 
decisions. On this account, the exercises progress 
so slowly that the interest in them is often lost. 
Faulty work does not always receive a suitable 
penalty. If the adversaries are not well instructed 
in tactics, the maneuver degenerates into a series of 
disjointed movements, often devoid of interest. 

Like two students of the art of fencing who have 
been permitted too early to fence freely with each 
other, the two sides slash away without learning 
anything. Instruction in tactics should follow the 
same course as instruction in fencing; first, lessons 
in the cuts and thrusts; then, practice with the in- 
structor, who gives opportunities for using them and 
who criticises faults; and last, free fencing. In 
studying tactics it is necessary to practice with the 
instructor for a long time, — that is to say, to handle 
one force at a time. The enemy is handled by the 
instructor, who is thus enabled to set for us any de- 
sired problem; or else by a well instructed assistant 
who, after a preliminary understanding, is given 
freedom of action. There is no delay imposed upon the 
director, who gives the exercise the form he wishes, 
sometimes asking for prompt decisions, sometimes 



bringing- about general discussions; and is always 
able to decide immediately the results of the meas- 
ures taken. No assistants, no notes. The director 
brings about successive events and places represen- 
tations of them before the eyes of the students, and 
thus holds their attention." (Une Manoeuvre sur la 
Carte, Revue Militaire Generale, March, 1907). 

"The one side maneuver is, at first sight, less 
attractive than the two-side maneuver. It is, how- 
ever, especially for beginners, much more instruc- 
tive. By means of the one-side maneuver an officer 
can teach his subordinates more rapidly than in any 
other way the spirit of the drill regulations and de- 
velop their tactical sense. 

In the one-side maneuver the director commands 
the hostile force himself, and makes use of it to bring 
out the tactical lessons which he wishes to teach, and 
to show the mistakes which have been made. If a 
unit is not sufficiently covered, he causes hostile 
troops to appear suddenly and throw it into confu- 
sion; if a force is too much scattered, he causes it to 
be attacked at a selected point by a hostile force 
which is well in hand; if a leader is too timid, he op- 
poses him with a mere screen and then shows him 
that he has allowed himself to be deceived. 

"In a two-side maneuver, it may happen that 
many of the mistakes which are made are not pointed 
out; this would, perhaps, be the case in actual war; 
but the lesson is none the less bad; the repetition of 
the same mistakes or uncorrected carelessness tends 
to establish bad habits. 

"It may be objected that the part of the director, 
commanding one of the forces and knowing the 
movements of the other, is too easy from a tactical 
point of view. This would be true if it were a con- 
test or a game; but there is no contest and no game; 
the director does not compete with the student 



—63— 

officers, he teaches them." (Jeu de Guerre et Ma- 
noeuvre sur la Carte, Revue MiHtaire Generale, Jan. 
1907.) 

One-side maneuvers have many evident advan- 
tages. More students can profitably take part in a 
single exercise, the exercise is more completely under 
the control of the director, who can guide it into in- 
teresting and instructive channels, can pass rapidly 
over stages which are not interesting, and linger 
upon those which are more profitable. The discus- 
sion is continuous, all participants are kept fully in- 
formed of the military situation and there are no 
dreary waits in an outer room. 

Nevertheless, they have their pitfalls and their 
hmitations. If the director, when permitting students 
to command, always defeats them with the concealed 
hostile force (which, of course, he can easily do) or 
exposes them to ridicule, he will only discourage them 
and give them the impression that they have been 
unfairly treated. And the student is not always con- 
vinced that the measures which the director charac- 
terizes as mistakes are really such. Broadly speaking, 
it may be asserted that the one-side maneuver is the 
better vehicle for instruction — the two-side maneuver 
the better means of giving training and practice. In- 
struction presupposes an instructor; and one-side 
maneuvers accomplish the best results when the di- 
rector, by reason of greater experience, superior ad- 
vantages or special preparation, can speak with the 
voice of authority. Directors of this sort are not 
always available; and, in any case, there is a point in 
military education when didactic instruction should no 
longer be its predominent feature and opportunities 
should be given for practicing what has been learned. 

In conducting a one-side maneuver the troops 
employed may be fully represented with blocks, as it 
is not necessary to conceal any of them from the 



students, who are all supposed to belong to the same 
side. If the number of students present is so great 
that all can not see the map well in its ordinary hori- 
zontal position, it may be suspended vertically. The 
students are then seated in front of it and can thus 
follow the exercise more comfortably. The director 
describes and represents the initial situation and asks 
the opinions of the students as to what action should 
be taken, how contemplated measures should be car- 
ried out, etc. He comments upon the opinions ad- 
vanced and may invite a general discussion of them. 
When this situation has been sufficiently discussed 
(and the director's tact will be displayed by neither 
continuing to discuss a situation after it has been 
worn threadbare nor leaving it prematurely) the di- 
rector announces the movements which were actually 
made, describes and represents the new situation, 
supplying information of the enemy when necessary, 
and another discussion follows. In deciding upon the 
movements to be actually made the director may 
either follow the opinions of one or more of the stu- 
dents or make movements not contemplated by any 
of them; but where different measures are suggested 
which seem equally judicious it should be made plain 
that the decision does not indicate that those not 
adopted were thought faulty. 

The director may follow out opinions which he 
believes to be faulty for the purpose of showing the 
weakness of the dispositions which would result, but 
it is believed that this can generally be accomphshed 
by the discussion and that the best progress will 
usually be made by following out measures which are 
believed to be judicious— both the director and stu- 
dents remaining in sympathy with the commander. 

As an evidence of good faith the director may 
write out, before the exercise, a special situation for 
the hostile force. At the close of the exercise this is 



-65— 

shown to the students and an explanation is made 
that the strength displayed by the enemy was no 
greater than was originally contemplated, and that 
the movements made by him were possible and con- 
sistent with the original situation. Or the director 
may make it a rule that any hostile troops which have 
once been shown must be accounted for at the close 
of the exercise and will not be used in any unusual 
way or in a manner inconsistent with the enemy's 
supposed mission. But if it is made clear to all that 
the exercise is not a contest between the students 
and the director, these precautions will usually be 
unnecessary. 



TWO=SIDE MANEUVERS 

Two-side map maneuvers have important advan- 
tages and will probably always be regarded as the 
highest form of the exercise and be the form most 
frequently used. There is a closer approximation to 
the conditions of war, for there is an actual contest 
and greater interest is aroused. Responsibility is 
thrown directly upon the commanders, who thus ac- 
quire training in bearing it. The lessons taught are 
more convincing and are more indelibly impressed 
upon the memory. 

The one-side maneuver is likely to develop cau- 
tiousness and conservatism unduly, for in seeking to 
avoid what the director may regard as mistakes stu- 
dents may shrink from the risks sometimes necessary 
to gain important successes. And in one-side maneu- 
vers the commander of the hostile force is assumed 
to be able and aggressive — at all times ready to take 
advantage of any weakness in our dispositions, while 
two-side maneuvers give a commander an opportun- 
ity to gauge his opponents, to make use of his knowl- 



—66— 

edge of their personal characteristics, and to shape 
his own course accordingly. * 

In two-side maneuvers both commanders are 
given freedom of initiative, hampered only by the 
missions assigned them and by the requirements of 
the military situation. The director's chief role is to 
furnish each such information of his enemy as is 
likely to be gained through the progress of the ma- 
neuver, make needful interpretations of the map and 
decisions as to rates of march, visibility, results of 
contact, etc., and to lead the discussion which closes 
the exercise. 

The manner in which two side map maneuvers 
are conducted is best learned by taking* part in such 
maneuvers conducted by a skillful and experienced 
director. Officers who have no opportunities to learn 
in this way can get a very good idea of them by 
following out, step by step, with a map and blocks or 
pins, the exercise described by Von Verdy (Simplified 
War Game) those described by Immanuel (The Regi- 
mental War Game) by Von Litzmann (Einftihrung in 
den Betrieb des Kriegsspiels) by Oberlindober (An- 
lage und Leitung von Kriegsspielen) in "Das Kriegs- 
spiel, Anregungen, Erfahrungen und Beispiele" 
(Anonymous) or those contained in chapter IV of 
this work. 

In the present chapter it is merely intended to 
offer suggestions which may be found helpful by 
beginners. 

PROBLEMS 

A commander is informed of the initial situation 
by the director either orally or by means of a written 
statement called a problem. Maneuver problems are 

*Such decisions as that of General Lee in halting behind Antietam 
Creek and accepting battle with the Potomac at his back — or in dividing his 
forces at Chancellorsville in the presence of a superior enemy — would, in a 
one-side maneuver or in a map problem, be regarded as mistakes: but when 
the personality of the opposing commander is taken into account they may 
be very far from being mistakes. 



—67— 

usually drafted in two parts, called the "general" 
and "special" situations.* The same general situa- 
tion is usually given to the commanders of both 
the opposing forces; it contains information of the 
principal features of the military situation of both 
forces; and a commander consequently learns from it 
not only the main features of the situation of his own 
and the enemy's troops, but in addition, what the 
enemy may be expected to know of them. If a gen- 
eral situation is not used it will be found more diffi- 
cult to describe briefly a military situation so com- 
pletely that a commander will be able to draw infer- 
ences as to the information probably possessed by 
the enemy; the problem can usually be made shorter 
by conveying information of this kind to both parties 
alike by means of a general situation. As a matter 
of convenience, the date, any statements regarding 
the weather thought necessary, and any suppositions 
made concerning the terrain (the depth of streams, 
condition of roads, etc.) are usually also placed in 
the general situation; for this information is sup- 
posed to be possessed by both parties, and, by plac- 
ing it in the general situation, it need be drafted 
but once. When it is thought necessary to state 
which force is operating in its own and which in hos- 
tile territory, this information is usually placed in the 
general situation. 

A special situation is prepared for each com- 
mander; it usually contains a list of the troops he 
is to command, and should inform him of their lo- 
cation and the exact hour at which the operations 
involved in the solution of the problem are to begin. 
When a definite mission is to be assigned to him it is 
ordinarily placed in the special situation. The special 
situation also usually contains information of the 

*It is not necessary to draft map problems and those for terrain exer- 
cises in two parte, though this is often done for the purpose of acquiring 
greater familiarity with maneuver problems. 



—68- 

enemy; but this, as a rule, is restricted to the results 
of his own observation or of recent reconnaissance, 
and ordinarily consists of details which the enemy 
is not likely to be aware that he possesses.* 

Problems should be short. Situations covering 
a page or more of written matter have a discourag- 
ing effect. Problems are sometimes seen with very 
lengthy general situations, which show an eifort to 
write a resume of the imaginary war which has led 
to the ^situation described; and, after reading two or 
three pages, we discover, perhaps, that the situation 
is a simple one which miight have been described in a 
dozen lines; it then becomes apparent that the com- 
manders might have been spared the apocryphal his- 
torical matter. It is true that in war officers are 
often confronted with orders and information con- 
tained in numerous and sometimes conflicting mes- 
sages and reports, and that training in sifting masses 
of such matter is useful; but practice of this kind can 
be given more appropriately by means of map prob- 
lems than by maneuver problems. 

The forces employed should be small. The size 
of the forces employed should be proportioned to the 
degree of instruction and experience of the officers 
who are to command them, and, as a rule, they should 
be relatively small. "The smaller the forces em- 
ployed, the more details can be noticed, the more 

*Tlie problems used in map maneuvers and tactical rides are often 
shorter and niore meager in details than those used in field maneuvers, 
map problems or terrain exercises, for the reason that the director has the 
exercise completely under his control, and can unfold the situation more 
fully during the progress of the exercise. Thus, the sound of distant can- 
nonnading may be heard, orders may be received from higher authorities, 
additional troops may appear on the scene, supporting troops may advance 
or suffer a reverse, or other circumstances may be conjured up at the will of 
the director and the situation may be materially modified at any time. De- 
vices of this kind are seldom employed in field maneuvers and, as a rule, the 
situations presented in map problems and tenain exercises should be com- 
plete at the outset. In map maneuvers, however, information in regard to 
the weather, condition of the roads, etc., should either be contained in the 
problem, or else supplied by the director orally; while in field maneuvers 
the actual condition of weather and terrain are ordinarily taken as part of 
the situation. A discussion of war game problems, by Captain A. L. Conger, 
in which the distinction between map problems and maneuver problems is 
clearly defined, can be found in the March, 1910, number of the Cavalry 
Journal. 



—69— 

thorough the discussion can be made. * * * When 
large forces are employed, details of great importance 
to the majority of officers are necessarily excluded 
from consideration" (Meckel). The chief objection 
urged against the employment of small forces is that 
exercises of this sort are thought unreal. The con- 
flicts of entirely isolated small bodies seldom lead to 
important results. In war, the commanders in chief 
will usually keep all parts of their armies in position 
for mutual support and are more likely to use all of 
them for the attainment of a common object (for in- 
stance, the defeat of the chief army of the enemy) 
than to permit them to engage in isolated and inde- 
pendent combats'. Captain Oberlindober recommends 
that the attention to details, which Meckel insists on, 
be secured by limiting the attention to a part only of 
the troops considered, and suggests problems involv- 
ing the employment of covering detachments (advance 
guards, rear guards, flank guards, outposts, etc.), the 
main bodies not being actually represented; or prob- 
lems involving troops in only a portion of the field in 
a general engagement— for instance, the troops em- 
ployed in an enveloping movement or the contact of 
divisions near the center of opposing lines. 

It is not necessary that the forces assigned to 
the opposing commanders be equal in strength or 
similar in composition. When equal forces are 
brought into contact with each other under approx- 
imately equal conditions, the exercise is often brought 
to a standstill and a long drawn out combat follows; 
it is not easy to decide the result, and the justice of 
the decisions is not always apparent. In exercises in 
"retreat and pursuit," a disparity is necessary to the 
progress of the exercise. Maneuvers in which the 
opposing forces are composed of different arms or in 
which the various arms appear in different propor- 
tions are especially interesting and instructive in con- 



-70- 

trasting the powers, limitations and peculiar func- 
tions of each. 

If a sufficient familiarity with the tactical em- 
ployment of companies and battalions has already 
been gained through field exercises with troops (which 
are, of course, more valuable than map maneuvers) 
problems involving larger forces and introducing other 
arms should be taken up early; for only a limited view 
of the field of tactics can be gained from the use of 
very small forces or of only one arm of the service. 

Sometimes one of the contending forces is sup- 
posed to be composed of foreign troops, presumably 
for the purpose of giving instruction in the organi- 
zation and tactics of the armies of nations with whom 
we may at some time be at war ; some useful results 
may, no doubt, be gained in this way, but it should 
be remembered that facility in handhng our own 
troops is the object of the first importance to us. 

The situations presented should be plausible. 
Officers are not readily interested in situations which 
appear unnatural or strained; and commanders can 
not form decisions unless the situation is one which 
they can comprehend. If the situation appears to be 
such as might be expected to actually occur in war, 
the participants will more readily become interested 
in it and will act with greater promptness. The most 
plausible problems are those based upon actual situa- 
tions or events drawn from military history. The di- 
rector, by narrating the historical incident upon 
which the problem is based can add greatly to the 
interest of the discussion, and the results which 
really occurred often throw light upon tactical ques- 
tions raised by the maneuver. Problems of this kind 
have the additional advantage of stimulating interest 
in the study of military history. 

It is best to begin with problems of a simple 
character— i.e., in which the missions of the oppos- 



—71— 

ing forces are definite and tangible. For example, 
one party may be instructed to march from Kickapoo 
to Leavenworth and the other be instructed to march 
at the same time from Leavenworth to Kickapoo; or 
one party may be instructed to hold a position and 
the other to attack it, etc. If it is desired that con- 
tact should take place at a particular locality the 
director, in framing the problem, measures back from 
the selected point and starts the opposing forces from 
positions they might have occupied at a certain time, 
say a half-hour, before meeting. If it is to be a prob- 
lem in attack and defense the force on the defensive 
may be moved back only half as far in order to give 
time for the occupation of the position. Many prob- 
lems can be framed bringing about rencounters in 
which the opposing columns approach each other at 
various different angles; and the deployments in dif- 
ferent directions incidental to these exercises form a 
very valuable training for all officers. Problems of 
this kind are problems of execution only but they 
cover an important field of instruction which should 
not be overlooked. When a considerable degree of 
experience has been gained, it will be better to em- 
ploy problems which leave the commanders free, to 
some extent, to act on their own initiative. For in- 
stance, an officer may be assigned command of a de- 
tachment in the theater of operations and informed 
of the approximate situations and objectives of the 
main bodies of the opposing armies but given in- 
structions of only the most general character, or 
instructions which are not recent and which evident- 
ly contemplate a different situation from that which 
appears to exist. Very interesting problems may be 
framed where one or both commanders may be forced 
or induced to abandon their original missions and 
adopt new ones on their own initiative. A body of 
troops may be sent on an offensive mission, but 



—72— 

before reaching its objective unexpectedly encounters 
superior hostile forces; if the commander does not 
promptly realize that the original mission must be 
abandoned and act in conformity with the require- 
ments of the changed situation, he will expose his 
troops to destruction without accomplishing any ade- 
quate results. For instance, a force may be ordered 
to pursue energetically a fleeing and disorganized 
enemy and subsequently finds itself confronted by 
a strong body of fresh hostile troops; if the com- 
mander of the pursuing force does not quickly draw 
correct inferences from the changed demeanor of the 
enemy he -may dash his troops to pieces in an un- 
guarded and ill considered attack. Or the commander 
may be tempted to exchange his original mission for 
one which appears to be more important. By exer- 
cises of this sort military insight is sharpened and 
the offensive spirit is fostered. 

Problems should be varied and progressive. The 
object of the maneuvers, as a means of instruction, 
should be kept in view; the problems should be 
adapted to the proficiency of the participants, should 
be drafted so that the resulting exercises will illus- 
trate different lessons in military art, and should pro- 
gress from the simplest exercises to those presenting 
greater difficulties. These considerations should be 
kept in view in drafting the problems for both sides 
in two-side maneuvers. 

The opposing forces are sometimes started at a 
considerable distance from each other and merely 
given missions which will bring them in contact. 
Events then develop according to the m.ovements de- 
cided upon by the commanders, and the form which 
the exercise will assume cannot be foreseen. While 
exercises of this kind are occasionally desirable, as 
for instance, when instruction in reconnaissance is 
desired, there can be no certainty as to the other 



—73 - 

tactical measures which will be illustrated, and the 
amount and kind of instruction which may be given 
is left to chance. It is apparent that no complete or 
systematic instruction can be given by adhering ex- 
clusively to this method. 

Sometimes the forces are placed in contact at 
the outset and each commander is given such infor- 
mation in regard to his adversary as he would be 
likely, in actual operations, to possess. The latter 
method is especially adapted to the ordinary purposes 
of map maneuvers on account of the limitations of 
the tim.e which can be allotted to a single exercise. 
By placing the troops at once in situations which we 
desire to illustrate, or which will give point to a les- 
son which we desire to teach, we can be sure of 
covering the desired ground in the time available; 
otherwise there is danger of the time being con- 
sumed by preliminary movemients which are not 
especially instructive, or which do not illustrate the 
desired situations. 

A fresh problem should be prepared for each 
meeting. It sometimes happens that the time al- 
lotted slips away before the exercise has developed 
far enough to illustrate clearly the lesson which 
the director has in mind, and there is a temptation 
to postpone the completion of the exercise to another 
meeting. If this is done, there can be no full dis- 
cussion of the course of events up to that time with- 
out disclosing to each party the situation of the 
other. If the discussion is postponed its value is 
impaired, for it is of the greatest value when the 
events discussed are fresh in the minds of every one. 
Besides, officers are not likely to take as much interest 
in the completion of an old problem as they would 
take in a new one. 

For use as an aid in devising problems, the large 
scale maneuver map ordinarily will not be so con- 



—74— 

venient as the guide map, or other small scale map 
showing the tract covered by the maneuver map and 
the adjacent territory. 

HOW INITIATED 

The "situations" may, of course, be given to the 
commanders either at the beginning of the exercise 
or at any convenient time before; but it is customary 
to follow one of the four methods described below. 

1. The problem is transmitted in writing (sealed) 
to the commanders a day or two before the exercise 
begins. This method is suitable when the partici- 
pants have had but little experience or when the 
problem presents unusual difficulties. In this case 
commanders are usually required to submit their first 
orders in writing— and sometimes also a written esti- 
mate of the situation— to the director before the 
time set for the exercise. 

2. The problem is transmitted in writing to the 
commanders a half hour before the exercise. This 
method gives them time to familiarize themselves 
with the situation, to reflect upon the courses of action 
open to them, and to form their decisions; it approx- 
imates the conditions of war, for in actual service 
commanders are always familiar with the greater 
part of the elements of the military situation, and the 
most rapid decisions are based on conditions which 
present but few new features. In this case the 
commanders are expected to be ready to announce 
their decisions and give their orders when they are 
first called to the map. 

3. The problem is given at the beginning of the 
exercise. One of the parties— say the Blue — is called 
to the map; if the situations are in writing the com- 
mander reads them aloud to his assistants, otherwise 
the director communicates the situation orally. The 
members of the Blue party refer to the map to famil- 



—75- 

iarize themselves with the locahties named and retire. 
The situation is then communicated in a similar man- 
ner to the Red party and, when they have retired, 
the Blues are again called to the map, the Blue com- 
mander assigns his assistants to subordinate com- 
mands, communicates his intentions and orders to ' 
the director, and the maneuver begins. 

This method, no doubt, offers less opportunity 
for reflection than would ordinarily be the case in 
war. But one of the greatest benefits to be obtained 
from map maneuvers is practice in estimating situa- 
tions rapidly and in forming decisions promptly, and 
it is believed that — for officers who are familiar with 
this work— it will generally be found to be the most 
suitable. 

4. There is another method of starting a map 
maneuver which is frequently used in the German 
army and which possesses many advantages. A day 
or more before the exercise, the problem for the Red 
commander is sent to each of the officers assigned to 
the Red party, and the problem of the Blue com- 
mander is similarly sent to all the Blues. Certain 
definite requirements are appended to the problem — 
for instance the commander's estimate of the situa- 
tion and initial orders may be asked for. The prob- 
lems are solved as map problems and the solutions 
are submitted to the director at a designated time be- 
fore the exercise. The director examines all of the 
solutions and selects two, one for each side, which he 
thinks would lead to interesting and instructive situ- 
ations, and designates the authors of these solutions 
as the commanders. By this method the director can 
give the maneuver the form which he desires without 
detracting from the initiative of the commanders and 
gains in advance an insight into the intentions of both; 
he may be able to carry the maneuver through 
some preliminary steps at once and thus gain time. 



—76— 

All of the participants are, in this way, made familiar 
with the problem, the interest in it is more general, 
and fewer explanations are required. This method 
can be used to advantage only when the initial prob- 
lems for both sides are good map problems; it has 
been successfully employed in the Army Staff College 
and in the post graduate schools of some posts. 

A commander can give the director a clear idea 
of his dispositions by means of a sketch. Sketches 
are useful even when (as is usually the case) they 
show no topography and are not drawn to scale, but 
merely show distances, intervals and the strength of 
units by means of figures. If the commander has 
tracing paper or thin typewriter paper, he can place 
it on the maneuver map or on his guide map and 
draw an accurate representation of the position of 
his troops, trenches, etc. Drawings of this kind 
greatly facilitate the work of the director, diminish- 
ing the number of notes required, and draw attention 
to details which might otherwise be overlooked. 

ACCESORIES 

The room used by the director should communi- 
cate with another, which should be well lighted and 
provided with chairs, tables, and writing materials 
where officers who are not engaged at the map can 
smoke, talk, read, or write at their convenience. 
The selection of a room opening only into a hail- 
perhaps cold and ill lighted— where officers have to 
await their turns at the map, will only cause map 
maneuvers to be regarded as a hardship and bring 
them into disfavor. 

The task of seeing that the proper maneuver 
map is laid out, and that small scale maps, scales, 
blocks, etc. , are provided, will in most cases devolve 
upon the director; he should also see that two or three 
pads of message blanks and sufficient paper for notes, 
sketches, and orders are at hand. The Field Service 



—77— 

Regulations, and the drill regulations of the different 
arms should be conveniently accessible. 

DIRECTOR'S ASSISTANT 

It is believed that exercises in minor tactics v^ill 
in most cases proceed more smoothly and rapidly, 
and that better results will be attained if only one 
maneuver map is used, and the director keeps his own 
notes, dispensing with an assistant. If, however, 
an assistant can be found who will follow the exer- 
cise attentively, jot down quietly the necessary notes 
without being told to do so, mea'sure distances 
marched, compute road spaces — time necessary for 
deployments, etc., and who will be always ready 
with needed information, he will contribute greatly 
to the success of the maneuver and lighten the work 
of the director. 

But if it is necessary to tell the assistant what 
he should take down, or if when asked for certain 
data— as, for instance, "When did the Blue cavalry 
reach Kickapoo?"— he is unable to answer without a 
prolonged search through his notes and the making 
of new computations, it becomes apparent that the 
director could do better without him. A communica- 
tive assistant who becomes so interested in the exer- 
cise that he cannot refrain from seeking to exchange 
views with the director and the commanders is not 
desirable. 

In complicated maneuvers involving large bodies 
of troops two assistants are sometimes used, one 
keeping notes of the Blue force and the other of the 
Red. But nothing is gained by the division of labor 
unless the assistants work smoothly and quietly and 
without unnecessary conversation. 

Notes in regard to features of the exercise which 
the director wishes to bring up in the discussion had 
best in any case be taken down by himself. 



—78— 

Duty as a director's assistant should be accepta- 
ble to young officers as it affords the best means of 
preparation for the duty of director. 

DECISIONS 

The director is the arbiter in all cases of doubt 
and his decisions admit of no appeal. The questions 
which he must decide are many and various. The 
imperfections of maps, even when they are of large 
scale, render the representation of the smallest de- 
tails of military operations dependent, in a large 
measure, upon the imagination; in order to be able 
to carry out successfully such exercises as patrolling, 
the director must have a ready imagination and the 
power of describing vividly scenes which suggest 
themselves to him. His imagination must always be 
on the alert to interpret the map and supply its de- 
ficiencies. Thus a director may be heard to say, 
pointing to a blue hne on the map: "The banks of 
this stream are steep and six feet high; the stream 
itself is swollen by recent rains; it is fordable but 
the current is swift and the bottom soft; you are de- 
layed fifteen minutes, etc." The height and density 
of forests, the height of hedges, grass and standing 
crops, the condition of the ground as affected by the 
weather, etc., must often be decided by the di- 
rector in the same way. When the problem involves 
the employment of larger bodies of troops, the smal- 
ler details fall into the background and the strain 
on the imagination diminishes. In handling forces 
so large that the element of personal leadership of 
the commander is lost, and orders and messages are 
written, the work done in the map maneuver does 
not differ greatly from that done at the headquarters 
of a commander in the field. 

The most frequent decisions are in regard to the 
rates at which troops march. The rate of march of 



—79— 

infantry or mixed troops is ordinarily taken at eighty 
yards per minute under favorable circumstances, 
when computed for considerable distances, — this rate 
makes allowance for the usual halts. When consid- 
ering the rate for short distances, as in deployments, 
this rate is taken at eighty-eight yards per minute. 
The time, in minutes, required for the deployment of 
a column of infantry or mixed troops, is determined 
by dividing the length of the column in yards by 
eighty-eight. Infantry may increase the rate of 
march for short distances by "stepping out" (for in- 
stance when going into action) to 110 yards per min- 
ute. Double time is little used. 

The rates of march of cavalry and field artillery 
are: — walk 110 yards, trot 220 yards, and gallop 330 
yards. The rate of movement of staff officers and 
weH mounted messengers in carrying "urgent" mes- 
sages and orders is taken at 440 yards per minute 
and the rate of charging cavalry at 660 yards. The 
rate of march of cavalry over considerable distances 
including halts, the walk and trot alternating, is taken 
at 5 miles per hour or 146 yards per minute* All 
of the foregoing rates apply only to favorable con- 
ditions,— fresh troops, good roads, etc. Heat, steep 
slopes, mud, cultivated ground, standing crops, thick 
brush, and other unfavorable conditions reduce the 
rates of march, and must be taken into consideration 
by the director. 

Slopes less than 3° do not affect the rate of march 
but for greater slopes suitable allowances should be 
made. Slopes greater than 5*^ affect the breathing 
and may reduce effectiveness of the fire of infantry 
if brought into action immediately afterward. Very 
short slopes are not taken into consideration. 

Questions of visibility arise frequently, — and the 
distance, intervening obstacles, weather, state o f the 

*The rates given are intended merely as a guide; they should be mod- 
ified whenever by doing so real conditions can be approached more closely. 



atmosphere, and the size, position, and motion of 
the object must be taken into consideration. It does 
not follow that a patrol has been seen because it has 
reaced the top of a hill within sight of the enemy, 
for this would happen only if the patrol were care- 
less. 

In deciding questions of visibility it would be 
well to keep in mind the general rules to be found in 
Par. 75 of the Small Arms Firing Manual (1909). 

The results of hostile contact must be decided by 
the director according to his judgment based on con- 
sideration of the circumstances of the case. Decis- 
ions on the results of hostile contact will ordinarily 
be of one or more of the following classes: 

1. That troops are not to advance for, a stated 
period. 

2. That they are not to advance at all unless ad- 
equately reinforced. 

3. That they must retire to a designated posi- 
tion. 

4. That they cannot be used offensively for a 
stated period. 

Losses are estimated by the director in accordance 
with his judgment, based on his experience and study 
of modern wars. In most cases the estimate of losses 
need not be stated and is taken into consideration 
only in determining their probable effect on the con- 
duct of the troops sustaining them. 

A study of "The Rifle in War" by Captain Eames, 
Pars. 171-188 Small Arms Firing Manual (1909), 
and of Pars. 17—20 Proposed Regulations for Field 
Maneuvers (1908) will be of assistance to officers in 
preparing them to be able to judge the effect of fire. 

All decisions should be prompt and unequivocal. 
Mistakes are pardoned more easily than unreasonable 
slowness. "Slowness has always been the greatest 
enemy of the game" (Meckel). The poorest direc- 



-81— 

tor is not the one who makes the most mistakes, but 
rather one who decides slowly and hesitatingly, or 
whose decisions are not clear and definite. 

The director sometimes states briefly the reasons 
on which his decisions are based, especially in cases 
of hostile contact. "The best results are attained 
when the decisions of the director carry conviction 
with them" (Meckel). But the limits of the time 
allotted for the exercise will ordinarily restrict dis- 
cussions to the one held at the close of the exercise. 

When officers having extended experience or 
special knowledge are present, the director will do 
well to avail himself of the opportunity to consult 
them in regard to difficult questions, and may request 
them to deliver opinions at length to the participants. 
For instance, if an artillery officer is present he may 
be asked to give an opinion as to the effect of artil- 
lery fire in a particular case. But in all cases the di- 
rector is the final arbiter and is not necessarily bound 
by such opinions. * 

The director should avoid restricting the initia- 
tive of commanders. When a course of action is im- 
posed on a commander which is not his own choice, 
he is likely to become careless of the results and lose 
interest in the exercise. The director generally has 
in view a special lesson which he wishes to illustrate 
by means of the maneuver, but this should not lead 
him to overrule the decisions of commanders in order 
to lead the exercise into a particular channel. He 
is sometimes compelled to interfere to prevent the 
occurrence of grotesque or impossible situations; but 

*Maior Immanuel recommends that important decisions be made by 
special umpires, other than the director; but later writers do not endorse 
this method. Meckel favors the use of dice for the same purpose. These 
methods would relieve the director of much responsibility and would, es- 
pecially when the' director is no older in service than the other participants, 
make his task lighter; but it is believed that more satisfactory^ results will 
generally be obtained when the director makes the decisions himself, and 
that officers of our army will not shrink from the responsibility involved. 



—82— 

these may usually be avoided by the exercise of tact 
in giving information and in rendering decisions. 

PROGRESS OF THE MANEUVER 

We will suppose that the commanders on both 
sides have given their orders, explained their in- 
tentions and gone out, leaving the director alone at 
the map. He examines the movements of each 
separate body of troops and determines which par- 
ticipant is the first to receive important information, 
likely to cause him to form a new decision (for ex- 
ample, he gains contact with the enemy). The 
director now computes the time at which the infor- 
mation is received (say 8 a.m.). It is usually best, 
especially for inexperienced directors, to move all 
troops on both sides up to the positions they will 
occupy at that time (8 a.m.) and take notes showing 
their positions at that hour, before caUing in any 
one. 

This gives him a new situation and the informa- 
tion to be given the commander may be affected by 
the new positions of supporting troops or of other 
bodies of the enemy than those with which contact 
has been gained. In this way the director is sure 
that he is keeping everything in order. With ex- 
perience, however, the director learns to determine 
for himself which troops must be moved, and he 
does not move them unnecessarily. 

The steps by which a two sided map maneuver 
proceeds are ordinarily as follows: 

1. A commander* is called to the map. 

2. The director imparts to him the military sit- 
uation, including the time, the location of his troops, 
what he has seen or heard, the messages received, etc. 

*The word " commander" is used here broadly to include not only the 
two commanders-in-chief, but all participants who may give orders, for ex- 
ample, commanders of detached bodies of cavalry, of advance guards, flank 
guards, etc. 



-83— 

3. The commander announces his decision, gives 
his orders, and retires. 

4. The director decides upon the result of the 
orders and carries on the exercise until the situation 
changes to such an extent that one or more of the 
commanders will probably form new decisions. One 
of these officers is called to the map and the same 
steps are repeated. 

The more closely the dialogues between the di- 
rector and the commanders are confined to the mat- 
ters here stated, the more smoothly and rapidly will 
the exercise progress. If the commander does not 
clearly understand the situation as presented to him, 
or if the director does not fully understand the de- 
cisions and orders given, the necessary questions 
should be asked and answered. 

In deciding upon the order in which officers 
should be called to the map, the director should keep 
in mind their supposed positions and the initiative 
properly belonging to each; for instance, in the case 
of a division whose advance guard has come in con- 
tact with an enemy, there will be company and bat- 
talion commanders at the head of the advance guard 
who must take action before they can receive orders 
from the advance guard commander; and the advance 
guard commander must usually take action before he 
can obtain orders from the division commander. The 
action of subordinates in such cases may not always 
be approved of by the superior, but the director 
should carry out the order of the officer who properly 
acts first, and the superior is permitted to modify 
such dispositions later, if he desires to do so, by 
means of such orders as could actually be issued. 

If, in the initial situation, one or both of the 
forces is supposed to be in column, the commander 
may be permitted or required to give the order of 
march. He usually does this after leaving the ma- 



neuver map by making a drawing of an imaginary 
straight road and drawing his troops on it, showing 
in letters and figures the strength of each part of his 
force and the distances between them, the strength 
and intervals of flank guards, etc. This drawing is 
not necessarily made to scale nor to show topo- 
graphical features; it is turned in to the director or 
to the assistant when the commander comes to the 
map again and becomes a part of the records. If a 
force is occupying a defensive position, a position in 
readiness, or is in camp or bivouac, its commander is 
usually required to make an outline tracing either 
from the maneuver map or from his guide map 
(using tracing paper or thin typewriter paper) and 
draw his troops on it in the positions he selects for 
them. His position is usually fixed approximately 
by the problem, as, for instance, "You are in com- 
mand of a regiment of cavalry which is in bivouac 
on Seminary Ridge in the vicinity of the Lutheran 
Seminary with outposts along Willoughby Run," etc., 
but the details of the position are usually left to the 
commander. The drawings and tracings serve to 
make the situation more definite and to compel at- 
tention to details which might otherwise be over- 
looked. 

If the commander called in is one who has been 
called in before, the information which he is supposed 
to have received (from observation, messages, re- 
ports, etc.) since he left the map should be imparted 
to him in the order in which he is supposed to have 
received it, by means of a continuous narrative of 
events. The situation is developed continuously 
without breaks or jumps. The commander may 
interpose orders whenever he thinks the situation 
requires them. 

It is generally preferable to avoid asking com- 
manders the questions, "What do you decide to do?" 



—85— 

or "What orders do you give?" for these questions 
might be taken as admonitions that new decisions or 
orders are expected. Orders should be given v^ith- 
out prompting and should be the natural outcome of 
the situations presented. However, the director will 
prompt inexperienced commanders when it appears 
advisable to assist them, and will prompt others, if 
necessary, rather than permit the exercise to lag 
and become tedious. After a degree of experience 
has been acquired, the director may note the time 
consumed by the commanders in forming decisions 
and giving orders, and add this time to that required 
for the execution of the orders given, in determining 
the total time consumed by the movement. The di- 
rector can take the time readily by starting a stop 
watch immediately after communicating the situa- 
tion and stopping it when the order has been given. 

If the director does not think the decision or or- 
der to be a good one under the circumstances, he 
should avoid betraying his opinion at the time. Faulty 
dispositions are best shown to be such by their results, 
and the director should, as a rule, reserve his opinions 
for the discussion. 

If the commander expresses an intention to issue 
a written order or send a written message, the 
order or message is not ordinarily written while 
at the map; its substance is stated verbally and 
taken down by the director or the assistant, but it 
should be actually written as soon as practicable and 
handed to the director. ' 'Such written work, done in 
the hurry and excitement of the game, is more useful 
and instructive than preliminary work done at home 
with plenty of time. We should require it often" 
(V. Litzmann). 

When the opposing forces are started a consider- 
able distance apart, time can be saved by using only 
the guide map during the preliminary movements, 



taking up the large scale maneuver map and the 
blocks when the forces come into contact. 

A commander sometimes states his intentions and 
wishes in great detail, —giving not only his orders 
but an extended description of the manner in which 
he wishes them carried out. In the case of small 
bodies which the commander is supposed to lead 
personally, this may be permitted to a reasonable ex- 
tent; but in the case of troops removed from his per- 
sonal supervision, it must be kept in mind that they 
are not animated by his individual intelligence. He 
must communicate to the director the orders he gives 
them and the director will decide the time at which 
the order could reach them and the manner in which 
the order is complied with. The order must'be brief, 
clear and definite or it will fail to accomplish the ob- 
ject for which it is intended. 

It is objectionable to question commanders as to 
the manner in which their orders are to be carried 
out. The director should draw upon his own ex- 
perience and general information and — when neces- 
sary—on his imagination for aid in carrying on the 
exercise. For instance, on receiving a commander's 
order, he may reply, — "Your troops deployed and 
moved forward at 9.40 A. M. as you ordered, but on 
reaching the position where I place this block they re- 
ceived a heavy rifle fire from the railroad cut here in 
your front and from this hill on your left. The ene- 
my appeared to occupy a continuous line from this 
point to this, but you did not see any intrenchments. 
The suddenness and intensity of the fire caused your 
line to fall back in some confusion, though with 
slight loss, to the cover of the woods here. The 
movement occupied twenty minutes and you have 
used the next ten minutes in restoring order in your 
ranks. It is now 10.10 A.M.," etc., etc. 

It often happens that when a commander returns 



—87— 

to the map he finds, to his disappointment, that or- 
ders previously given have been imperfectly obeyed 
and that his intentions have not been fully carried 
out. At such times there is a temptation to make 
protests and enter into explanations which are likely 
to consume a great deal of time. Of course the 
director will consider that such protests and explana- 
tions are made in good faith and do not result from a 
desire to issue what are sometimes called "ex post 
facto" orders, — that the intentions stated have been 
actually communicated to him and are not such as 
were completely formed only after the commander 
had left the map. Nevertheless, it is usually a mis- 
take to attempt to change the course of the exercise 
in consequence of such protests. The commander's 
proper remedy is to avoid such mishaps by stating his 
intentions and giving his orders so clearly and de- 
cidedly that they cannot be misunderstood. If he 
finds it difficult to do this, he should remember that 
it will be still more difficult when commanding troops 
in the field and that the effort to overcome this diffi- 
culty is beneficial to himself. 

There is this notable difference between the ex- 
ercise of command in a map m.aneuver and the exer- 
cise of command in the field, that in the map ma- 
neuver the commander can not change his mind till 
the sitliation changes. In the field a commander 
may form a decision and issue orders pursuant to it 
and then, upon more mature reflection and without 
external cause, alter his decision and countermand 
his orders. Map maneuvers offer no opportunity for 
this and it is not desirable that they should do so. 

It sometimes happens that a director, after learn- 
ing a commander's intentions and receiving his or- 
ders, calls him to the map again before these orders 
have been fully complied with, for the purpose of 
imparting to him some information which is of only 



minor importance and not of a nature likely to 
cause him to alter his decision. In such cases the 
commander can only reiterate the desire that his or- 
ders be carried out; and it becomes apparent that it 
was only a waste of time to recall him. 

The director's skill and tact will be called into 
play in deciding how far the exercise may be carried, 
after hearing the intentions and orders of the oppos- 
ing commanders. If he carries it forward only short 
intervals before recalling the commanders, the ma- 
neuver progresses slowly and there is danger of its 
becoming tedious. If he carries it further he must 
at times, mentally personate one or more of the com- 
manders and act for them in accordance with the in- 
tentions which they have expressed. Of course this 
is a fruitful source of differences of opinion, as the 
commander may claim that he would have acted dif- 
ferently if he had been allowed to act for himself. 
These difficulties are only to be avoided through care 
on the part of the director in learning the intentions 
of the commanders, and a degree of fairness on their 
part, which will be shown by a willingness to admit 
that they might have acted as the director has done. 

The time at which the situation will have changed 
sufficiently to make it advisable to communicate the 
changed conditions to the officers concerned should 
at first be determined by measurements, computa- 
tions and study. Practice and experience will give 
facility and rapidity in this work, and the director 
will learn to estimate time and space without con- 
siderable errors. It is important that the movements 
of troops be developed in detail and in an orderly 
way without losing the sequence of events or omit- 
ting any troops from consideration, but the exact 
periods of time consumed are of less importance. 

. The director's skill and good judgment will also 
be shown by hurrying over movements which are in- 



—89— 

decisive or uninstructive, and in dwelling upon those 
from which valuable lessons may be learned. Inter- 
esting situations should be fully shown with blocks 
to as many officers as practicable, consistently with 
the requirements of the maneuver. Sometimes par- 
tial discussions of such situations take place, but or- 
dinarily the limitations of time will restrict discus- 
sions to the close of the exercise. 

If the object of the exercise is to illustrate the 
work of cavalry, the cavalry operations will be con- 
sidered in detail; but it will not be desirable to make 
every exercise a special study of cavalry operations 
and, in order to reach other phases of the maneuver 
in the allotted time, it will often be necessary to pass 
over the work of the cavalry rapidly. 

The first stages of contact between the cavalry 
detachments of the opposing forces are often inter- 
esting. It may be that one cavalry commander has 
his troops dispersed and out of hand and that his an- 
tagonist can break through and secure important 
results. But if it appears that neither cavalry 
can make headway against the other or that 
the cavalry action will have but little influence 
on the course of the maneuver, the remaining 
forces may be brought at once to a position in 
which important decisions are required of their com- 
manders, A proper allowance of maneuver time 
should, of course, be made for operations thus passed 
over, though the director may dispose of them in a 
few minutes; and the commanders should be furnish- 
ed such information as they would be hkely to obtain 
during the operations omitted. 

It is not necessary to follow the course of every 
patrol sent out, though those likely to obtain import- 
ant information should be followed, not only with a 
view to ascertaining the information which they will 



—90— 

obtain, but also to fix the time when this information 
will be received by the commander. 

As many members of each party are called to the 
map at one time as can be done consistently with the 
requirements of the situation. This is done in order 
to enable as many officers as possible to derive in- 
struction from the exercise. However, when impor- 
tant information is given to one member of a party 
and cannot properly be communicated to the others 
until a later stage of the exercise (when the informa- 
tion could reach them by the means of communi- 
cation supposed to be employed) this officer writes 
the information given him on a message blank and 
gives it to the director, who calculates the time re- 
quired for it to reach the' officer to whom it is ad- 
dressed and, at the proper time, delivers it to him. 
A message which is not likely to cause the officer to 
whom it is addressed to form a new decision may be 
handed to him at once and there is no need of com- 
puting the time of its receipt. 

Maneuvers in grand tactics (called by Meckel 
"the great war game" and by Von Litzmann ''the 
game for experts") are conducted in practically the 
the same way as maneuvers in minor tactics; maps 
of somewhat smaller scale and representing larger 
tracts of country are used, larger forces are employed, 
minor details are given less consideration and as a 
rule only the older and more experienced officers 
take part. 

USE OF BLOCKS 

The blocks representing troops are, as a rule, 
handled only by the director. In some cases, how- 
ever, commanders may be instructed to place blocks 
to show the disposition of their troops, — for instance, 
in the case of an outpost or in the occupation of a de- 
fensive position, where the commander has ample 



—91— 

time to post his troops as he wishes. But the ordi- 
nary method in such cases is to require the comman- 
der to make a sketch or tracing showing his disposi- 
tions. 

Directors differ greatly in their modes of using 
the blocks (or other means of representing troops). 
They are not indispensable— map maneuvers can be 
carried on without them. But a skillful employment 
of blocks will contribute greatly to the success of an 
exercise. By their use the director can illustrate a 
situation quickly and with few words— saving time 
and trouble and giving the commander a clearer view 
of the situation than could be done without them. 

The blocks will also aid the director's memory, for 
when a situation has been illustrated by blocks a 
more vivid and lasting impression is produced by it 
on the mind. A liberal use of blocks makes the ex- 
ercise more definite and insures attention to impor- 
tant details which might otherwise be overlooked. 

The blocks themselves present valuable object 
lessons and their use will insure correct ideas being 
formed in regard to the space occupied on the map 
by the various organizations in different formations. 

The method generally used is to place on the 
map blocks representing all of the troops of the party 
at the map and only such troops of the other party 
as are supposed to be seen. 

Some directors use blocks only occasionally and 
incidentally, to indicate the location of troops which 
they are describing at the time. The blocks are re- 
moved as soon as this purpose has been accomplished. 
The director relies on his memory- - assisted by pen- 
cil notes— to carry the troops. In this way the 
whole of the map can be shown to the commanders, 
and exercises can be carried on more rapidly. 

But until a degree of experience has been ac- 
quired, directors may find it preferable *to represent 



-92— 

on the map all the troops employed and to keep 
these representations on the map throughout the 
exercise. It is then necessary to cover up with a 
newspaper or the top of a card board box the blocks 
representing troops hostile to the party at the map, 
excepting such as are supposed to be seen by them. 
There can be no reasonable objection to covering parts 
of the map representing ground that could not be seen 
from the supposed position of the commander at the 
map, for the map is to be regarded— not as a map- 
but as the maneuver ground. When a part of the 
map is covered, care should be taken to cover the 
greater part of it, in order to avoid disclosing the 
location of the troops covered. The realism of the 
exercise is heightened by covering parts of the map 
showing ground which would not be visible to the 
commanders if they were actually on the ground with 
the troops, and such parts of the map are sometimes 
covered merely for this purpose. 

Representing all troops with blocks will prevent 
many of the mistakes which beginners sometimes 
fall into, such as ordering different bodies of troops 
to march in such a manner that two or more must 
occupy the same space at the same time, ordering 
columns to cross each other's lines of march, etc., 
and certain tactical lessons are inculcated. But these 
lessons need not be repeated indefinitely, and, in the 
case of officers who are familiar with the space and 
time involved in the handling of troops, the exact 
manner of representing troops on the map decreases 
in importance. With practice the director can learn 
to remove blocks from the map without losing track 
of the troops which they represent; and, when all the 
participants are familiar with map maneuvers, a col- 
umn may be sufficiently represented by placing a pin 
to show the location of its leading element, a battery 
or a battalion may be shown by placing on the map a 



—93— 

scrap of paper, a button, a piece of a broken match, 
etc. 

HOW FAR CARRIED 

After contact has been gained between the op- 
posing forces at several points it becomes more diffi- 
cult for the director to tarry on the exercise in a 
plausible manner and with due regard for the wishes 
of all of the participants who would be concerned. 
For this reason some authorities recommend discon- 
tinuing the maneuver as soon as the greater part of 
the troops on both sides are committed to an engage- 
ment. ' 'For, while during the advance and the de- 
ployment the actions of only a few persons (the com- 
manders) need be considered," says Lt. Col. v. 
Zimmerman, "with the opening of an engagement 
the actions of a great number of subordinates, from 
lieutenants to squad leaders, have to be taken into 
account, and this makes the conduct of the game and 
a consideration of details impossible." But combats 
between small forces— not larger than regiments — 
can be carried through very well. And engagements 
between larger forces (brigades and divisions) can be 
carried on by "playing open" (with all participants at 
the map). 

The difficulty of conducting the engagements of 
large forces can be greatly reduced by limiting the 
number of the participants, restricting them to the 
higher grades and permitting them to give orders 
no more in detail than is usually done by officers of 
their grades. For instance, in mixed brigades the 
officers assigned to commands would be the brigade 
commander, the regimental commanders and the 
commander of the cavalry; the commander of the 
leading regiment might command the advance guard 
until its functions were terminated, the commander 
of the next regiment might also command the artil- 



—94 — 

lery and the brigade commander might also command 
the last regiment and the reserve. By assigning no 
officers to command battalions or smaller units and 
by permitting the participants to decide only such 
questions as properly fall to the province of the bri- 
gade, regimental, artillery and cavalry commanders, 
the director may keep the control of the execution of 
all details in his own hands and greatly simplify the 
conduct of the exercise. * 

The maneuver should certainly be carried far 
enough to illustrate the tactical lessons which the di- 
rector has in view and to show the results of the 
measures adopted by the commanders. But it is not 
always necessary to carry engagements through to 
accomplish this. For instance, if the exercise is de- 
signed to illusLrate the reconnaissance preceding ser- 
ious contact, it may be terminated at the preliminary 
stage of the engagement and the discussion be re- 
stricted to the effectiveness of the measures adopted 
by both sides for gaining information. Or the exer- 
cise may be started with a situation in which the ad- 
vance guards of the opposing forces are in contact; 
each commander is given the information which he 
probably would have obtained up to that time; the 
advance guard action may be followed out; the artil- 
lery be brought into action and the orders given for 
the employment of the main bodies; the exercise 
may be terminated with a discussion of the prelimi- 
nary stages of the combat. The final stages of a 
combat or the breaking off of an engagement can be 
illustrated in similar ways. Two or three situations 
well illustrated and thoroughly discussed are better 
than a long series of events run over so hastily that 
they do not leave any complete picture in the mind. 

*Ininianual, Litzmann, and OberlincJober each give examples of engage- 
ments between mixed brigades being carried through to a decision. And 
in Von Verdy's classic "Beitrag zu Kriegspiel" one of the forces is defeated 
and retires from the field. 



-95- 



PLAYINQ OPEN 



When the time allotted to the exercise has nearly 
expired and most of the troops on both sides have 
been drawn into the engagement or committed to 
definite courses of action, the director usually calls 
both parties to the map and the exercise is brought 
to a conclusion quickly, the commanders giving their 
orders in the presence of each other and the director 
developing the situation rapidly in accordance with 
them. 

DURATION 

A map maneuver should not, as a rule, last over 
three hours; its real limit is the endurance of the di- 
rector. When he becomes fatigued the exercise is 
likely to drag and become unprofitable. 

SPECTATORS 

Spectators will show tact and consideration by 
refraining from addressing questions or remarks to 
the director during the exercise. Interruptions of 
this kind delay the exercise greatly and may prevent 
its being brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Con- 
versation among spectators which is loud enough to 
be heard by commanders sometimes divulges infor- 
mation which should not be given them, and is other- 
wise a source of annoyance. 

DISCUSSION 

All maneuvers should be followed by a discussion. 
The director should state the strength and mission 
of each of the opposing forces, if they have not al- 
ready become known to all, and should make such an 
explanation of the situation at the beginning of the 
exercise as may be necessary to make clear the les- 
sons to be learned from it. He then recapitulates 
briefly the events of the maneuver, and comments on 
its salient features, —dwelling chiefly on the most in- 



—96 - 

structive situations presented and the most important 
decisions formed. 

He should not leave the commanders with the im- 
pression that he regards their dispositions as the 
best possible when, as a matter of fact, he thinks them 
faulty; on the other hand he should avoid harsh 
criticism. He will ordinarily avoid saying, for in- 
stance, ' ' Captain X made a mistake in failing to 
attack." Such expressions as "If Captain X had 
attacked promptly the results would have been more 
favorable in this case, " or, "Under the circumstances 
I beheve that an attack was advisable," etc., do not 
give offense, and emphasize tactical lessons suffi- 
ciently. In most cases the commanders have already 
seen the unfavorable results of their bad judgment 
or oversight and there is no need for the director to 
harp on them. 

It often happens that the maneuver cannot be 
brought to a satisfactory completion in the time 
allotted. It should, nevertheless, be closed with a 
discussion as stated above. 

If time permits, the commanders are asked to 
explain the reasons for their decisions, but the dis- 
cussion should never be allowed to turn into a lengthy 
argument over a point which conveys no tactical 
lesson or which does not interest any considerable 
number of the participants. The director should 
retain control over the discussion as he has done 
over the maneuver, and should keep in mind that 
practical military instruction is the chief object of 
both. 

If there are experienced officers present as spec- 
tators, who have followed the exercise with interest, 
they may be invited, during the discussion, to make 
comments; their remarks are often a source of pleas- 
ure and profit to all the participants. 



-97— 



TWO MAPS 



It sometimes happens that no guide maps can be 
obtained and that several copies of the maneuver 
map are available. In this case each party may be 
provided with a copy of the large scale map, and 
assigned to separate rooms, or to opposite ends of 
one large room w^ith a screen between them. The 
maneuver is carried on simultaneously on both maps. 
Both parties remain continuouslj'^ at their maps and 
may keep on them blocks representing all of their 
own troops and of bodies of hostile troops whose 
location is known. The director must frequently 
pass from one map to the other. The commanders 
are sometimes required to write their decisions, 
orders and intentions and hand them to the director 
when he visits the map; sometimes they are com- 
municated to him orally. The director, after obtain- 
ing the orders, etc., overlooks the map, makes need- 
ful decisions as to rates of march, results of hostile 
contact, gives suitable information of the enemy and 
carries the exercise on until it becomes necessary for 
him to consult the other party. Great care is neces- 
sary to keep the situations shown on both maps consist- 
ent with each other. It is sometimes discovered that 
troops of both parties have occupied the same ground, 
making it necessary to repeat certain movements — 
giving additional or different information. This 
method works very well during the early stages of a 
maneuver in which the opposing forces are not in 
contact at the outset, but it is usually advisable to 
conclude the exercise entirely on one map. 

The protracted study of a large scale map per- 
mitted by this method — especially of portions of it 
not supposed to have been reached by the troops 
employed— does not approximate the conditions of 
warfare, for the commanders act with a more com- 



—98- 

plete knowledge of the terrain than they would ever 
have in war. 

This method is in common use in the French 
army. 

THREE MAPS 

A method which was formerly very common, but 
now little used in tactical exercises, consists in giv- 
ing each party and the director separate rooms, large 
scale maneuver maps and sets of blocks and scales. 
One large room may be used, separating the three 
maps by screens. The director places on his map 
blocks representing all troops on both sides and 
keeps them on his map throughout the exercise. 
The orders and intentions of the commanders are 
ordinarily written and sent to the director by mes- 
sengers; the decisions and information furnished by 
the director are sent to the commanders in the same 
way. But in some cases commanders are called to 
the director's map to receive information and give 
orders orally; portions of the director's map occupied 
by hostile troops not supposed to be visible are then 
concealed by a screen. Sometimes there are assist- 
ants to the director, one of whom visits the Red 
room, the other the Blues, to obtain orders, convey 
information, move the blocks and make records; and 
these assistants may be authorized to make certain 
decisions — for instance, in regard to rates of march. 

The three map method is the one commonly used 
in England. 

Captain E. Dubois, of the French army, recom- 
mends giving each commander a plate of ground 
glass which he lays upon the maneuver map and 
draws his troops on it with colored pencils. The 
glass plates are then sent to the director who places 
both plates on his map, one above the other, and can 
thus see the entire situation. A modification of this 



—99— 

method has been in use for several years at our 
Naval War College and has recently been tried in our 
Army War College with satisfactory results. Sheets 
of transparent celluloid are used instead of the 
ground glass recommended by Captain Dubois. 

The objections to the three map method are that 
the continuous use of large scale maps by the com- 
manders does not simulate war conditions, the ex- 
ercise is carried on slowly, more writing is required, 
and the commanders are not kept in as close touch 
with the director as is desirable in tactical exercises. 

The three map method is, however, well adapted 
to siege operations, to the naval war game, and to 
strategic maneuvers. 

SIEGE MANEUVERS 

Map maneuvers have long been known to be 
specially well adapted to problems in the attack and 
defense of fortified positions. A work on this sub- 
ject entitled "Directions for the Fortress War 
Game," by Major Neumann, was published at Berlin 
in 1872, and in 1874 a work on the same subject by 
Von Makowiczka was published at Vienna. Numer- 
ous works on the same subject have appeared in 
recent years, among which may be mentioned those 
by Colonel Kunde (1899), by Captain Krisak (1901), 
by Major Schroeter (1904), by Major Schwarte (1905), 
by Scharr (1905), by Frobenius (1906), by Von Brun- 
ner (1906), and by Fritsch (1907). 

The war game maps especially suited to siege op- 
erations are "North Front of Paris," "Sedan" and 
"Toul— Verdun;" all pubHshed by Voss, Berlin. 

NAVAL WAR GAME 

The naval war game is conducted at the Naval 
War College at Washington as follows: —the officers 
solving different portions of the problem are isolated 



—100- 

from each other when they would actually be so sep- 
arated in actual service, and all messages, orders, etc., 
are forwarded in writing through the umpire, who 
holds them for a length of time corresponding to the 
time which it would take to transmit the message in 
actual service. Each map used is covered with large 
sheets of celluloid, the sheets being oriented by means 
of reference marks. After each move the change on 
each individual map is noted on a small piece of cel- 
luloid which is divided into four squares of 4 inches 
each; all of these "transfer sheets" are carried to 
the umpire, who plots all moves on his sheet. After 
this has been done, those solving the problem may 
erase their work as they see fit, for all plottings made 
by the umpire are kept as the record of the game. 
In order to keep this record clean, the umpire places 
his work on as many sheets as he requires, giving to 
each a number for the purpose of identification. At 
the conclusion of the game a draftsman plots the 
principal moves from the umpire's report, and this 
forms the permanent record. 

The sides are divided into sections, the principle 
governing the division being that officers commanding 
squadrons separated by considerable distances, such 
that a communication that would have to be carried 
on by means of a chain of wireless messages, or by 
means of repeated cablegrams, are kept in separate 
rooms and communicate with each other only by 
means of messages. These are written as a telegram 
would be written, and a copy is sent to the umpire, 
who also receives the copy intended for the officer to 
whom the message is addressed. The officer sending 
the message makes three copies— two whites and one 
yellow— the yellow leaf he keeps as his retained 
copy; both of the white sheets are sent in to the um- 
pire, one being retained on the umpire's files and the 
other being sent to the officer to whom it is addressed. 



-101— 

The umpire notes the time at which this message 
would probably be received in service; it is then 
placed on a file and at the proper time is taken off 
and sent to the officer to whom it is addressed. The 
celluloid sheets used have marked on them squares 
about four inches on a side. The sheets are tacked 
fast to the map by the chief umpire before the game 
begins, so that all orient. Each move is plotted on 
the celluloid sheets and sent in to the chief umpire, 
who makes tracings of them on his celluloid sheets. 
The umpire also has numerous small sheets of cellu- 
loid which contain four, six or eight squares. In 
case of close contact, or when ships arrive in sight of 
each other, the chief umpire takes off on these small 
sheets a tracing showing the position of the ships 
which are in sight of each other and sends these to 
the respective sides for their information. 

STRATEGIC MANEUVERS 

Strategic map maneuvers are intended to give 
practice in such work as, in war, would fall to gen- 
eral staff officers. The organization and concentra- 
tion of armies, the establishment of lines of commu- 
nications, the service in rear of an army and on the 
lines of communications, the use of railway and tele- 
graph lines, the service of information,— as well as 
orders for the movements of troops, cantonments and 
bivouacs, dispositions for battle, lines of fortifica- 
tions, the keeping of records and the preparation of 
reports, etc., are taken up. Most of the work, in 
these exercises, is done by the participants at their 
homes. Meetings are held only for the purposes of 
discussion, giving important information, or announ- 
cing important decisions. 

No attempt is made to conclude an exercise at 
one sitting, but a campaign is carried on continuously 
for several days during such hours as are available. 



—102— 

Small scale maps of large areas are used (1:100,000 in 
Germany, but our Geological Survey maps answer 
very well) and at least three maps of the entire 
theater of operations are required,— one of which is 
used by the director and one by each of the parties. 
An umpire may be detailed for each party, to make 
needful decisions in regard to rates of march, etc., 
and keep the director constantly informed of all 
movements of the party to which he has been as- 
signed. Blocks may be placed on the director's 
map representing all troops employed on both sides. 
Commanders are not permitted to see this map until 
the final discussion. 

Meetings for discussions are occasionally held by 
each party separately, and these usually result in 
fresh tasks being assigned to the subordinate com- 
manders. There should be a sufficient number of of- 
ficers in each party to admit of a chief of staff being 
assigned to each commander-in-chief, an officer to 
command the communications, and at least one officer 
for each body of detached troops. If possible each 
infantry division and cavalry regiment should have a 
commander. The work done (orders, reports, etc.) 
isin writing; the written work of each party should 
be collected by the chief of staff and arrangements 
should be made to have this work criticised. If the 
commanders-in-chief are well instructed officers of 
high rank, they will criticise the work of members 
of their own parties. The value of strategic map 
maneuvers as a means of instruction depends to a 
great extent on the discussion of the written work. 

"The most important and most delicate duty of 
the director is the communication of information of 
the enemy. It is the most important because operations 
depend upon this information, and it is the most deli- 
cate because it is very difficult to give just the right 
measure of information and no more. One of the 



—103- 

most interesting features of the strategic game is 
the uncertainty which prevails as to the enemy's 
movements, ^actual war conditions being simulated 
in this respect as much as possible. 

Therefore much care must be exercised in giving 
information of the enemy; but the measures taken 
for reconnaissance by both parties must be given due 
consideration. The more experience the director has 
had in high staff positions in war, the more familiar 
he will be with the peculiarities of messages and 
other sources of information, and the better will he 
be able to hit on the right amount and kind of in- 
formation to be given, and to mix correct, inaccu- 
rate, incomplete, and false information together in 
proper proportions. He should not, however, re- 
strict the freedom of commanders in selecting means 
for obtaining desired information. " (Anleitung zum 
Kriegsspiel, Meckel.) 

Officers with the experience here spoken of are 
not numerous in our army but the experience of our 
Staff College shows that well instructed officers— such 
as the students of the Staff College— are able to con- 
duct strategic map maneuvers well enough to make 
them interesting and profitable. 

Information may be given in writing, in the 
form of messages and reports from cavalry com- 
manders, patrols, spies, etc., or it may be given 
verbally, —the director at one time personating a 
prisoner, at another a spy who has come to make an 
oral report, etc. 

Combats cannot be followed out in all their de- 
tails; but their duration, results, and the situations 
growing out of them, must be decided by the director 
in accordance with his judgment based on the relative 
strength and situations of the forces engaged. 

"The best time to bring a maneuver to a close is 
at the end of a day's operations or at the end of a 



— 104— 

battle, since most of the written tasks are dependent 
on these periods" (Meckel). 

A war diary* should be kept by each party and 
Meckel recommends that each commander be re- 
quired to submit a brief report of each day's opera- 
tions and that the chiefs of staff be required to make 
reports of the entire campaign. 

*See p. 313, "Duties of the General Staff", Von Schellendorf, 4th Edi- 
tion, 1905, British translation. 



CHAPTER IV 



PROBLEMS 



PRELIMINARY EXERCISES 

No. 1. A column of mixed troops is march- 
ing south on the Kickapoo-Atkinson-French- 
man road. At 10 a.m. its commander, who 
is at the head of the main body, has reached 
the bend of the road 300 yards south of Kick- 
apoo Hill; at the same moment a mounted 
messenger starts from Frenchman with an 
important message for him; when and where 
does he receive it? 

See page 52. A scale of minutes of march for 
"infantry or mixed troops" is laid along the road 
with one division opposite the location of the com- 
mander; a scale of minutes for a "mounted messen- 
ger" is applied to the road beginning at Frenchman 
and a small (estimated) deduction is made on account 
of hills; and it is seen that at the end of ten minutes, 
or at 10:10 a.m., the commander and the messenger 
will meet near Section Lane. 

No. 2. At 10 :32 A. M. , the commander men- 
tioned in the preceding problem reaches the 
Millwood Road: at this moment an important 
message is sent to him by a mounted man 
from the cross-roads 200 yards west of T. 
Meyers (southwest of Kickapoo). When and 
where is it received? 

The solution is similar to that of the first prob- 
lem—only, in this case, the messenger overtakes the 
commander instead of meeting him. 

No. 3. Represent fully on the map a Blue 
column composed of 2 regiments of infantry, 

105 



—106— 

2 batteries, and 1 squadron of cavalry, (6, 2, 
4) marching in hostile territory northward 
on the Kasten-Frenchman-Kickapoo road 
with the leading infantry element opposite 
Dolman. Red cavalry has been seen at 
Kickapoo. Show in detail the same column 
5 minutes later. How much time will this 
column require for deployment on the line of 
the Millwood Road? (See page 79.) 

No. 4. A Blue force is taking up a defen- 
sive position along the north front of Leav- 
enworth. A cavalry patrol reports seeing at 
11 A. M. from Hancock Hill a column of Red 
troops on the Kasten-Frenchman-Atkinson 
road; that there was cavalry all the way 
from Gauss to Frenchman, infantry from 
Burns to Taylor, and a continuous column of 
infantry and artillery north of the Millwood 
road, the tail of which had just cleared At- 
kinson. The patrol was driven away before 
further details w^ere noted. What is the 
strength of the Red column? 

Solve by building it up with blocks or by apply- 
ing to the road the units shown on the edge of the 
cardboard scale. (Plate 2). 

No. 5. How long before the Red force 
mentioned in the preceding problem can 
occupy Atchison Hill with artillery? 

No. 6. A Blue patrol is on Wagner Point 
watching a column of Red troops as they 
emerge from cover at Moore (on the Atchi- 
son Pike) move west, and disappear behind 
trees near Flint. The patrol commander 
wishes to note the time the various units re- 
quire in passing a certain point. The col- 
umn is composed of a squadron of cavalry in 
column of twos which passes the point at a 
gallop, followed by a battalion of artillery 
which passes it at a trot, and then by a regi- 
ment of infantry at quick time. What in- 
formation does the director give him and how 
is it obtained? 



—107— 

The various units as shown on the edge of the 
card board scale (Plate 2) are applied to scales of 
minutes of march at the rates stated (Plate 3). The 
squadron is applied twice, because it is in column 
of twos, to the scale for "cavalry walk", as we 
have no scale for "cavalry gallop", remembering 
that the rate for the gallop is about three times 
that for the walk; or it may be applied to the scale 
of yards, (Plate 2) noting that 440 yards or i mile 
is covered at a gallop in 1^ minutes. The periods 
are, cavalry 3 minutes, artillery 6 minutes, and in- 
fantry 8 minutes. 

No. 7 A Red company is falling back west- 
ward on the Millwood Road, after attacking 
unsuccessfully a Blue outpost at the edge of 
the wood east of L, Kern. The Blues have 
a machine gun on the Millwood Road at the 
edge of the wood. The Blue commander di- 
rects the machine gun to fire on the retreat- 
ing Reds as they cross the Salt Creek bridge. 
If this is not practicable, the machine gun is 
to fire on them as soon as they are seen. 
What is the ruling of the director? 

The chief obstruction is Hill 873, north of Sharp, 
which is about 800 yards from the machine gun. The 
elevation of the machine gun is 900 feet; the fine of 
sight from it to hill 873 drops 30 feet in 800 yards; 
and as the line of sight is a straight line it must 
continue to fall at the sam.e rate. The bridge is 
less than 800 yards from Hill 873 and is more than 
30 feet lower; consequently it is sheltered from the 
machine gun. 800 yards west of Hill 873 the eleva- 
tion of the line of sight will be 840 feet, at a point 
nearly opposite J. E. Daniels; a little further west 
the ground rises to an elevation of 840 feet; the line 
of sight will strike the ground on the Millwood Road 
a little east of the 840 contour. The director rules 



—108— 

that the Reds will be visible from the post of the 
machine gun when they reach J. E. Daniels. 

ONE SIDE MANEUVERS 

No. 1.* The director is 1st Lieutenant A, who is 
instructing the non-commissioned officers of his 
company. He has conducted several recitations in 
the Service of Security and Information and now 
wishes to test the familiarity of the class with this 
subject and their ability to apply intelligently what 
they have learned. 

For this exercise the map maneuver table top (of 
softwood, 4i by 7| feet) is stood on end on top of the 
trestles which ordinarily support it and is leaned 
against the wall in such a position that the light from 
two windows falls on it. The maneuver map (Leav- 
enworth— Kickapoo, 12 inches to 1 mile) is fastened 
to it with thumb tacks. Lieutenant A stands in front 
of the map with a pointer in his hand; on a table near 
him he has a box of colored pins and card board 
blocks, a pad of message blanks and a copy of the 
Field Service Regulations. Of the class there are 
jiresent: — 1st Sergeant B, Q.M. Sergeant C, Sergeants 
D, E and F, Corporals G. H and I, and Privates K 
and L. 

Lieutenant A represents with blocks on the Tnap 
a regiment of Blue infantry in column, marching 
south on Grant Avenue and west on Metropolitan 
Avenue, the head of the support of the advance guard 
at the corner of 9th Street and Metropohtan Avenue. 

Lieut. A: The 1st Blue Infantry has crossed the 
Rock Island Bridge and is advancing into Kansas, 
which is hostile territory, and has just reached the 
position shown by these blocks. Do you all under- 

*This is Map Problem No. 1, Course in Tactics, Part I, Army School of 
the Line, 1909^10. Any good map problem cg,n be expanded and di§GU§sed in 
tjiis way. 



~1G9— 

stand the character of the ground about here as 
shown by the map? 

(The class has recently completed a course of in- 
struction in map reading but Lieutenant A points out 
the principal streams and hills which will enter into 
the problem and assures himself that all members of 
the class are reading the map correctly before going 
on.) 

Lieut. A: It is 8 o'clock in the morning at this 
season of the year when the 1st Infantry reaches 
this position. The commander of the advance guard 
is at the head of the support, here, and has just given 
orders to Lieutenant X to take two noncommissioned 
officers and eight privates, who have been detailed 
from the leading company of the support, and go to 
the top of the hill, here, (South West hill) which he 
points out and which Lieutenant X can see over the 
top of the U. S. Penitentiary. Lieutenant X's orders 
are to watch the country that can be seen to the nor.ch 
and west from this hill, to cover the right flank, and 
to rejoin the advance guard, here, (24). The point 
where he is to rejoin is pointed out to him on a small 
scale map which he carries. You will notice that an 
officer is sent with this patrol; do you think that offi- 
cers will usually be sent with such patrols? 

Q. M. Sergt. C: There are only ten men in the 
patrol; I do not think that an officer would be sent 
with a party of that size. 

Lieut A: The size of the patrol is not the only 
thing to be considered. Lieutenant X is sent to an 
important point of observation on the flank of the 
column not only to see what can be seen from there 
but also to protect the column while it is passing. 
His mission is important enough to require an offider, 
but our regular regiments are always so stripped of 
officers in war that it is not likely that there will 
often be officers available to go with patrols of this 



—no- 
kind. For this reason our noncommissioned officers 
must learn to do the work and carry the responsibili- 
ties of officers — up to the command of a company. In 
our problem today it is supposed that there is an offi- 
cer available and an officer, Lieutenant X, is sent. 
But any one of you may be sent in command of a 
patrol of this kind. Now, what route oug'ht Lieuten- 
ant X to take? 

1st Sergt B: I think that the advance guard 
commander would tell him which way to go. 

Lieut. A: I have given you all the instructions 
that he has and there was nothing about the route. 
Sergeant D, which way do you think he ought to go? 

Sergt. D: I think he would go up the ravine to 
the north to the big creek there— 

Lieut. A: Corral Creek. 

Sergt. D: Yes, sir, and then go up the bed of 
the creek, keeping out of sight. 

Lieut. A: Lieutenant X could keep his patrol 
concealed very well in that way— there is good cover 
in the bed of Corral Creek. The banks of the creek 
are from four to six feet high and there are bushes 
along the banks. Do any of you see any objection 
to this route? 

Corpl. G: I don't think he could see much. 

Lieut. A: I agree with you; and observation is 
more important than concealment here. Can anyone 
see another objection to it? 

1st Sergt. B: If he goes in such a round about 
way he will not get to the hill very soon. 

Lieut. A : Right. And I think he should get up 
there as soon as he can. 

Corpl. H: I think he ought to go right along 
Metropolitan Avenue and take the road that leads off 
to the right near the railroad. 

Lieut. A: At 64. Yes, that route would take 
him to the hill quicker than any other, because it is 



— Ill— 

the best road. But is there not an objection to this 
road? 

1st Sergt. B: The advance party is already on it 
and Lieutenant X will not see anything that has not 
been seen by the advance party till he gets to the 
hill. 

Sergt. E: He ought to take the road leading 
past the Penitentiary and to the cross roads at the 
foot of the hill (14). 

Lieut. A: We will take the route suggested by 
Sergeant D. It runs along a low ridge all the way 
to the hill and gives a good view. 

Sergt. E: I think that the patrol ought to search 
the Penitentiary before going past it. 

Lieut. A : When Lieutenant X reaches the point 
where I place this blue pin (70) he sees a patrol from 
the advance party enter the Penitentiary. As his 
mission takes him beyond he leaves the searching of 
the Penitentiary to this patrol from the advance 
party. He has marched his patrol in column of twos 
to the northwest corner of the Penitentiary because 
the ground that far has been patrolled by the advance 
party. Private K, what formation do you think the 
patrol should take up after it passes the Peniten- 
tiary? 

Pvt. K: Lieutenant X would send a noncommis- 
sioned officer and one private 50 yards ahead on the 
road and one man 50 yards out on each side. He 
would have 6 men with him and they would march 
in column of twos behind him. 

Lieut. A: (representing the patrol in this for- 
mation with pins and a blue disc) Private L, do you 
think that this is a good way to march this patrol? 

Pvt. L: Yes, sir, except that I would put one 
man 50 yards behind the main body and leave only 
5 men with the lieutenant. 



—112— 

Lieut. A : Corporal I, what do you think about 
this? 

Corpl. I: I think the lieutenant ought to be 
with the point— the Field Service Regulations say 
that he ought to be there. 

Lieut. A: First Sergeant B, what do you think? 

1st Sergt. B: I would not put any men out on 
the flanks because they could not see any more there 
than could be seen from the road and they would de- 
lay us because they could not go as fast out there as 
they could on the road. 

Lieut. A : I agree with the First Sergeant that 
there would be no advantage in putting out flankers 
here. Sergeant C, do you think that Lieutenant X 
should go with the point? 

Q.M. Sergt. C: No, sir, he could not see any 
more up there and he is going toward some woods 
that an enemy might be concealed in— laying for 
him. 

Lieut. A: The rule in the Field Service Regula- 
tions (1905), ' 'In small exploring patrols the commander 
should in most cases be in the lead" is not intended 
to cover all cases. We will arrange the patrol in this 
way (representing it with pins), this represents a 
noncommissioned oflScer and one private; here, 75 
yards in rear of them, is Lieutenant X with one non- 
commissioned officer and six privates walking on 
both sides of the road with about ten yards distance 
between the men; here, about 75 yards further back 
is one man. The patrol marches in this formation to 
the cross roads here (14) and sees nothing of the en- 
emy. It now enters the woods. Sergeant D, do you 
think that we should retain the same formation? 

Sergt. D: 1 think that the lieutenant ought to 
go up to the front now, and that the distances ought 
to be shortened. 



—113^ 

Lieut A: Very good. Sergeant E, would you 
make any further change? 

Sergt. E: I would put out flankers now unless 
the underbrush is so thick that men cannot march off 
of the trail. 

Lieut. A: There is but little underbrush in this 
wood and flankers could march practically as fast as 
men on the trail; so we will put out a flanker about 50 
yards on each flank and the distances of the point 
and rear man are reduced to 50 yards. Lieutenant X 
goes up to the point. Nothing is seen of the enemy 
in passing through the wood. Lieutenant X reaches 
the point where I place this pin (50 yards north of 
the letter ' ' W ' in ' 'South West Hill"). Here he gets 
a view of the country to the north. (As an exercise 
in map reading some members of the class are called 
on to describe the country as Lieutenant X sees it.) 
Here where I place this red pin and yellow block (200 
yards west of G) he sees about 20 hostile cavalrymen, 
and here (on the Atchison Pike between Gauss and 
Baker) he sees a somewhat larger body of cavalry; 
they are advancing at a walk. It is now 8:40 o'clock 
and it is five minutes since Lieutenant X last saw the 
column of his own regiment; at that time they were 
here (Lieutenant A moves the blocks representing 
the Blue regiment— the head of the main body to 64). 
Now what does Lieutenant X do? 

Sergt. F: He ought to hide his men and watch 
the Red cavalry. 

Corpl. G: He ought to send a message. 

Lieut. A: You are both right; and as no one 
seems to disagree I will ask each of you to write the 
message that Lieutenant X should write. 

Message blanks are distributed to all members of 
the class and each writes the message. A message 
which meets Lieutenant A's approval is as follows: 



—114— 

From Lieut. A's Patrol, 

At South West Hill, 

Date 21 Sept. 10 Hour 8:45 a.m. No. 1. 

To Major A, Comdg. Advance Guard, 

About 70 hostile cavalry at salt creek village 
moving east at a walk on the atchison Pike. I can- 
not see the Pike beyond salt Creek. I remain here. 

X, Lieut. 

Lieut. A : How does Lieutenant X send his mes- 



sage 



Corpl. H: By one of the men who is with him 
and saw the enemy. 

Lieut. A: Very good, but there are two men 
with him, a noncommissioned officer and a private; 
which one of them would you send? 

(There is a difference of opinion in the class on 
this point and some members are of the opinion that 
both should be sent). 

Lieut. A: Lieutenant X decides to send the 
noncommissioned officer as he believes that the non- 
commissioned officer will be more likely to find his 
way to the column quickly, deliver the message to 
the proper person, and give a clear account of what 
he has seen. He does not send both because he does 
not wish to deplete his patrol unnecessarily. If the 
message had to be carried a long distance through 
hostile territory, it would be better to send two men 
with it but that is not the case here. Lieutenant X 
now has nine men left; what disposition does he 
make of them on South West Hill? 

Sergt. D: I think that two men ought to be sent 
to the north end of Government Hill (16) to see if 
the Red cavalry is coming by there. 

Corpl. I: It seems to me that some men ought 
to be sent over on 1100 Foot Hill to take a look at the 
Atchison Pike west of Salt Creek. There may be 
some more Red troops following this cavalry. 



—115— 

Lieut. A: There would undoubtedly be advan- 
tages in sending men to these places; but does any- 
one see objections to sending them? (No one in the 
class answers and Lieutenant A continues. ) 

Lieutenant X's most important duty now is to 
guard the trail along the Government Hill— South 
West Hill Ridge and prevent the enemy from passing 
him, because this ridge would give them a view of 
the Blue column. If Lieutenant X should send men 
as far away as you suggest he would lose control of 
them and could not use them in case he has a fight. 

Corpl. I: I did not know that he expected to 
fight. The Field Service Regulations say that "the 
object of a patrol is not to fight but to obtain infor- 
mation" 

Lieut. A: The Field Service Regulations can 
not give us rules to cover all cases. This patrol 
must cover the flank of the advance guard —perhaps 
of the main body also— and it may be compelled to 
fight to accomplish its mission. First Sergeant B, 
how would you arrange this patrol while in observa- 
tion on South West Hill? 

1st Sergt. B: I would put them under cover at 
or near the road fork (20) in such a position that they 
could use their rifles to the north and northeast. 
And I would put a lookout on the road to the north- 
east, about 200 yards out. Lieutenant X would stay 
at the north end of South West Hill and would keep 
one man with him but he should be near enough to 
his men to be able to give them orders. 

Lieut. A: I will accept First Sergeant B's dis- 
position but will send two men instead of one to this 
point (18) as a double sentry post, and I will post 
one man on the trail to the southwest at this point 
(about half way between 20 and the cemetery). The 
patrol has the appearance of being badly scattered 
as I have represented it on the map, but I would re- 



—116— 

gard it as tactically concentrated because all of the 
men are under Lieutenant X's control and can be 
used for a common object. On the other hand if 
some of them were sent to the north end of Government 
Hill and some of them sent to 1100 Foot Hill they 
would be tactically dispersed because they would be 
out of hand. By attempting to accomplish too much 
we might fail to accomplish anything; and this is a 
very common fault with our people. 

At 8.50 A. M. one of the men posted here (18) sig- 
nals "enemy in sight". Lieutenant X moves toward 
the main body of his patrol and a moment later sees 
8 hostile cavalrymen here (at the words "Government 
Hill") on the trail coming toward him at a walk. 
They do not appear to have seen the Blues. Private 
K, what will Lieutenant X do now? 

Pvt. K: I think he would just lay low till they 
got up to him and then capture them. 

Lieut. A : Does everybody think that is a good 
plan? (The class generally agrees with Private K.) 
What do you take this hostile cavalry to be? 

Pvt. K: I suppose it is a cavalry reconnoitering 
patrol. 

Lieut. A: Does any one think differently? 

Sergt. D: There seems to be a Red troop com- 
ing this way and this patrol- may be the point or a 
flanking party from its advance guard. 

Lieut. A: Suppose that it is the point and that 
you let them come up to you; is it not likely that by 
the time they reach you there will be more of them 
in sight? 

Sergt. D: Yes, sir; may be the platoon that was 
seen at Salt Creek village will be coming up. 

Lieut. A : And then while we are trying to cap- 
ture the patrol we may be charged by a platoon. 
No, I think that Lieutenant X would assemble all of 
his men as quickly as he could and then open fire on 



—117— 

the Reds immediately. This will keep them at arm's 
length and prevent them from learning the strength 
of his patrol. We will say that this is what Lieuten- 
ant X does and that the Red cavalry falls back to the 
north — out of sight— here (toward 16). Several 
minutes pass and the Reds do not appear again. 
What do you think Lieutenant X should do now, 
Private L? 

Pvt L: I do not think that the Reds will try to 
come by that road again — they will think there is a 
strong force on it. I think they will go on the 
Atchison Pike and that Lieutenant X ought to go 
over to Atchison Cross and head them off. 

Lieut A: That would be exceeding his re- 
sponsibility. No doubt there is another Blue party 
watching the Atchison Pike. But by this time the 
tail of the Blue main body has passed this corner 
(60). Do you not remember that Lieutenant X was 
ordered to rejoin the advance guard here (24)? 

Pvt. L: He will have to start right away if he 
is going to catch up with them. 

1st Sergt. B: The sound of the firing ought to 
bring a party of Blues up from the main body; but I 
do not think that Lieutenant X ought to leave South 
West hill till they come— at least not yet. 

Lieut. A: I agree with the First Sergeant. 
Lieutenant X should have been reheved by a party 
from the main body by this time, but as it does not 
appear that this has been done he should continue to 
guard the flank of the column, since he is covering a 
good point of observation and the enemy has been 
seen here. He would leave it, however, by the time 
the tail of the main body reached this point (a little 
east of 56); he would then fall back to the southwest 
along the ridge and probably join the rear guard. 
Liutenant X fails to comply literally with his in- 
structions in regard to rejoining the advance guard, 



—118- 

but, no doubt, he will be commended for taking this 
responsibility on his shoulders when the circum- 
stances become known to his superiors. 

It has probably become apparent to all of you 
that the work of Lieutenant X's patrol differs in 
some respects from that of the infantry patrols we 
have chiefly studied hitherto. This patrol is, in fact, 
a flank guard. I will ask First Sergeant B to read 
paragraphs 110, 111 and 112 of the Field Service 
Regulations, (1905). 

After the reading Lieutenant A closes the ex- 
ercise with some additional remarks in regard to the 
duties of flank guards and shows how these duties 
are illustrated by the operations of Lieutenant X's 
patrol. 

No. 2. A Blue battahon from Atchison has 
halted for the night at 2 P. M. near J. Aaron; 
it is in hostile territory and a Red cavalry 
patrol has recently been seen near Taylor. 
Show with blocks the Blue camp and outpost. 

The director reconnoiters the outpost and camp 
with Red patrols; thus indicating posts of observa- 
tion from which they can be overlooked. He also 
brings small parties of Reds by routes v>^hich are not 
observed to favorable points from which they can 
fire on the camp; and, later, attacks the Blue outpost 
with a Red battahon. 

No. 3. A troop of Blue cavalry has just 
crossed the Missouri river with instructions 
to disable the railroads in the vicinity of At- 
chison Cross. At 10 A. M. it has reached 
Merritt Hill and its commander has just 
received information that about 40 dis- 
mounted Red cavalrymen are in the railroad 
cut 250 yards northeast of Atchison Cross 
with their horses in the woods to the west 
of them. What is his decision and what or- 
ders does he give? 



—119— 

The director commands the Reds and gives ap- 
propriate information in regard to them. 

No. 4. A troop of Blue cavalry in friendly 
territory has reached South West hill via the 
Zimmerman road, and has received informa- 
tion that a train of fifty impressed two-horse 
wagons, containing provisions which have 
been requisitioned in Leavenworth, is stand- 
ing on Metropolitan Avenue south of the U. 
S. Penitentiary and is to start for Kickapoo 
(where there is a Red outpost) in one hour, 
escorted by one platoon of Red infantry and 
a squad of (12) Red cavalry. It is now 1 p.m. 
June 26 — the atmosphere is hazy. The com- 
manding officer of the Blue troops decides to 
attack the train. Show the manner in which 
he disposes his troops and explain the mode 
of attack contemplated. 

No. 5. A Blue detachment, consisting of 
two regiments of infantry, one battalion F. 
A., one squadron of cavalry, one company of 
engineers and one field hospital, has just de- 
trained at the Kickapoo station and is direct- 
ed to cover the detrainment of other troops 
there. A Red force of all arms is crossing 
the Missouri River from the east at Fort Leav- 
enworth, and Red cavalry has appeared on 
Hancock Hill, Show the disposition of the 
Blue detachment. 

No. 6. A Blue independent infantry brig- 
ade, with troops of other arms attached has 
crossed the Missouri river and halted for the 
night at Fort Leavenworth, placing an out- 
post consisting of one regiment of infantry, 
one battery F. A. , and one troop of cavalry 
(3, 1, 1) on the Sheridan Drive ridge. It is 
2 p.m., May 6, and the weather is fair. Red 
troops of all arms are known to be at Easton. 
Show the disposition of the outpost. (Salt 
Creek and Plum Creek are serious obstacles). 

No. 7. A Blue advance guard consisting 
of one infantry brigade with one battalion 



—120— 

F. A. and one squadron of cavalry (9, 3, 4) 
has reached Frenchman from the north. Its 
cavalry has occupied Sentinel Hill and reports 
a Red infantry regiment with one battery F. 
A. in position on Atchison Hill — the right 
flank at the railroad cut, the left on the spur 
north-west of Government Hill, and the bat- 
tery on Atchison Hill. It is 10 a.m. on a clear 
summer day. The Blue force (a division) 
must occupy Leavenworth before 1 p.m. 
Give the decision and orders of the advance 
guard commander. (Salt Creek is a dry ra- 
vine about three feet deep.) 



TWO SIDE MANEUVERS 
No. 1 

Detail: 

Director, Captain A. 

Commander, Blue, Captain B. 

Assistants, Blue, Lieutenants C and D. 

Commander, Red, Captain R. 

Assistants, Red, Lieutenants X and Y. 
All of the participants have been notified that 
the next exercise would be in cavalry patrolling. 

The following problem, in writing, is sent to 
Captain B a half hour before the exercise. 

General Situation: 

A Blue detachment in friendly territory 
occupies Leavenworth. A Red detachment 
from Atchison has halted northwest of Kick- 
apoo. The date is August 15th. Corral 
Creek, Salt Creek and Plum Creek are serious 
obstacles. The atmosphere is hazy. 

Special Situation — Blue: 

The outpost of the Blue detachment con- 
sists of one battalion of infantry and one 
troop of cavalry, and has orders to hold the 



—121— 

approximate line of Metropolitan Avenue and 
observe to the north as far as Kickapoo. 
You are in command of the outpost; at 2 
p.m. your outpost is in position. 

Required: 

1. The arrangement of the outpost. 

2. The number of cavalry patrols and 
the orders given them. 



The situation is communicated to Captain R at 

the same time as follows: 

General Situation: 

A Blue detachment in friendly territory 
occupies Leavenworth. A Red detachment 
from Atchison has halted northwest of Kick- 
apoo. The date is August 15th. Corral 
Creek, Salt Creek and Plum Creek are serious 
obstacles. The atmosphere is hazy. 

Special Situation — Red: 

The outpost of the Red detachment con- 
sists of one battalion of infantry with a ma- 
chine gun platoon and two platoons (50) of 
cavalry. It has orders to hold the approx- 
imate line of the hills 858, 929 and 1000 and 
to reconnoiter through Fort Leavenworth 
and Frenchman. You are in command of the 
outpost and at 2 p.m. the outpost is in posi- 
tion. 

Required: 

1. The disposition of the outpost. 

2. What cavalry patrols are sent out 
and what orders are given their commanders. 
The director sees that the proper maneuver map 

is laid out and that the scales, blocks, message blanks, 
paper and pencil are provided. As the maneuver is 
a simple one he does not require an assistant. At the 
hour set for the exercise he calls the Blue party to 
the map. * Captain B reads the problem to his assis- 

*In this exercise it is immaterial which party is called first. 



—122— 

tants and points out on the maneuver map the local- 
ities named; he then hands to the director a sheet of 
thin typewriter paper on which he has drawn a trac- 
ing showing the arrangement of the outpost. This 
tracing has been made from a four inch scale map in 
his possession, but only two localities on the map 
have been traced through — Atchison Cross and the 
corner of Grant and Metropolitan avenues; the out- 
post has been drawn on the tracing with a blue pen- 
cil. The director places the tracing on a four inch 
scale map, orienting it by means of the two reference 
points; and Captain B explains the dispositions of the 
outpost, pointing out the location of the various units 
on the twelve inch scale maneuver map. He has 
placed Company A on the north slope of Circus hill, 
Companies B and C on Prison hill and Company D on 
Avenue hill. He explains that Company A is to hold 
the line from the Missouri river to the first ravine 
west of Grant hill, inclusive; that Companies B and 
C hold the line from this ravine to the U. S. Peni- 
tentiary, inclusive; and that Company D holds the 
line from the U. S. Penitentiary west to include 20th 
street, communicating with the cavalry, which occu- 
pies the Government hill. South West Hill ridge, 
observing the Atchison Pike and the Barnes and 
Zimmerman roads. Company A places a picket 
on Grant hill and sends an infantry patrol to examine 
the Pope hill and Devin ridge woods; Companies B 
and C perform the functions both of a support and a 
reserve and place a detached post on Long Ridge. 
Captain B says that for the present his own position 
is on South West hill and that he will send out cavalry 
patrols from there. 

Director: What cavalry patrols are sent out? 

Capt. B: Two, of eight men each; one to exam- 
ine the country east of Salt Creek, the other the 
country west of it. 



—123— 

Director: Please assign your assistants to the 
command of these patrols and give them their orders. 

Capt. B: C, you will take eight mounted men 
who have already been ordered to report to you, and 
examine the roads between Salt Creek and the Mis- 
souri River; if you find no important hostile forces 
there you will push on as far as Kickapoo. Send 
messages here (to South West hill). D, you will take 
another patrol of the same size, reconnoiter the 
country west of Salt Creek and gain touch with the 
enemy. Send messages here. 

Director: Mr. C, what steps do you take? 

Lieut. C: I inspect my patrol and then move 
out at a trot to Atchison Cross and then take the 
road west of the target range. At the target butts I 
detach a non-commissioned officer and two men to 
follow Hancock Avenue, reconnoiter Fort Leaven- 
worth and the road by the Prison Cemetery, and re- 
join me on the Millwood Road. I move north from 
the railroad cut along the ridge and follow Sheridan's 
drive and the Millwood Road. 

Director: What is your formation? 

Lieut. C: There are two men about four hundred 
yards in front of me, one with me, and two about 
four hundred yards behind me. The McGuire — Sharp 
trail is watched when it can be seen from Sheridan's 
Drive; all of the men are cautioned to avoid exposing 
themselves to view from the west. I continue to 
move at a trot. 

Director: What are your intentions, Mr. D? 

Lieut. D: I will move along the trail to Govern- 
ment hill, then take the Atchison Pike to Frenchman 
and there turn north on the Kickapoo road. At the 
road fork south of Flint I send two men up Sentinel 
Hill to observe the country to the north and west, and 
rejoin me on the road. I ride at the head of my 
party; there are four men with me; three follow at 



—124— 

about three hundred yards and one follows one hun- 
dred yards further back. 

Director: What gait do you take? 

Lieut. D: Walk and trot. 

Director: Do you send anyone on the Atchison 
Pike west of Frenchman?* 

Lieut. D: At Frenchman I send three men west 
to the railroad. They will move through the railroad 
cut to the hollow north of T. Flint, then follow the 
depression parallel with the railroad and about one 
hundred yards northeast of it, keeping one man 

Director (interrupting): What orders do you 
give these men?t 

Lieut. D: To go west to the railroad, turn north, 
and rejoin me near A. Daniels. I show the location 
of A. Daniels to the chief of the party on my pocket 
map. 

The director now directs the Blue party to with- 
draw and requests Captain B to call the Red party to 
the map. Captain R reads the problem aloud, points 
out to his assistants the localities mentioned and 
turns in to the director a tracing showing the dispo- 
sition of his outpost. One company, posted on the 
road where it crosses the stream between Hill 858 
and L. A. Aaron, holds the line Hill 858— L. A. Aaron 
inclusive; one company, posted on the northwest 
slope of Hill 929, holds the line, L. A. Aaron, ex- 
clusive—Hill 929, inclusive; and one company, posted 
on the northwest slope of Hill 1000, holds the line 
Hill 929, exclusive— Missouri River. The reserve 
consists of one company, the machine gun platoon 
and one platoon of cavalry and is posted in the south- 
east angle of the wood 250 yards west of Hill 929. 

*The director prompts Lieutenant D more than is desirable. 

tLieut. D cannot control every move of these men after they leave him; 
— besides, he could not see this depression from Frenchman, and he is tak-- 
ingmore time than the director ia willing to devote to this subject, 



— 125-. 

There are no pickets or sentinels in front of the line 
of the hills 858, 929, and 1000. 

Capt. R's orders to the Red patrols are:— A de- 
tachment of the enemy is at Leavenworth. Our out- 
post will hold the line of the hills 858, 929, and 1000, 
I am ordered to reconnoiter through Fort Leaven- 
worth and Frenchman. Lieutenant X, with a cav- 
alry patrol of 12 men, will go through Frenchman; 
Lieutenant Y, with 12 cavalrymen, will go through 
Fort Leavenworth. Information of the enemy's 
strength, position, and intentions is important. Mes- 
sages will reach me at Hill 929. 

Lieutenant X states his intentions as follows, — 
I will take the Spencer— A. Daniels— Millwood road. 
At Taylor S. H. I turn south toward Frenchman. I 
will march at a trot in normal formation. 

Director: What do you mean by "normal forma- 
tion"? 

Lieut. X: A noncommissioned officer and two 
privates constitute the point and keep 500 yards 
ahead of me. Two troopers are detailed as right 
flankers and two as left flankers,— they are to march 
300 yards from the road and the same distance be- 
hind the point. The point and flankers gain their 
distances and intervals at a gallop. A rear guard of 
two men follows me at a distance of 500 yards. 

Director: You reach A. Daniels without seeing 
anything of the enemy, —your attention is then called 
to the fact that nothing has been seen of your flank- 
ers since passing Plum Creek. 

Lieut. X: I wait at A. Daniels for them to com- 
municate with me. 

Director: They come up to the Millwood Road 
ten minutes later. 

Lieut. X: I will then go on. 

Lieut. Y gives his intentions as follows,— I will 
take the Atkinson — Taylor S. H.— Millwood road to 



—126— 

Fort Leavenworth, moving at a trot and keeping all 
of my party on the road. Two troopers are sent 
ahead but they do not keep any fixed distance, —they 
gallop ahead till they come to a place giving a good 
view to the front and stop there till I signal them to 
go on. Lateral roads are observed by sending two 
troopers out on each till they come to a place giving 
a good view. They go out at a gallop but return at 
a trot. My rear is usually covered by some of these 
men catching up but I have no other rear guard. 

The Red party now retires. It is apparent that 
the patrols of Lieuts. D and X will come in contact 
with each other, and the director studies their move- 
ments (particularly noting whether or not the two 
Blues sent to Sentinel Hill would have seen the Red 
patrols) and then calls Lieut. D. 

Director: At 2.35 P. M. you have reached Burns 
without having seen or heard anything of the enemy. 
The two men sent to Sentinel Hill have rejoined you 
but have nothing to report. As you come upon the 
Burns ridge here where I have placed this blue pin 
you see two Red cavalrymen here, where I place this 
red pin (near Taylor on the road) coming toward you 
at a trot. 

Lieut. D: I rein back partly behind the ridge 
and signal to my party to close up. 

Director: The Reds continue to advance and you 
now see another, here— three in all. 

Lieut D: I dismount my party by signals to fight 
on foot and take a position, under what cover I can 
find, on the Burns ridge. The horses are placed in 
the ravine south of the ridge, under cover east of 
the road. 

Director: Your men are concealed by weeds. 
When you are in position the three Reds have passed 
Dolman. They do not appear to have seen you. 



—127— 

Lieut D: I order the sights laid down and open 
fire at will. 

Director. The Reds retire at a gallop. You see 
two or three more mounted Reds here, on the road 
near Taylor. 

Lieut. D: I hold my ground and watch them. 

Director. Please call Mr. X. (To Lieut. 
X). I will caution you to avoid saying anything to 
disclose your strength or position unnecessarily, as 
Mr. D, who is present, is your antagonist. You reach 
Taylor at 2.37 p.m. without having learned anything 
of the enemy. On reaching this point you hear firing 
to the south and as you come over the ridge you see 
your point retreating at a gallop. They report that 
they were fired on from the low ridge (here) which 
they point out to you. They saw no one. 

Lieut. X: I examine the ridge attentively with 
my glasses. I also examine the road to the south 
and look especially for dust rising in the vicinity of 
Frenchman. 

Director. You see nothing of the enemy and no 
dust. 

Lieut. X: I signal to my flankers to come in. 

Director. Nothing has been seen of your left 
flankers since you left the Millwood road. Your 
right flankers were seen near Moss some minutes 
ago but they are not now in sight. 

Lieut. X: I draw sabers and charge the posi- 
tion from which we were fired on. 

Director: {To Lieut. D) You are charged by 
about seven mounted Reds proceeding along the road 
from Taylor. 

Lieut. D: I open rapid fire on them when they 
are opposite Dolman. 

Director: I consider the fire sufficient to check 
the charge. There would be difficulty in pushing the 
charge home in any case on account of the ravine 



—128— 

northeast of Burns, which is crossed only by a wagon 
bridge. The Reds fall back in disorder behind the 
Taylor ridge.* Mr. D will retire. 

Lieut. X: I assemble all of my party as soon as 
I can and send a message to Captain R. I will then 
move west, by Moss, north and west to the two hills 
marked 900, and follow the railroad track southeast 
to the Atchison Pike. I keep three men on my left 
watching the Blue position. I will take the Atchison 
Pike to Government Hill and then turn south along 
the ridge. 

Director: Write the report and bring it to me 
when you are next called in. Please ask Mr. 
D to return. {Lieut. X goes out and Lieut. D comes 
in). When the Reds were repulsed the three men 
detached by you at Frenchman rejoin you. They 
tell you that they have been watching two Red cav- 
alrymen who were about 300 yards west of Taylor 
but have now disappeared in the direction of Taylor. 

Lieut. D: I order them to go back to the ridge 
northwest of Burns and watch the Reds from there. 
I hold my ground and write a message. 

Director: Bring the message to me the next 
time you are called in. At 2.55 P. M. you are in- 
formed that a party of mounted Reds is moving west 
near the Moss house. 

Lieut. D: I mount m'y party and gallop forward 
to the Taylor ridge, sending three men in the di- 
rection of Moss to keep in touch with them. 

Director: , At 3 p.m. you are on the Taylor ridge 
and have information that there are about eight Reds 
near the A. T. & S. F. R. R., west of you— moving 
southward. 

*It will be noticed that the director does not assess losses— though 
they are no doubt severe. Losses are not always assessed when the exer- 
cise can be carried on without doing so. If the director thought the losses 
sufficiently heavy in this case to warrant it, he might inform Lieut. X that 
the subsequent forward movement was impracticable. 



—129— 

Lieut. D: I send another man to join the three 
already detached and carry them an order to follow 
the Reds and watch them. I go to Kickapoo at a 
trot by the Taylor S. H. — A. Daniels road, with three 
men. 

Director: When you reach the cross roads here 
(17) you come upon two dismounted Reds, both slight- 
ly wounded, making their way toward Kickapoo. 

Lieut. D: I capture them and question them. 

Director: They will tell you nothing. 

Lieut. D: I examine their insignia. 

Director: They both belong to Troop D, 1st Red 
Cavalry. You have passed some dead horses near 
Taylor and seen the same letter and number on their 
equipments. What disposition do you make of your 
prisoners? 

Lieut. D: It seems that they are able to walk 
and if I do not guard them they will give informa- 
tion of my movements. I disarm these men, put 
them in the Taylor school house, leave one of my 
men to guard them and go on to Kickapoo. I intend 
to come back to this school house when I complete 
my reconnaissance, get these men and take them 
back with me. I instruct my men that in case we 
become scattered we will assemble at this school 
house. 

Director: You still have two men with you. In 
what order do you march? 

Lieut. D: I go ahead, one man follows me at 50 
yards, and the other is 50 yards further back. 

Director: You may retire but please ask Captain 
R and Mr. X to come in. (To Lieut. X) Have you 
finished the message you were to write? (Lieut. X 
hands the message to the director, who reads it and 
hands it to Capt. R and then makes some measure- 
ments and computations. Lieut. X retires.) Captain 



—130— 

R, thi^ message is brought to you by a mounted man 
of Lieut. X's patrol at 3 p.m. , 

Capt R: I make no change in my dispositions. 

Director: At 3:15 p.m. it is reported to you 
that two Blue cavalrymen have crossed Plum Creek 
and are moving north on the A. Daniels— Schweizer 
road. 

Capt. R: I will go up on Hill 929 and watch 
them with my field glass. 

Director: You see one here (placing a blue pin 
about 100 yards south of 23) another here, and still 
another here. They are moving at a walk, you see 
no one following them, and they do not appear to 
have seen your outpost. 

Capt. R: I caution my men not to show them- 
selves and not to fire. 

Director: Please call Mr. D. (To Lieut. D) 
You reach the point shown by the blue pin here at 
3:20 p.m. without seeing anything more of the ene- 
my. What route do you take now? 

Lieut. D: I will leave the road at the cross 
roads (23) and go up on the hill there (929). I ought 
to get a good view from that hill. 

Director: You ride into a concealed party of 
Reds on Hill 929 and are captured. 

Lieut. D: I fire my pistol as soon as I see them. 
Do not my men escape? 

Capt. R: As soon as the leading Blue trooper 
sees us I open fire on the others. 

Director: I rule that the trooper at the rear of 
the patrol escapes. Mr. D, you can now direct the 
movements of this man. 

Lieut. D: What has he seen? 

Director: He has made out a Red infantry 
picket of about 20 men, on Hill 929, and another of 
about the same size near the L. A. Aaron house, 
here. 



-131— 

Lieut. D: He goes back to the Taylor school 
house as fast as he can. 

Directcr: That will do. You may both retire. 

The director now studies the movements of the 
patrols of Lieutenants Y and C. Although Lieut. C 
announced an intention to move at a trot, the direc- 
tor believes that he would not trot continuously from 
South West Hill to Atchison Cross, and estimates 
that some minutes would be lost in giving instruc- 
tions to the detached patrol and in gaining the ridge 
between the target butts and Wagner Point. ■ ' 

Lieut. Y will probably walk up the steep slope 
south of Plum Creek and down the slope near J. E. 
Daniels. In studying the question as to when these 
patrols would see each other, if at all, he takes into 
consideration the haze in the atmosphere, Lieut. C's 
precaution to avoid exposure, that Lieut. C does not 
stop to use his glasses, and the hedge and other ob- 
stacles along the south side of the Millwood road. 

Director: (to Lieut. C, ) As you approach Han- 
cock Hill the men in front of you signal "enemy in 
sight" and one of them comes back at a gallop and 
informs you that he has just seen two Red cavalry- 
men on the Millwood Road, —that they were going 
east at a trot and disappeared in the wood here (east 
of Kern). They did not appear to have seen your 
men. 

Lieut. C: I halt and post my men so as to watch 
Sheridan's Drive in both directions and the Millwood 
Road. I then write a message to Capt. B. 

Director: What is the substance of the message ? 

Lieut. C: That two Red cavalrymen have been 
seen near Kern. I will then move cautiously along 
the edge of the wood to the Millwood Road. I halt 
there and wait for the patrol which I sent to Fort 
Leavenworth. 

Director: How long will you wait? 



—132— 

Lieut. C: Not more than fifteen minutes. If the 
patrol does not come up before that, I will then go 
on to Taylor S. H. and from there north to Kickapoo. 

Director: You may retire. Please ask Mr. Y 
to come in. {To Lieut. Y.) On approaching the 
Prison Cemetery at 2:37 

Lieut. Y: It was my intention to send three men 
east to the Missouri Pacific railroad to follow the rail- 
road south and join me at the crossing of Shady 
Creek. I intend to detach them immediately on en- 
tering the wood east of Kern. 

Director: You gave me your intentions as far as 
Fort Leavenworth and said nothing about this patrol. 
I make it a rule not to go backward even if it causes 
some dissatisfaction for I have neither the time nor 
the inclination to make computation of time and space 
twice. 

Lieut. Y: I must send this patrol because my 
road goes diagonally through the wood and I can see 
but little until I reach Shady Creek. The patrol is 
to push directly across the wood and watch the open 
ground to the east. It was my intention from the 
first to do this. 

Director: Very well, I will credit you with hav- 
ing sent the patrol.* At 2.38 p.m. you are approach- 
ing the Prison Cemetery and have reached the point 
where I place this block when you hear firing in front 
of you and the two men in your front come back at a 
gallop. The fire continues. Your men have seen 
nothing. 

Lieut. Y: 1 order them to go back and find out 
something. That is what they were put there for. 

Director: One of the men has been hit and the 
other's horse goes lame. Your party is under fire. 

Lieut Y: I will change the sound man to the 
sound horse, and send him and two other men to the 
front to reconnoiter. '^ 

*This concession of the director is more apparent than real 



—133— 

Director: While you are giving the orders for 
this another man and two more horses are disabled.* 

Lieut. Y: I countermand the orders, take cover 
at the side of the road, and dismount to fight on foot. 

Director: The fire ceases. 

Lieut. Y: I form skirmish line dismounted and 
advance at a double time. 

Director: You see through the wood a Blue 
trooper retiring southeast at a gallop. When seen he 
was where I place this pin, but he disappears imme- 
diately. 

Lieut. Y: I mount and move forward at a trot, 
sending three men forward at a gollop. 

Director: As you approach Shady Creek (here) 
you hear firing and the three men sent forward 
come back at a gallop. They have seen two dis- 
mouted Blues here (in the ravine west of Blunt Hill) 
and believe that there are seven or eight Blues there. 
. Lieut. Y: I dismount in the Shady Creek ravine 
and send my horses to cover about one hundred yards 
to the west. I will open fire on the Blues if they 
show themselves. I wait here for my detached patrol. 

Director: How long will you wait? 

Lieut. Y: As it has not joined me already I sup- 
pose it has met opposition. Nevertheless, I will 
wait ten minutes. I will then charge the enemy dis- 
mounted. 

Director: Your patrol does not arrive. When 
you advance you find no one in the ravine, but three 
Blue troopers are seen here, galloping south. They 
turn west (here) and disappear in the vicinity of the 
cavalry stables. 

Lieut. Y: I mount and pursue themt 

Director: It will now be necessary to close the 

*The director assesses losses to convince Lieut. Y that he is really under 
fire, of which fact he seems oblivious. 

jThis exercise might profitably have been carried further. 



—134— 

exercise, for we have only enough time left for the 
discussion. Please call both parties to the map. 

The director states the strength of both outposts 
and explains their dispositions, states the strength 
and missions of the four officer's patrols and describes 
briefly their movements. He then comments on the 
exercise as follows: 

The cavalry of the Red outpost (with the excep- 
tion of the patrols) was held in the reserve. If this 
cavalry had been pushed to the front to hold the main 
roads, say at the bridges over Plum Creek, it might 
have held hostile patrols at a distance. One of the 
Blue patrols came in contact with the Red infantry 
outpost and developed its position; the other would 
probably have done so if the exercise had been car- 
ried further. 

The formations taken by the four officer's patrols 
were different and the exercise illustrates some of 
the advantages and disadvantages of the methods 
used. Mr. D, being at the head of his patrol, gained 
an early view of his antagonist, and placed his patrol 
in concealment more quickly than he otherwise could 
have done, but the post selected is dangerous as 
shown by Mr. D's experience on Hill 929. By plac- 
ing himself at the head of his men an officer can con- 
trol them by means of signals — quickly and silently. 
Mr. X, in selecting what he calls a "normal" forma- 
tion, found that his flankers could not make rapid 
progress over difficult streams, fences, plowed 
ground, etc., and was considerably delayed by them. 
The flankers did not see much that could not be seen 
from the road and this work was very exhausting for 
their horses. He also found, when he desired to use 
the effective strength of the partfy in combat, that it 
was too much dispersed. 

Mr. C did not appear to take into consideration 
the advisability of reconnaissance on his flanks, and 



- -135— 

seemed more desirous of avoiding observation than 
of gaining information. His route— along Sheridan's 
Drive— gave an excellent view of the country to the 
north and west, of which he did not fully avail him- 
self. 

Mr. Y adopted an ironclad rule of sending patrols 
on every lateral road. This is not necessary in every 
case. In this case, the Millwood road and the Taylor 
S. H. — Frenchman road were covered by Lieut. X's 
patrol and the Sharp— Klasinski trail could be over- 
looked from the road. 

The patrolling of lateral roads is exhausting work 
and should be done sparingly. In addition to the 
reconnaissance of lateral roads, it is often advisable 
to send patrols to good posts of observation near the 
road taken by the main party. Mr. D's sending two 
men to the top of Sentinel hill is approved. 

Cavalry patrols, as a rule, move rapidly over 
ground from which a good view cannot be obtained, 
and pause at good posts for observation. Mr. Y 
might have stopped for a minute on the ridge west 
of J. E. Daniels to sweep Salt Creek valley and the 
heights to the east with his glasses. 

The non-arrival of Mr. Y's detached patrol at the 
crossing of Shady Creek was due to the fact that this 
patrol, not being familiar with the country, lost the 
trail in the wood and wandered about for some time 
without being able to find the way out. Mr. C was 
similarly disappointed in the non-arrival of the patrol 
which he sent to Fort Leavenworth. This patrol was 
commanded by a young corporal possessed of more 
zeal and military ardor than discretion. He discov- 
ered Mr. Y's patrol near the Prison Cemetery, and 
immediately instituted an independent campaign on 
his own initiative. He succeeded in delaying Mr. Y's 
patrol and inflicting some losses on it, but he would 
have shown better judgment if he had evaded it and 



—136— 

rejoined his own party as he was ordered. These inci- 
dents illustrate the mishaps which occur not infre- 
quently in cases of patrols commanded by inexperi- 
enced leaders and show that the performances of de- 
tachments sent beyond our own observation do not 
always come up to our expectations. 

The message sent by Mr. C from Hancock Hill 
did not contain information possessing any special 
significance. It was known that a detachment of the 
enemy was near Kickapoo and it was to be expected 
that small parties of cavalry would be seen in the 
vicinity. The information was not of sufficient im- 
portance, in this case, to warrant sending a message; 
but it would have been otherwise if no enemy had 
been known to be about. 

Mr. C's decision not to pursue the Reds seen, but 
to continue his reconnaissance, is approved. We 
might, of course, speculate on the probable conse- 
quences of an onslaught by Mr. C on the rear of Mr. 
Y's patrol while it was engaged in front; but, as a 
rule, the pursuit of hostile patrols is more likely to 
result in broken down horses and wasted time than 
in the accomplishment of anything advantageous. 

I cannot approve of Mr. X's mounted charge 
under the circumstances. He, of course, did not wish, 
to be delayed, and he perhaps believed the Blue force 
to be insignificant; but the facts that his movements 
were confined to a narrow road and that there was a 
ravine in front of the enemy should have been given 
more weight in making his decision. His persever- 
ance in continuing his reconnaissance and not allowing 
himself to be drawn into a dismounted combat with 
his antagonist is commended. 

I cannot see any sufficient reason for Mr. D's de- 
taching half of his patrol to follow Mr. X. His mis- 
sion was to learn what he could of the main hostile 
force, and these four men might have been very use- 



—137 — 

ful to him later. This patrol started out with an 
officer and eight men and was in a short time reduced 
to a single trooper. This man gained important in- 
formation but there is a probability that he would not 
have succeeded in carrying it through to his own out- 
post. A patrol commander should avoid depleting 
his patrol except for good cause.- 

Mr. D would also, in my opinion, have shown 
better judgment by leaving the main road after pass- 
ing Frenchman, selecting a route further west from 
which he could keep the road under observation, and 
seeking high ground at the enemy's flank or rear 
from which his position could have been overlooked. 
Crook Point would probably have served this purpose 
and could have been reached without opposition, 
though its importance would have warranted the Red 
outpost in placing a detached post there. 

The roads in front of an army are usually held 
by its cavalry. Cavalry patrols are most likely to 
secure information when directed toward the flank 
or rear of an enemy. When a patrol is to traverse 
long distances, it must use roads in order to cover 
them in good time. But in this case the distances 
were not great enough to make it important to re- 
main on the roads. 

Our exercise today illustrates some of the diffi- 
culties and dangers of cavalry patrolling and shows 
that skill, judgment, boldness, and willingness to 
sustain losses are essential requisites in a leader of a 
cavalry patrol. 

No. 2 

Detail: Director, Capt. A 

Commander, Blue, Capt. B 
Assistants, " Capt. C and Lieuts. 

D, E and F 
Commander, Red, Capt. R 
Assistants, ' ' Lieuts. X and Y 



—138— 

As the exercise is a simple one, no assistant for 
the director is detailed. 

All of the participants were notified at the last 
meeting that the next exercise would be in the 
duties of advance and rear guards. 

At the hour set for the exercise the director calls 
the Red party to the map and hands to the com- 
mander the following general and special situations, 
which the commander reads aloud to his assistants. 

GENERAL SITUATION 

On November 2, a body of Red infantry 
is retreating south through Fort Leaven- 
worth, Kansas, pursued by a larger force of 
Blues. The weather is clear and the roads 
are dry. Corral Creek is unfordable. 

SPECIAL SITUATION,-RED 

The rear guard of the Red infantry con- 
sists of one company, under your command. 
At 10 A. M. you are with the rear party (1 
section) which has reached One Mile Creek 
on Grant Avenue, and have received a mes- 
sage from your commanding officer, direct- 
ing you to hold the enemy in the vicinity of 
One Mile Creek for an hour in order that the 
bridges over Corral Creek may be prepared 
for demolition. Your support (3 sections) is 
on Grant Avenue opposite Devin Ridge. A 
small party of Blue cavalry has been follow- 
ing you closely and is now near the corner of 
Grant and Pope avenues. Dust can be seen 
rising in the north end of Fort Leavenworth. 

After finding on the map the various localities 
mentioned in the problem, the Red party withdraws 
and the Blue party enters. The Blue commander is 
handed the following problem, which he reads aloud. 

GENERAL SITUATION 

On November 2, a body of Red infantry 
is retreating south through Fort Leaven- 
worth, Kansas, pursued by a larger force of 



—139- 



Blues. The weather is clear and the roads 
are dry. Corral Creek is unfordable. 



SPECIAL SITUATION,— BLUE 

You are in command of the advance 
■ guard which consists of two companies of in- 
fantry and a squad (12) of cavalry. Your 
orders are to push the enemy vigorously. 
At 10 A.M. your cavalry is at the corner of 
Pope and Grant Avenues in touch with the 
enemy; your support (one platoon) is at the 
corner of Grant and Kearney Avenues, and 
the reserve (IJ cos.) is west of the U.S. Mil- 
itary Prison. The main body of the Blue 
force is approaching Shady Creek, where it 
is to halt ten minutes. You are mounted 
and with the support. 

The Blue party examines the map long enough 
to find the places named and then withdraws. The 
Red party is called to the map and Capt. R announces 
that he will send the 4th section (now the rear party) 
under the command of Lieutenant Y to the ice house 
south of Merritt Lake -to hold Merritt Hill from 
Grant Avenue, exclusive, to Prison Lane, inclusive, 
and patrol to Engineer Hill; and send the 3d section 
under command of Lieut. X to knoll 850 at the east 
end of Devin Ridge— to hold Devin Ridge from Grant 
Avenue, inclusive, to the Missouri River, and patrol 
toward the bridge over the Missouri River. The 1st 
and 2d sections are to halt at the east side of Grant 
Avenue opposite its junction with the Cavalry Drill 
Ground road. Capt. R. is with them* Capt. R says 
that this order is communicated to Lieut. Y verbally 
immediately on receipt of the message from the com- 
manding officer; that immediately afterwards he 
goes to Devin Ridge and gives the order to Lieut. X 

*Asan exercise Capt. R. might be required to write this order, or he 
might be required to make a sketch or tracing showing his dispositions. 



—140— 

who would naturally halt on seeing the movement of 
the rear party. * 

Lieut. Y says that he will order selected sharp- 
shooters to fire on any Blue cavalry seen watching 
his movements, move his section by the trail south of 
Merritt Lake to the ice house, deploy two squads 
about 100 yards south of the ice house, place one 
squad in the depression about 50 yards further south, 
and send one squad to Engineer Hill. 

Lieut. X says that he will deploy the whole of 
the 3d section on knoll 850, with the exception of one 
squad which is ordered to go to the old railroad bed 
and follow it as far as the buildings, which can be 
seen on the hill to the northeast of Devin Ridge at a 
distance of about 700 yards and watch the roads in 
that vicinity. 

Capt. R says further that the 1st and 2d sections 
are placed in concealment and the men lie down; he 
wishes to know how many mounted orderlies are 
with him and the director replies that there are 
none. 

The director places blocks, to represent the dis- 
positions described, shows them to the Red officers, 
makes pencil notes of their positions (which he also 
impresses on his memory) and then removes the 
blocks from the map. The Red party retires. 

The Blue party enters, and Capt. B says that he 
will continue to advance on Grant Avenue. He as- 
signs Capt. C and Lieut. F to the reserve, Lieut. E 
to the support, and Lieut. D to the cavalry. The 
director requests all of the Blue party except Lieut. 
D to withdraw. 

Director: At about 10 a.m. two or three of your 
advance troopers are fired on from the east end of 
Merritt Lake. You move forward to a good post of 

*According to the data it appears that the message was received before 
10 A.M. The director considers that Capt. R's order to Lieut. Y was given 
at 10 A.M. 



—141— 

observation about 300 yards southwest of the car 
station and see about twenty or thirty Red infantry- 
men moving west along the south side of Merritt 
Lake. You also see indistinctly through the trees a 
formed body of Red infantry moving east from 
Grant Avenue on Devin Ridge. You have been fol- 
lowing a company of Red infantry, but now all Red 
troops have disappeared from Grant Avenue. What 
is your estimate of the situation? 

Lieut. D\ It appears that the Reds are deploy- 
ing and probably intend to check us on One Mile 
Creek. I will watch them, send a patrol to each of 
their flanks, and send a written message to the ad- 
vance guard commander. 

Director'. What orders do you give the patrols? 

Lieut. D: Four men are sent by Pope Avenue 
to Engineer Hill. Four are sent east to take the 
road which joins Farragut Avenue just north of One 
Mile Creek. They are to find the enemy's flanks, 
remain in observation, and send messages here. 

Director: Write the message you send to Capt. B. 

While Lieutenant D is writing the message, the 
director studies the map and decides upon the time 
required for the movements ordered. He then calls 
Capt. B, hands him Lieut. D's message, and informs 
him that this message is handed to him by a trooper 
at the corner of Pope and Grant avenues at 10.06 
A, M. The message is as follows: 

From Advance Cavalry At 300yds. S.W. of Car Stat'n. Com- 
municated by Mtd. Messenger. 
Date 2 Nov. Hour 10.05 A. M. No. 13 

To Capt. B, 

Fired on near Merritt Lake. Red infantry is deploying 
on south side of One Mile creek. Have sent patrols to recon- 
nolter their flanks. Remain in observation. 

Received at 10.06 A. M. D, Lieut. 

Capt. B decides to halt the advance guard, re- 
connoiter the ground in his front, and wait for reports 
from the patrols. 



—142— 

Director: At the best near-by post of observa- 
tion you find Mr. D. With the aid of your glasses 
you make out three or four Reds at a locality pointed 
out by Mr. D— (here), south of the ice house. At 
10.08 A. M. you observe a Red infantry patrol ascend- 
ing the southeast slope of Engineer Hill— a minute or 
two later observe a struggle between this patrol and 
four mounted Blues— the Reds are victorious and the 
Blues retire westward. At 10.11 A. M. you hear 
firing to the southeast— at 10.13 two mounted mes- 
sengers approach— the first is from the patrol which 
you have seen driven from Engineer Hill and he in- 
forms you that his patrol retired to the U. S. National 
Cemetery— the other tells you that his patrol was 
fired on from an embankment of an abandoned rail- 
road on the north bank of One Mile creek and near 
Farragut Ave. (between X and 6) and that his patrol 
retired northward to a cut of the abandoned railroad 
(300 yards north of 6). 

Capt. B: I wish to question the last messenger. 

Director: Proceed. 

Capt B: Is the road from here to the cut you 
speak of sheltered from view from Devin Ridge? 

Director: The farther half of this road is ex- 
posed—the messenger drew fire from the east end of 
Devin Ridge when he returned but he could see a 
road nearer to the river (Farragut Avenue) which 
was sheltered from Devin Ridge. 

Capt B: What is the nature of One Mile creek? 

Director: He did not reach it. He noticed that 
the woods were thick east of the railroad bridge, 
but he could not see the creek. None of your troops 
have reconnoitered it, but from where you stand 
you can see that west of the railroad bridge the 
south bank is steep and three or four feet high. 
What is your estimate of the situation ? 



—143— 

Capt. B: The enemy occupies a very long line, 
half a mile or more; his patrolling north of One Mile 
Creek looks aggressive. He has probably been re- 
inforced. Nevertheless my orders require me to 
maintain a vigorous offensive and I will attack at 
once. If I encounter superior numbers I will soon 
be supported by our main body. Where is the in- 
fantry of the advance guard at present? 

Director: It halted at 10.07 a.m., in compliance 
with orders from you. The support is at the car 
station— the men under cover west of Grant avenue. 
The reserve is at the corner of Grant and Kearney 
avenues. 

Capt. B: I will assemble the officers at the car 
station and issue an order for the attack. My order 
is as follows: 

' 'The enemy is in position on that ridge (Devin) 
and south of that lake (Merritt). His strength is not 
known. 

"We will attack, enveloping his right flank. 

"The support (1st Plat. Co. A), commanded by 
Lieut. E, will advance at once east of Grant avenue 
to the ridge between here and One Mile creek and 
support the main attack, which— consisting of Com- 
pany B under command of Captain C— will move by 
Farragut avenue against the east end of Devin Ridge. 

"The 2d Plat. Co. A, under command of Lieut. 
F, will form the reserve and move under cover to the 
railroad siding. 

"The cavalry will observe the enemy west of 
Grant avenue. 

"Send messages to the reserve." 

I will also send a message to the commanding 
officer, informing him that the Reds are in position 
on Devin Ridge and appear to have received rein- 
forcements. The director notes the substance of the 



—144 — 

order, estimates that it was issued at 10:25 a.m., 
and inquires of the subordinate commanders their 
intentions. 

Capt. C says that he will march east on Kearney 
Avenue to Farragut and then march south on Farra- 
gut Avenue to One Mile Creek, and that he will order 
the men to march on the sides of the road to avoid 
raising dust. 

Director: When you reach this point (east of old 
R. R. cut, 500 yards south of the bridge over the 
Missouri river) the head of your column is fired on 
from this point (old R. R. embankment between X 
and 6). 

Capt. C: I deploy my leading platoon and ad- 
vance it at double time — march direction, knoll 850 
at the east end of Devin Ridge. The other platoon 
follows in column of squads at 100 yards. 

Director: You are impeded by thick underbrush, 
One Mile Creek, which here has almost vertical banks 
about six feet high, and a railroad cut. 

Capt. C: I urge my men forward as rapidly as 
possible. 

Lieut. E indicates his route, shows the position 
he will take, and says that he will open fire on any 
Reds seen, but will fire slowly until Co, B assaults 
and then order fire at will on Devin Ridge. 

Lieut. F indicates the route he will take. 

Lieut. D says that he will order his eastern patrol 
to rejoin him as soon as Co. B is seen coming up and 
that he will open fire on the Red patrol on Engineer 
Hill from his present position and order his patrol at 
the Cemetery to do hkewise. 

The Blue party withdraws, and the director com- 
putes the time necessary for the movements ordered, 
makes notes, and recalls the Red party. 

Director: Your company is in the position ordered 
at 10:06 a.m.— the dust which was seen in the north- 



—145— 

ern part of Fort Leavenworth becomes denser for a 
time but disappears at about 10:08— at 10:06 you see 
Blue infantry near the car station, but it disappears 
in a minute or two apparently toward the west — at 
10:10 you hear firing both at Engineer Hill and near 
Farragut avenue, and shortly afterwards receive 
messages informing you that your patrols have re- 
pulsed small parties of Blue cavalry— at 10:27 you 
hear light firing in the direction of the infantry bar- 
racks and shortly afterward from the National Cem- 
etery — at the same time you see about 50 Blue in- 
fantrymen cross to the east side of Grant avenue 
near the car station — at 10:31 a desultory fire is 
opened on Devin Ridge from the ridge about 170 
yards northeast of Merritt Lake— at 10:35 you see a 
cloud of dust, considerably larger than the former 
one, in the north end of Fort Leavenworth— at 10:42 
you .* 

Capt. R: At 10:40 1 send an order to Lieut. Y 
directing him to withdraw his section to the post of 
the reserve. 

Lieut. Y: On receiving the order I will signal 
the patrol on Engineer Hill and will withdraw without 
showing myself, moving at first south and then east. 

Director: At 10:42 you see three or four Blue 
infantrymen near the railroad siding — the dust in 
Fort Leavenworth has disappeared — at 10:47 you 
hear rapid firing near Farragut avenue which in- 
creases in volume, together with loud shouting and 
the sound of whistles— at the same time a sheet of 
fire breaks out from the ridge in front of you— you 
see Lieut. Y with his section here (where I place this 
block) approaching from the west. 

*The director unfolds the situation slowly and impressively, making 
occasional pauses. Commanders give orders on their own initiative when- 
ever the situation appears to them to demand action on their part. The di- 
rector sometimes asks a commander for his estimate of the situation in order 
to be sure that the information given is understood. It is not to be expected, 
however, that the commander's estimate of the situation will he identical 
with that of the director. 



—146— 

Capt. R: I retire to Pope Hill with the reserve, 
keeping under cover of the trees east of the road— I 
send an order to Lieut. X directing him to fall back 
to Rabbit Point and informing him that I will support 
him with fir3 from Pope Hill — I order Lieut. Y to re- 
tire slowly along the street car track leaving a patrol 
on the ridge temporarily to observe the enemy— I 
send a message to my commanding officer informing 
him that I am attacked by superior numbers and am 
falling back to Pope Hill and requesting him to sup- 
port my withdrawal from Pope Hill with fire from the 
south bank of Corral Creek. 

The director now calls the Blue party and takes 
up the discussion.* He states the special situation 
given each party, recapitulates rapidly the steps 
taken by each, shows with blocks the situation of 
both parties at 10:50 A.M., and comments as follows; 

The line which the Red company undertook to 
defend was entirely too long. The assignment of a 
section of a defensive line to a fraction of a company 
is very unusual. A company should not be broken 
up in this way. The sections were so long that they 
could not be effectively defended by the troops as- 
signed to them. 

The men sent to the ice house were of very little 
use there. The Blues could not advance across Mer- 
ritt Lake, and if they advanced west of it they would 
have been seen in time to allow the Red company to 
flank them from Merrit Hill or intercept them on 
Long Ridge. The long line occupied had the effect 
of deceiving the Blue commander, and, owing chiefly 
to the dilatory character of his movements, it was 
successfully held; but if he had attacked promptly 
between Grant Avenue and the railroad, the Reds 
would have needed all of their men there to check 
him. The withdrawal of the Reds from Devin Ridge 

*TIje exercise might have been carried further. 



—147— 

to Pope Hill was timely and provision was made for- 
mutual support. 

Sending patrols so far to the front and flanks 
was not essential to carrying out the mission of the 
Red company. These patrols gave the Blue cavalry 
a great deal of annoyance and prevented it from 
pressing in on the flanks of the Red company. They 
also added to the mystification of the Blue com- 
mander. Their success in this case was due largely 
to their finding exceptionally good positions; one was 
protected on its right by the river and the other 
found on Engineer Hill an exceptionally good field of 
fire, in all directions. But the detachment of small 
parties of infantry to such distances is hazardous. 

Several minutes were consumed by Mr. D in 
writing a message which in this case might better 
have been sent verbally. 

The decision of the Blue commander "to attack 
at once " is approved; but he was slow in arriving at 
this decision and did not carry it out promptly. 

The situation of the Red rear guard with an un- 
fordable stream at its back offered an opportunity to 
the pursuers to cut it off or inflict heavy losses on it; 
but such opportunities can be turned to account only 
by boldness and activity on the part of the pursuers. 

A frontal attack over open ground is certainly a 
delicate affair against even an inferior enemy. But 
here the ground was not open. The bed of One Mile 
Creek especially favored a direct attack. The Blue 
advance guard might have advanced with little ex- 
posure to the ridge east of Grant Avenue and from 
there could have gained the bed of One Mile Creek at 
a run — advancing one platoon at a time, supported 
by the fire of the other three. Devin Ridge could 
have been carried with the bayonet before the Blue 
commander finished issuing his orders for the attack. 
Captain B's combined order for attack might have 



—148- 

been commended in a solution of a map problem; but 
the two side map maneuver shows us that we cannot 
always take the time necessary to wait for the re- 
sults of reconnaissance, to assemble officers and issue 
combined orders. 

Such wide turning movements as that ordered 
are seldom employed by such small forces; and, in 
this case, the method of attack was inconsistent 
with the mission of the advance guard. The advance 
cavalry was in touch with the enemy and the in- 
fantry was close behind. The deployment of the 
Reds was observed. The sooner the attack was 
launched against them the less opportunity they 
would have to select a position and strengthen it. 
The Blue main body reached the corner of Grant and 
Kearney avenues at 10:35 a.m. and would have been 
ready to support the attack if needed. 

As it happened, the Blue main body was com- 
peJled to wait a considerable period for the advance 
guard to act, and this delay is not likely to be accept- 
able to the commanding officer. When he finds that 
the carefully planned attack of the advance guard 
strikes nothing but an empty ridge his dissatisfaction 
will be increased. Captain B's experience should 
warn us against jumping at the conclusion that our 
enemy has been reinforced, and especially against 
reporting it as a fact, without definite information. 

Captain B's selection of a point of attack was 
unfortunate; the difficulties encountered by the main 
attack in reaching Devin Ridge were unusual and 
hardly to be expected; but the possibility of meeting 
such obstacles should be kept in view in ordering an 
attack over ground which has not been reconnoitered. 

The ground in front of the center of the enemy's 
p3sition lay in plain sight and contained no serious 
obstacles. The enemy's left was covered by Merritt 
Lake. Captain B seems to have reasoned that since 



-149- 



the attack could not envelop the enemy's left it must 
inevitably be directed against his right.* 



DIRECTOR'S NOTES 

MAP MANEUVER NO. 2 



BLUE 



RED 



Cavalry patrol (4)Eng. 
hill 



10.10 
.11 



Cav. patrol (4) old R.R. 
Support, Capt.B, corner 

Pope ave. - - .06 
Reserve, (Japt.C and Lt. 

F, Kearney ave. - .06 

Cavalry patrols report .13 

Off s. assemble car station .20 

Order attack - - .25 
Message to CO. (enemy 

position reinforcement) .27 

Cav. fires on Eng. hill .27 

1st Plat. Co. A, ridge .30 

2dPlat.' o.A,R.R.siding .42 
Co. B starts Pope and 

Kearney ave. - - .30 

Co. B arr. old R.R. cut .47 
Main body cor. Kearney 

ave. - - - .35 



In position - - 10.06 
3d Sec. Lt. X, Devin R, 
4th Sec. Lt.Y, sou. Ice House. 
1st and 2d Sees. Capt. R, east 

of Grant. 
Patrol 4th Sec.(8)Eng.hill .10 
Patrol 3d Sec. old R.R. 



embankment 



.11 



Message Capt.R to Lt.Y, 

(sent) - - - 
Message Capt. R, reed. 
Lt. Y, car track 
Capt, R rets, to Pope hill 
Capt. R mess, to Lt.X 



.40 

.44 

.50 

.48 

.48 

Note. — There can be no invariable form of keeping notes. They vary 
with the exercise and the needs of the director. They do not contain a com- 
plete record of the exercise, but only such data as the director may need to 
assist his memory. If the director has an officer to assist him, the notes 
will be kept by the assistant. Written orders, messages and memoranda 
written by commanders and sketches or tracings made by them showing dis- 
positions, orders of march, etc., are attached to the notes and lighten the 
work of the director. 

NO. 3 

General Situation: 

On Sept. 15, a Blue corps whose base is 
Kansas City is near Atchison, pursuing 
northv^ard a beaten Ked corps. The Blues 
have an entrenched camp at Kickapoo. The 
Missouri Pacific R. R. is the line of commun- 
ications of the Blue corps. The country is 
friendly to the Reds. The weather is clear 

* The decisions, orders, etc., in this and the preceding exercise are 
not intended to be taken as models of correctness. It will be noticed that 
the director states his opinions in a feailess and positive manner. This is 
thought desirable; although, of course, his opinions are not authoritative. 



—150— 

and cool and the ground is dry. Salt Creek 
and Plum Creek are serious obstacles. 

Special Situation — Red: 

A regiment of Red cavalry is approaching 
Leavenworth from the southwest with the 
object of destroying the Missouri Pacific R. 
R. and capturing a small Blue detachment 
reported to be there. Two troops have been 
detached to proceed by the Atchison Pike to 
cut off any Blue troops found retreating 
northward to Kickapoo, which is reported to 
be strongly held by the Blues. You are in 
command of these two troops and at 8 A.M. 
are at the head of the main body of your de- 
tachment on the Atchison Pike 5C0 yards 
west of Mottin. Your advance party, 12 
men, is opposite Mottin and has just report- 
ed seeing a thick cloud of dust in the direction 
of Sentinel Hill. 

Special Situation — Blue: 

A battalion of Blue infantry, without horses 
or machine guns, under your command, has 
been sent from Kickapoo to Leavenworth to 
patrol the railroad. You have received reh- 
able information that a large force of Red 
cavalry with artillery has been seen about 
ten miles southwest of Leavenworth at 6 
A.M., apparently marching on that place; you 
decide to retire to Kickapoo which is well 
garrisoned and protected by field works. At 
8 A. M. your leading element has reached 
Frenchman, the main body iSh companies) 
has reached the fork of the road leading to 
Gauss, and you have just received informa- 
tion from a flanking patrol that a small party 
of horsemen was moving east on the Atchi- 
sofi Pike near Mottin. 

The opposing forces are here placed in contact 
at the outset and an important decision is required of 
each commander. The Red commander reasons that 
the dust seen may be caused by Blue troops retreat- 



—151— 

ing from Leavenworth to Kickapoo on the Kasten- 
Frenchman road, and that it is his duty to capture 
them if he can. If they are too strong to be captured 
by his detachment, he must inflict losses on them and 
check or delay them until reinforcements can be ob- 
tained. Since Salt Creek is a serious obstacle, his 
best opportunity for checking the Blues is at the 
bridge near Frenchman. The possession of this 
bridge is important, but if he cannot seize it, he can 
bring dismounted fire on it while the Blues are cross- 
ing or attempting to debouch from it. His decision 
is to move forward rapidly on the Atchison Pike, 
take such action as circumstances require as the situ- 
ation develops, sending a message to the regimental 
commander as soon as it is definitely known that 
Blue troops are in his front. His orders sltb "Gallop, 
March". 

The Blue commander does not believe that the 
main body of the Red force, from which he is retreat- 
ing, is on the Atchison Pike, because it was reported to 
be southwest of Leavenworth, while the Atchison 
Pike runs northwest. The horsemen seen are thought 
to be Red scouts reeonnoitering at a distance from 
their main column. However, they may be the leading 
element of a strong patrol or of a detachment large 
enough to be able to cause considerable annoyance. 
As it is now 8 A. M. and the Red force was reported 
to be composed of mounted troops and to be only ten 
miles distant two hours before, they may now be 
entering Leavenworth; he has, consequently, no time 
to lose and must not allow himself to be checked or 
delayed. If the information on which he is retreat- 
ing is correct, the Red force is probably an indepen- 
dent brigade of cavalry. He will be safe when he 
crosses Plum Creek. His best road is the direct 
Frenchman— Kickapoo road, but he has a defile di- 
rectly in front of him (the bridge over Salt Creek). 



—152— 

Here a comparatively small force of the enemy might 
delay him by compelling him to force a crossing under 
fire, and inflict losses on him while crossing and at- 
tempting to debouch on the other side. He decides 
to expedite the march of the battalion until it is across 
Salt Creek to a rate of march approximating the 
"cavalry walk" (110 yards per minute); his order is 
"Step out" (delivered verbally to the battalion). In 
case fire is opened on the column, the advance guard 
will without orders at once attack the enemy: it will 
be reinforced if necessary: a new advance guard will 
be pushed forward: and the former advance guard, 
depending on the position and conduct of the enemy, 
may become successively a flank guard and a rear 
guard. After Salt Creek is crossed the high ground 
west of the Frenchman — Kickapoo road is the natural 
feature of the highest importance; from it the fire of 
an aggressive enemy, even if inferior in strength, 
could prevent the battalion from advancing in column 
on the road; it will, consequently, be necessary to 
cover this ridge with a flank guard, which will march 
northward along the ridge if practicable; if it is en- 
gaged so closely that it cannot gain ground to the 
north, fresh detachments must be thrown out, while 
those first sent fall back to the road and form a rear 
guard. 

This maneuver illustrates the passage of a defile, 
debouching from a defile, a flank march and the de- 
laying and harassing action of cavalry. The ques- 
tion as to whether cavalry can delay an infantry col- 
ums more effectively by operating against its head or 
its flank will, no doubt, receive attention in the dis- 
cussion. 

NO. 4 

General Situation: 

On June 20, a Blue army, whose base is 
Kansas City, Missouri, is operating in hos- 



—153— 

tile territory in the vicinity of St Joseph, 
Missouri, against a Red army whose base is 
Omaha, Nebraska. The weather is warm 
and clear. Salt Creek and Plum Creek are 
insignificant as obstacles. 

Special Situation — Blue: 

The 1st Infantry is at Beverly (three miles 
east of Fort Leavenworth) guarding the com- 
munications of the Blue army and has de- 
tached the 1st Battalion, with a machine gun 
platoon and four mounted orderlies, to go to 
Kickapoo and seize a quantity of supplies re- 
ported to have been collected there for the 
Reds. The battalion leaves one platoon at 
the Fort Leavenworth bridge over the Mis- 
souri River and at 8 A. M. is marching on 
the Millwood Road and its leading element 
has reached the Kickapoo— Frenchman road, 
when its commander, who is with the ad- 
vance guard, is informed by a trusted spy 
that about 1000 cavalry camped at Lowemont 
the preceding night. At the same time 
mounted men are seen in the vicinity of 
Breidenbauch and a cloud of dust is seen 
further west. 

Special Situation — Red: 

The 1st Cavalry has been sent south to re- 
connoiter the west bank of the Missouri 
River and cover the removal of supplies 
which have been collected at Kickapoo. The 
regiment camps at Lowemont on the night 
of June 19-20, and at 8 A. M. is on the Mill- 
wood Road; its leading element, which is 
opposite Breidenbauch, reports seeing a col- 
umn of Blue infantry east of the Taylor 
School House. 

The commanders may be directed to submit 
sketches showing in detail the arrangement of their 
columns at 8 A.M. Although it is stated in the prob- 
lem that Salt Creek and Plum Creek are insignificant 
as obstacles, the season of the year (June 20) should 
be taken into consideration in regard to movements 



—154— 

of troops off the roads. Cultivated ground would be 
soft and heavy and growing crops would impede 
progress but would afford cover for dismounted men. 
The Blue battalion commander finds himself con- 
fronted with conditions which were not contemplated 
by the regimental commander in sending the bat- 
talion to Kickapoo. The mission of the Blue 1st In- 
fantry is to guard the communications of the Blue 
army (apparently the Burlington R.R.); the sending 
of the battalion to Kickopoo appears to be in pursuit 
of an object of secondary importance, and it seems 
that no considerable resistance was expected or a 
stronger force would have been sent. The Red force 
reported appears to be a regiment of cavalry but its 
mission is not known; it is probable that it will at- 
tempt to cross the Missouri River and destroy or in- 
terrupt the Burlington railroad; the Blue battalion 
has left one platoon at the Fort Leavenworth bridge, 
but this is probably insufficient in view of the changed 
conditions. The battalion could probably reach Kick- 
apoo and seize or destroy the supplies there; but the 
importance of this task does not justify exposing the 
battalion to destruction or capture. 

The battalion commander decides: to send the 
adjutant with two mounted orderlies to the vicinity 
of Sprong to reconnoiter the enemy; to retire to the 
edge of the wood east of Kern immediately, the ad- 
vance guard becoming a rear guard; to send a mes- 
sage to the regimental commander, informing him of 
the changed conditions. If mounted Red troops ap- 
pear in superior numbers and especially if they move 
toward Frenchman, the retreat will be continued to 
the bridge over the Missouri river. 

The Red commander is ignorant of the strength 
of the Blue column (which may be the advance guard 
of a larger force) and his first concern is to cover the 
supplies in Kickapoo while reconnoitering the enemy 



— ]55— 

and endeavoring to ascertain his strength and in- 
tentions. His role, at the outset, is a defensive one, 
and his first move will be in the direction of Plum 
Creek with a view to interposing between the Blues 
and Kickapoo. He decides: To send the leading 
squadron forward rapidly to attack the Blues; to 
move the other two squadrons forward rapidly (on 
the Millwood— A. Daniels— Kickapoo road) to Plum 
Creek; and to send an officer's patrol around the 
enemy's left flank to ascertain the strength of the 
column and whether or not it is followed by support- 
ing troops. If he discovers the Blue force to be 
considerably smaller than his own, he will attack 
with his whole force, preferably the Blues' left 
flank, and endeavor to cut them off from the Fort 
Leavenworth bridge. 

NO. 5 

Situation — Blue: 

On October 20, a Blue detachment of all 
arms, in hostile territory, is moving via 
Leavenworth on Kickapoo, where it is to 
bivouac. 

Its independent cavalry (one squadron 
with a machine gun platoon) has been di- 
rected to trot ahead and hold Kickapoo until 
the arrival of the detachment, reconnoitering 
the roads to the north and west. At 11 a.m. 
the main body of the cavalry (82 troops) has 
reached Frenchman when its commander, 
who is at the head of the column, is informed 
that two small patrols of Red cavalry had 
been seen on the high ground about a mile 
to the northwest and that a cloud of dust 
was seen still further north which appeared 
to be moving eastward. 

Situation — Red: 

On October 20, a Red detachment in 
friendly territory is approaching Leaven- 
worth via Lowemont and the Millwood Road. 
Its independent cavalry (one squadron) has 



—156— 

been sent ahead to secure the Terminal 
Bridge at Leavenworth. At 11 a.m., the 
cavalry commander, who is at the head of 
the main body (three troops) is opposite 
Sprong- on the Millwood Road when he re- 
ceives information that a body of Blue cav- 
alry, estimated at three troops, was ap- 
proaching Frenchman from the south. 

Both commanders are given the information that, 
owing to a stock law which had been passed in Kan- 
sas, making fences unnecessary, all fences had been 
removed except those on small enclosures near farm 
houses, also that all crops had been removed and that 
the ground was hard and dry. 

NO. 6 

Situation — Red: 

On June 1st, a Red force, consisting of 
the 1st Infantry (less 3d Battalion) and Troops 
A and B, 1st Cavalry, is covering the removal 
of a quantity of supplies from a storehouse 
at Merritt lake to the R. R. station at Fort 
Leavenworth. At 8:30 a.m. it is in position, 
all troops being north of Corral creek, when 
information is received that Blue troops are 
approaching from the south and have reached 
Metropolitan avenue. The removal of the 
supplies will be completed by 11 a.m.; they 
are to be sent to Atchison. 

Situation — Blue: 

On June 1st, a Blue force from Kansas 
City, consisting of the 3d Infantry and 3d 
Squadron, 3d Cavalry, with orders to capture 
or prevent removal of supplies from a store- 
house at Merritt Lake, is approaching Fort 
Leavenworth from the south. At 8:30 a.m. 
its leading element has reached Metropolitan 
avenue on Broadway and information has 
been received that Red troops are holding 
the crossings of Corral creek. 



—157— 

Both commanders are informed that Corral creek 
can be crossed only at bridges and fords on Grant 
avenue, Farragut avenue and the Target Range road, 
and that the country west of the Leavenworth sheet 
of the maneuver map (600 yards west of the target 
range) is impassable. 

NO. 7 

General Situation: 

On October 3, a Blue division is advanc- 
ing via Platte City, Mo., on Fort Leaven- 
worth. A Red division is concentrating at 
Atchison, Kansas. The Missouri River forms 
part of the boundary between the territories 
of the Reds and Blues. The Terminal Bridge 
at Leavenworth has been destroyed. Plum 
Creek and Salt Creek are serious obstacles. 
The atmosphere is foggy. 

Special Situation — Blue: 

The advance guard of the Blue division 
has reached Platte City, Mo., and has de- 
tached the 1st Infantry, Troop A, 1st Cav- 
alry, and Bactery A, 1st Field Artillery, to 
occupy Fort Leavenworth and cover the 
crossing of the division. The leading ele- 
ment of the detachment has reached the 
west end of the bridge at 1 p.m. The re- 
mainder of the Blue advance guard is ex- 
pected to begin crossing at 4 p.m. 

Special Situation — Red: 

The 3d Cavalry, with Battery F, 5th F. 
A. (horse), has been sent from Atchison to 
check or delay the crossing of Blue troops 
over the Missouri river at Fort Leavenworth. 
At 1 p.m. the leading element of the detach- 
ment is two miles northwest of Kickapoo. 
Two regiments of Red infantry are expected 
to reach Kickapoo at 5 p.m. 

In order to cover the remainder of the advance 
guard while debouching from the bridge, and to gain 



—168 — 

sufficient room for their deployment, the Blue de- 
tachment will probably seek to occupy and hold the 
Sheridan Drive ridge. Here it will be able to make 
use of its artillery, but the position will be found to 
be too long to be effectively defended by so small a 
force. 

If the Reds make a simple frontal attack on the 
Sheridan Drive ridge and the Blues concentrate in 
front of them, the Reds will probably be defeated. 
But if the Reds make use of their superior mobility, 
or if the Blue detachment is too greatly dispersed, 
the Reds may gain possession of a part of the ridge 
and probably compel the Blues to retire to the vicinity 
of the bridge. If the Reds gain possession of the 
ridge they can bring an effective artillery fire on the 
bridge and check or delay the crossing of the sup- 
porting Blue troops till nightfall. 

NO. 8 

General Situation:- 

On November 20th a Blue division is re- 
treating through Leavenworth and Kickapoo 
towards Atchison pursued by a Red division. 
Salt creek is a dry ravine. The ground west 
of the map between the Millwood Road and 
the Atchison Pike is impassable (a lake). 

Special Situation — Blue: 

The Blue rear guard, consisting of — 
1st Infantry 

Battery A, 1st Field Artillery 
Troops A and B, 1st Cavalry 
One platoon of a field signal company — 

has halted for the night near Burns. It is 
now 6 a.m. Nov. 21, and the rear guard com- 
mander has justreceived orders toholdground 
south of Plum Creek until noon to cover the 
removal of supplies from Kickapoo. Blue 
cavalry patrols have been in contact with 



-159- 

hostile cavalry on the Atchison Hill — South- 
west Hill ridge during the night. 
Required: 

1. The disposition of the rear guard at 

6 a.m. 

2. The next order of the commander. 
Special Situation — Red: 

The advance guard of the Red division 
consists of — 

3d Infantry 
5th Infantry 

1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery 
3d Squadron, 9th Cavalry 
Company D, 1st Battalion, Engineers 
One field company, Signal Corps 
Ambulance Co., 3d Field Hospital. 
The cavalry reached Avenue hill at dark 
and bivouacked there; its patrols have been 
in contact with hostile cavalry on the Atchi- 
son Hill— South West Hill ridge during the 
night. The remaining troops of the advance 
guard halted for the night two miles further 
south. It is 6 a.m., Nov. 21st, and the ad- 
vance guard has just been set in motion. 
Required: 

1. The dispositions and orders of the 
cavalry commander, 

2. The order of march of the remain- 
der of the advance guard. 

After the attack of the Red advance guard on 
the position selected by the Blue rear guard has fully 
developed, the Blue rear guard commander is handed 
a message from the commander of the Blue division 
stating that the removal of the supphes from Kicka- 
poo has been completed and that the Blue division 
has nearly cleared Kickapoo. The rear guard is di- 
rected to withdraw to Kickapoo. The withdrawal to 
be supported by a battery on hill 929. 

The problem illustrates the selection of a posi- 
tion, an attack and defense and the breaking off of 
an engagement. 

NoTB — All of the foregoing maneuver problems may be varied by chang- 
ing the strength and locationof the forces. 



CHAPTER V. 



TACTICAL RIDES 



Tactical rides are analogous to tactical map ma- 
neuvers. They cover nearly the same field of instruc- 
tion and the differences in the methods of conducting 
them are only such as result from the use of actual 
ground instead of the maneuver map. 

The use of actual ground gives to tactical rides 
some important advantages over map maneuvers; for 
the study of ground is one of the most valuable ele- 
ments of military training; and maps are, at best, but 
imperfect representations of ground. For this rea- 
son, tactical rides are classed as second only to field 
maneuvers as a means of instruction in tactics. Tac- 
tical rides even possess some advantages over field 
maneuvers, in that they permit a more detailed study 
of instructive situations. They are more perfectly 
under the control of the director, and he has more com- 
plete knowledge of the situation and can stop the 
operations at any desired point and discuss them 
while the events considered are fresh in the minds of 
all. 

But the employment of real ground instead of 
the map introduces some difficulties into the work of 
conducting the exercises, and imposes some import- 
ant limitations upon the character of the exercises 
which can be conducted in this way and, consequent- 
ly, upon the scope of their utility. 

Experience in conducting map maneuvers has 
shown that very large scale maps are inconvenient 
The scale twelve inches to one mile is probably the 

160 



—161— 

largest that can be conveniently used and this is con- 
venient only when small forces are considered, or 
troops operating in very restricted areas. An infan- 
try division or a cavalry brigade cannot be conveni- 
ently handled on a map whose scale is greater than 
six inches to a mile, while on a Geological Survey 
Map we may start two cavalry divisions fifty miles 
apart and make all needful decisions in regard to their 
movements. 

But as the scale of the map is increased the area 
covered by the operations under consideration must 
be diminished. And the ground is on a scale which 
is more than five thousand times larger than the larg- 
est scale maneuver maps. In a tactical ride, where 
the scale of the maneuver map (the ground) is one to 
one, a single director can not handle two opposing 
forces which are a mile apart except slowly and with 
difficulty. 

However, almost any one side maneuver can be 
conducted in a tactical ride; and one side maneuvers 
give better opportunities for instruction, in some re- 
spects, than two side maneuvers. One side maneu- 
vers afford excellent opportunities for instruction in 
troop leading and for making a detailed study of mil- 
itary operations. Outposts, positions in readiness, 
the selection of defensive positions and studies as to 
the best methods of strengthening them with defen- 
sive works and of occupying them, deployments, etc., 
are common topics for one side maneuvers and can be 
advantageously conducted on the ground as tactical 
rides. When it is desired to conduct a two side ma- 
neuver as a tactical ride, the opposing forces should 
not be large; should be started in contact with each 
other and given missions which will ensure their re- 
maining in contact. The attack and defense of posi- 
tions and retreat and pursuit are suitable exercises 
for two side maneuvers conducted by this method. 



—162— 

The use of maps should be reduced to a minimum 
and only such maps should be employed as are likely 
to be used in war. If the participants have detailed 
maps of large scale they are likely to solve their tasks 
by "preference to the map only and lose the benefit of 
the study of the ground which is one of the important 
objects of these exercises. All of the participants 
may be provided with maps of the U. S. Geological 
Survey, if available; and it is desirable that all offi- 
cers should acquire familiarity with these maps as 
they are the nearest approach that we have to a mil- 
itary map of our country. 

The ground selected for tactical rides should in 
most cases possess a number of good points of obser- 
vation and a number of features of tactical impor- 
tance, small woods, hills, streams, etc. Ground dom- 
inated by a single feature is not favorable, and but 
little can be done in an open level country or a region 
covered entirely with woods. 

Each participant in a tactical ride should be pro- 
vided with a pad of message blanks, a lead pencil, a 
watch, compass and pair of field glasses. 

In tactical rides written estimates of the situa- 
tions should not be required and the drafting of 
written orders should be reduced to a minimum. 
Work of this kind is certainly desirable but it can be 
more appropriately done in the solution of map prob- 
lems or in connection with map maneuvers. 

Sketches are often indispensable; they compel at- 
tention to details which might otherwise be over- 
looked, prevent officers from forgetting portions of 
their forces, and compel definite decisions. 

It is not necessary that all or any of the partici- 
pants should be mounted on horses; automobiles, 
wagons and bicycles are often more convenient than 
horses. Sometimes all of the participants are on 
foot; the exercise is then called a "tactical walk." 



—163- 
ONE SIDE EXERCISES 

In one side exercises the whole party is assigned 
to one side. After reaching the point at which the 
operations are to begin, the director explains the in- 
itial situation and assigns tasks to members of the 
party. All members of the party may be assigned 
the same task, or different tasks may be assigned to 
each. If all have the same task the discussion which 
follows will be more complete, while if each has a 
different one the exercise will progress more rapidly 
and may be made more interesting. Thus both 
methods have their advantages and both may be 
used in the course of the same day's work. 

The tasks are given out at some point affording 
a good view of the ground on which the troops em- 
ployed are supposed to be at the beginning of the 
exercise; and some other point favorable for obser- 
vation, in the direction in which these troops are 
supposed to be moving, is pointed out as the place 
for assembling on the completion of the tasks as- 
signed, and a definite hour for the assembly should 
also be announced. 

The tasks assigned usually take some such form 
as the following: "Mr. X, you are in command of the 
advance guard, which consists of one battalion. You 
will be prepared to give me verbally the orders you 
would give on receipt of information that your point 
has been driven back and your support checked by 
fire from the crest of the hill you see yonder. Also 
make a sketch showing the manner in which the ad- 
advance guard will be employed. Report to me on 
top of that hill at ten o'clock." "Mr. Y, you are in 
command of the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and your 
battalion is at the head of the main body. You 
have reached this point and you see that the advance , 
guard has deployed and is firing on the hill you see 



—164— 

yonder, from which a continuous fire is returned. 
You receive orders here to move with your battahon 
down this ravine to the vicinity of the lone tree 
yonder, and from the vicinity of that tree attack the 
northern end of that hill. Join me on that hill at 
ten o'clock and show by a sketch the disposition of 
your battalion during the attack. '/ 

When the party assembles again at the desig- 
nated time and place, the solutions of the various 
tasks are discussed, the director gives additional in- 
formation of the movements of the enemy and as- 
signs fresh tasks. 

Where different tasks are assigned to each mem- 
ber of the party it is difficult for a director to handle 
a party of over ten or twelve members. If all are 
given the same task the party may contain any num- 
ber; but in this case the work consists of a series of 
terrain exercises. 

It is not advisable to assign a task to a committee 
of officers. The report of a committee does not neces- 
sarily embody the opinions of any member of it, and 
no one is responsible for them. One of the most val- 
uable results which may be gained from tactical rides 
consists in training officers to make decisions and as- 
sume the responsibility for them; and this training is 
not gained by committee work. Besides, the delib- 
erations of a committee take up a great deal of time, 
which might be spent to better advantage in the gen- 
eral discussions or working out new tasks. If the 
director cannot devise enough tasks to give a separ- 
ate one to each member of the party, the same task 
can be assigned to two or more members of the party 
who are then prohibited from conferring with each 
other. 

One side exercises, possess a great advantage in 
the fact that general discussions can be held fre- 
quently, while in two side exercises there can be no 



—165— 

general discussion till the end. Also the party can 
be kept better in hand and the exercise can be^carried 
forward more rapidly — which, in tactical rides, is a 
very important consideration. 

One side exercises are not, however, as interest- 
ing as two side exercises; and the participants are 
not so confident that they are getting fair play as 
they are in the case of two side exercises. An inju- 
dicious director can easily spoil the interest in a one 
side maneuver by always defeating the troops com 
manded by the officers of his party. These officers 
will feel that they must take some risks in order to 
have a chance of winning, and if they notice that they 
are always pounced upon by superior numbers of the 
enemy from the direction in which they are the least 
prepared to meet him, they soon become discouraged 
and are likely to conclude that the director is taking 
an unfair advantage of his knowledge of their dispo- 
sitions. 

The members of the party may be required to 
form decisions and give orders immediately upon 
having the situation communicated to them and val- 
uable training in troop leading given in this way. 
When this is done the party need not be dispersed 
for the detailed study of special problems; all ac- 
company the director, who halts from time to time, 
informs the party of the changes in the situation and 
asks their opinions, decisions or orders. 

TWO SIDE EXERCISES 

In two side exercises the party (which should not 
number more than twelve for a single director) is di- 
vided into two groups, usually designated as Reds 
and Blues. As stated above, the problem should 
start the two opposing forces in contact with each 
other, or be drafted so as to bring them into contact 
quickly; this can always be done by making one force 



—166— 

the objective of the other and giving the aggressive 
force information of the whereabouts of the other. 
The forces should be relatively small or given mis- 
sions which will restrict their operations to moder- 
ate areas. 

The director sends one group to a good post of 
observation in the vicinity of the starting point of 
their force, and goes himself with the other group 
to a good post of observation near their starting 
point, communicates the problem to them, returns to 
the first group and communicates the problem to them 
in the same way. The director may assign tasks to 
all the members of each group or may designate a 
commander in each and cause the commander to as- 
sign the remaining members of their groups to the 
command of units. These subordinate commanders 
may be assigned tasks by the director relating to the 
disposition or handling of their units, or the chief 
commanders may be given entire freedom in the exer- 
cise of command and the subordinates merely re- 
quired to report the action taken by them pursuant 
to the orders given by their commanders. 

This last form of the exercise is perhaps the sim- 
plest and it certainly requires the least preliminary 
preparation on the part of the director; but as the di- 
rector cannot forsee the course which the exercise 
will take, nor be certain in advance of the ground 
which it will cover, he will have to study the ground 
after learning the decisions of the commanders be- 
fore he can carry on the exercise, and this is likely 
to cause some delay. He may require the comman- 
ders to make sketches of the ground covered by the 
movements which they contemplate, and make de- 
cisions based on these sketches; or if he has a detailed 
topographical map, he may make decisions based on 
the map; but if the decisions and discussions are not 
for the most part made with reference to actual 



— 167-- 

ground. one of the most valuable features of the tac- 
tical ride will be lost. 

Once the problem is decided on, the rerraining 
steps of the exercise grow out of it. 

The succeeding situations should be developed in 
as natural and plausable a manner as possible; though, 
of course, the director will not fail to turn the course 
of events into instructive channels whenever he finds 
an opportunity to do so. This can be done by tacti- 
cal decisions on the results of contact, by information 
of the enemy, by orders from higher authority, etc. 
For instance, if the director wishes to continue an 
attack and defense problem with a view to illustrat- 
ing a withdrawal from an engagement and a pursuit, 
he may award the superiority of fire to the attack, or 
he may give the defenders a report that the attacking 
force is receiving large reinforcements, or he may 
give the commander of the force on the defensive an 
order, supposed to be from the next higher comman- 
der, directing him to withdraw. 

After the tasks have been assigned in both 
groups, all the officers are directed to re-assemble at 
a designated locality, preferably one giving a good 
view of the ground on which the operations are sup- 
posed to take place. They may be instructed to re- 
port there when their tasks are completed, but it will 
be generally better to fix in advance an hour for the 
re-assembly. When the party assembles again, the 
two groups (Reds and Blues) are kept out of earshot 
of each other, fifty or sixty yards apart, and partial 
discussions take place in both groups. Decisions 
made necessary by the progress of events are then 
made by the director, each group is given informa- 
tion of the enemy, and fresh tasks are assigned or the 
commanders are called on for their decisions and 
orders in view of the changed conditions. 



— 168— 

The principal danger to be guarded against con- 
sists in letting the party get out of hand. Where 
commanders are given a degree of initiative in the 
conduct of operations and are scattered to make the 
reconnaissances incidental to the solution of their 
tasks, it is next to impossible, without a pre-arranged 
rendezvous, to find them all and carry the exercise 
forward to another stage. 

Attempts made to carry on exercises by scatter- 
ing members of the party about in the positions which 
their troops are supposed to occupy, maintaining com- 
munication with them by visiting them, by mounted 
orderlies, or by wire, do not result satisfactorily; 
the officers scattered about get very little idea of 
what is supposed to be going on, and the exercise 
progresses slowly. 

When it is desired to conclude the exercise, all 
members of the party are assembled in one group, 
the problem of each side is explained for the benefit 
of their opponents, and a general discussion follows. 

Several days are sometimes devoted to one prob- 
lem but it is better to conclude a problem on the day 
in which it is begun, if possible; for in this way the 
interest of the party is better sustained and the gen- 
eral discussion takes place before the events discussed 
are forgotten or confused with others. 

DISCUSSIONS ON THE TERRAIN 

In a tactical ride a hypothetical situation involv- 
ing tactical operations is assumed at the outset and 
the discussions are restricted to the events and situa- 
tions which grow out of this initial situation. There 
is a similar form of instruction in which this is not 
done, commonly called "discussions on the terrain." 
A party of officers merely rides along any desired 
route and discusses the adaptability of various feat- 
ures of the terrain for various military purposes. 



—169— 

For instance, oncoming to a bridge or a railroad track 
the modes in which they might be destroyed or ren- 
dered temporarily unfit for use could be discussed, or it 
might be assumed that they had sustained certain in- 
juries and the best modes of repairing or strengthen- 
ing them might be discussed. Similarly, outpost posi- 
tions and defensive positions might be selected and 
computations made of the number of troops that 
would be required to occupy them properly. Discus- 
sions on the terrain may be made very interesting 
and profitable by an able instructor; but they do not 
belong to the domain of practical military instruction, 
and might more properly be classed as lectures illus- 
trated by object lessons. 

STAFF RIDES 

Tactical rides are sometimes confused with staff 
rides, although the latter differ from them in the ob- 
jects sought, in the character of the problems and in 
the manner in which they are conducted. Staff rides 
are conducted for the purpose of giving practical ex- 
perience to general and administrative staff officers in 
the duties which pertain to their departments. The 
problems deal with the handling of divisions or larger 
bodies of troops, and the tasks assigned consist in 
the preparation of orders, the organization of sys- 
tems of supply and in general the solution of strategic 
and administrative problems. As an example of a 
staff ride, a department commander might require 
his staff to prepare the orders and submit reports of 
the arrangements that would be necessary for the 
concentration of the regular troops and militia or- 
ganizations in his department. He and his staff might 
then visit the points decided on for the concentration, 
the camp grounds might be selected, the officers of 
the supply departments might be required to report on 
the arrangements that would be made, to provide the 



—170— 

necessary storehouses, etc., the chief surgeon might 
report the number, kind and location of the hospitals, 
the sanitary features of the camps, etc. The troops 
supposed to have been concentrated might be organ- 
ized into brigades, and orders might be made out for 
putting them on the march to meet an imaginary en- 
emy. If the troops have been assembled at more 
than one point, a strategic concentration might be 
ordered, the general staff officers might be required 
to submit plans for a campaign, the questions, of 
transportation and supply might be worked out in 
detail, and the operations continued as long as may 
be desired, the department commander acting as di- 
rector and supplying the information of the imagi- 
nary enemy. Two such imaginary forces might be 
operated against each other, but this would require 
two directors, one with each party; and these direc- 
tors must send long telegrams to each other daily in 
order that each may be able to give out plausible in- 
formation based on the movements of the other party. 
Considerable expense would be incurred by such 
staff rides, mainly in transportation of cfRcers and 
the hire of rooms at hotels; and officers would be 
kept away from their offices for considerable periods. 
A strategic map maneuver might be conducted which 
would contain most of the instructive elements of 
such a staff ride and would avoid these objections. 
The work done in staff rides is all submitted in writ- 
ing and most of it is based on a map; while in tactical 
rides the solutions of tasks are usually oral and the 
use of maps is reduced to a minimum. 

GENERAL REMARKS 

In tactical rides an officer is frequently directed 
to conduct an imagina;ry patrol or to make a recon- 
naissance with certain objects in view; but he is only 
expected to conduct the patrol or make the recon- 



—171— 

naissance in practically the same way that it would 
be done in a map maneuver; that is to say, he would 
study the ground, decide on the route to be taken and 
the methods or dispositions employed, and, at the 
discussion, describe them to the director; the director 
then gives him the information of the enemy which 
the reconnaissance would have secured. It is not 
necessary that the officer should personally follow 
precisely the route which he decides on; it is only 
necessary that he should do so with his "mind's eye"; 
he may, for instance, ride along a road and select a 
route for a dismounted patrol covered from the view 
of the imaginary enemy, up a ravine, through under- 
brush, creeping through tall grass, etc. 

No definite rules can be given for conducting 
tactical rides and set forms are to be avoided. They 
may assume a great variety of forms; the forms in 
any particular case will depend on the instruction 
which the exercise is intended to convey, and upon 
the character of the problem selected. 

Tactical rides merely constitute one method of 
giving instruction in tactics. By means of tactical 
rides almost any desired tactical lesson can be taught. 
Broadly speaking, an officer can teach in them every- 
thing he knows and some things which he does not 
know. For nearly every discussion elicits some 
special experience or some special preparation on the 
part of some member of the party, bearing on the 
point under discussion; and the discussion may be- 
come a clearing house of information which will 
make it instructive to the director as well as to the 
other participants. 

It is not recommended to substitute tactical rides 
for field maneuvers when troops are available; but 
tactical rides constitute a valuable means of supple- 
menting the experience and instruction to be gained 
from field maneuvers when troops are not available. 



—172— 

For instance, the officers of a small post, garrisoned, 
let us say, by a battalion, might conduct tactical rides 
involving the handling of a brigade. 

Field maneuvers which have been stopped for 
some reason before they have reached the culminat- 
ing point of interest may sometimes be carried a step 
or two further by assembling the officers and em- 
ploying the methods of tactical rides, and may thus 
be made more interesting and instructive. 

Sometimes the troops available for field ma- 
neuvers are not thought sufficient in number to 
carry out the exercises desired, and bodies of imag- 
inary troops are attached to one or both of the 
forces; the imaginary troops can only be handled by 
the methods of tactical rides. But the mingling 
of real and imaginary troops has a number of 
disadvantages and is, as a rule, to be avoided; it is 
thought preferable to conduct field maneuvers with 
the troops available; and, if it is desired to instruct 
officers in the employment of larger or different 
bodies of troops, to do so by means of tactical rides 
or map maneuvers. 

There seems to be no place for tactical rides at 
our maneuver camps; the time spent in these camps 
is so short and the enlisted men so much in need of 
the instruction to be obtained there that it would 
seldom be advisable to detach the officers from their 
commands for this purpose. Tactical rides or tactical 
walks are, however, well adapted to the purposes of 
instruction camps of militia officers. 

Those who desire a more extended knowledge of 
tactical rides than can be obtained from these pages 
are referred to the following works on the subject: 
"A Tactical Ride" (Von Verdy), "Staff Rides and 
Regimental Tours" (Haking), "Cavalry Studies" 
(Haig), "Combined Training" (British Field Service 
Regulations), "Report of the Maneuvers at Pine 
Plains, N. Y., in 1908, "Tactical Rides" (Von Litz- 
mann) and "Tactical Rides" (Hoppenstedt). 



APPENDIX 



FIRE LOSSES* 



NOT COMPUTED IN MANEUVERS 

Our "Provisional Instructions for Maneuvers" (1904) say 
(Par. 40) : "By practice in calculating losses in war games on 
the map a certain readiness in recognizing the principal fac- 
tors governing the effect of fire and consequent facility in es- 
timating losses may be cultivated." 

Losses are no longer calculated in war games. The ex- 
perience of ninety years shows that it is a mistake to do so. 
The director cannot take the time in a map maneuver to cal- 
culate losses by the aid of tables without distroying interest 
in the maneuver; and map maneuvers are too valuable as a 
means of instruction in tactics to justify making them unpop- 
ular merely for the purpose of training officers to estimate 
losses well. Besides, the delays caused by such computations 
prevent the exercises from being carried far enough to enable 
us to draw conclusions from them. 

Tables of losses are not used in field maneuvers. In Col- 
onel Wagner's report of the field maneuvers of 1903 at West 
Point, Kentucky, and Fort Riley, Kansas, he says: "A table 
of losses was carefully prepared for the use of the umpires. 
Such tables, while very valuable in a game of kriegsspiel, are 
of but little account in maneuvers in the field. * * * In 
most cases, the action moves so quickly that the umpire is 
compelled to make his decisions instantlj^, without time for 
referring to a table, and the best that can be done is to en- 

*The matter in this appendix was printed in pamphlet form nearly a year 
before the publication of the first edition of this book; this pamphlet was 
used for a time in the Army Staff College, for lack of anything more suitable, 
for the purpose of giving student officers who were to act as directors of map 
maneuvers some training which would serve as a guide in estimating losses 
from the effect of fire. Befoie this training was given, the effect of fire was 
generally overestimated— troops which came under fire in a dense formation 
were immediately ruled out, etc.; but the solution of a few problems was 
sufficient to show that such disastrous effects would be produced only when 
the troops fired on continued to present a favorable target to the troops fir- 
ing for a commensurate period of time and there was noticeable improve- 
ment in the umpiring. 
173 



—174— 

deavor to rectify any mistake that may thus be made when 
the problem is finally discussed. 

It is apparent that the "kriegsspiel" here referred to is 
the old war game, now distinctively known as "Rigid Kriegs- 
spiel." 

The opinion of Colonel Wagner on this subject also appears 
in paragraph 40 of the "Provisional Instructions for Maneu- 
vers" (1904) as follows: "At maneuvers decisions must be 
rendered so rapidly that there will seldom be time to make 
computations or to consult a table of losses." 

UTILITY OF TABLES 

In the revision of Meckel's "Anleitung zum Kriegsspiel" 
(1904) the tables of fire losses which appeared in the earlier 
editions of his work are omitted; in explaining the omission 
he says: — "The tables of fire losses, given in the first edition 
of this work, have been omitted here, because their use— as 
was known then — makes the game slow and tedious. It is 
believed that there are now officers in each regiment who 
have sufficient knowledge and good judgment to be able to 
estimate the effect of fire correctly." 

Does any field of usefulness for the old tables of lossas — 
upon which so much labor has been expended— still remain? 

It is not doubted that we also have in each regiment ofii- 
cers who are able to estimate the effect of fire correctly 
enough for the purposes of maneuvers. But while in the 
German army the younger officers have frequent opportuni- 
ties — at map maneuvers, tactical rides, and field maneuvers 
--to learn the probable effect of fire through listening to de- 
cisions of older, more experienced and better instructed offi- 
cers, our opportunities for such instruction have hitherto 
been limited to our field maneuvers. Many of us have formed 
exaggerated ideas of the effectiveness of fire arms from our 
observation of the effects of firing on the target range, and 
some of the decisions made at field maneuvers do not help to 
dispel the illusion. 

As a result, an unreasonable timidity is sometimes noticed 
in our younger officers at field maneuvers, — probably greater 
than they would show in action. A troop commander is 
sometimes seen to dismount his troop to fight on foot because 
a hostile patrol has been seen; a company sometimes deploys 
and halts because it has been fired upon by two or three men. 

Instruction in the probable effect of fire in action is highly 
desirable and our maneuvers (both in the field and on the 



—175— 

map) would be benefitted by it. The chief importance of 
the losses to the director lies in their indicating the probable 
conduct of troops which have sustained them; but, aside from 
the shock action of cavalry, the most important factor in- 
fluencing the conduct of troops in action is the effect of the 
enemy's fire on them, and it consequently becomes important 
to be able to determine this factor with some degree of cor- 
rectness. If such instruction cannot be obtained in any more 
satisfactory way,* it is recommended that the tables of fire 
losses — once used in map maneuvers but now discarded- -be 
revived and used in solving problems based on hypothetical 
situations, for the purpose of correcting our ideas sufficiently 
to enable us to estimate losses within the bounds of probability, 
for the purpose of gaining familiarity with the most important 
factors which influence the effect of fire. 

BASIS OF TABLE 

The table attached is based on paragraph 40 of the "Pro- 
visional Instructions for Maneuvers" (1904); which appears 
to be based on the tables of "The American Kriegsspiel" 
(Livermore). The use of percentages of losses is discarded 
because it has been found by an extended series of tests that 
it is simpler in most cases to compute the number of men 
who will probably be disabled than to compute the percent- 
age of the organization. It is true that the percentage is 
really the more significant number, — especially when taken 
in connection with the rough rule given in paragraph 28, "Pro- 
visional Instructions," that a loss of one third is a sufficient 
ground for ruling an organization out; but when the number 
of men disabled is determined, the percentage of loss is also 
known or can be readily computed. 

Paragraph 40, "Provisional Instructions," has also been 
departed from to some extent in regard to the effect of artil- 
lery fire; the allowance at 3000 yards appeared to be insuf- 
ficient in view of recent experiments, and the allowance at 
1000 yards appeared to be too great; and the figures have 
been modified accordingly. It is hoped that data can be ob- 
tained by means of which the table can be tested and cor- 
rected to accord more perfectly with recent experience both 
ni regard to rifle and artillery fire. Officers who use the table 
are recommended to depart from the weights given the var- 

*Offlcers are recommended to study the works of Lieut. General H. 
Bohne on "Infantry firing regulations", aud "The effect of infantry fire un- 
der service conditions", also "Ihe Rifle in War" by Captain H. E. Eames, 
Pars. 171-188," Small Arms Firing Manual" (1906), and Pars. 17-20, "Proposed 
Regulations for Field Maneuvers" 



—176— 

ious factors in the table whenever they can approximate 
more closely to actual conditions by doing so. 

USE OF TABLE 

To use the table in determining the probable effect of 
rifle fire, the mind is fixed upon the losses which will probably 
occur in the case of one company of 128 men — deployed and 
fired on by another company of equal strength — for one min- 
ute. 

Certain circumstances in regard to the troops causing the 
loss are always taken into consideration, — such as the range, 
rapidity of fire, position taken in firing, degree of instruction 
and physical condition, and their morale and the effect of 
hostile fire upon them. Circumstances relating to the troops 
fired on are also considered, such as the angle which their 
front presents to the line of fire, whether they are in motion 
or at rest, their formation or interval, their position (standing, 
kneeling or lying), and whether or not they are under cover. 

But the circumstances just named are shown in the table 
and it is unnecessary to burden the mind with them at the 
outset, though the object of using the table is to familiarize 
ourselves with these circumstances and their relative impor- 
tance. 

What is called the "standard case" is shown in the center 
column of the table j and, expressed in ordinary language, its 
meaning is as follows: — that if a company (128 men) fires one 
minute on another company (128 men — who return the fire) a 
loss will be inflicted on the second company of one man; 
corresponding to points (to be explained later); when the 
range is 900 yards; the first company fires six shots per man 
per minute; from a lying position; their instruction is aver- 
age (fair); their condition is fresh (not fatigued); their morale 
is unshaken (good); they are sustaining a fire equal to their 
own: and the front of the second company makes an angle of 
90° with a line through the centers of the two companies, the 
second company is not in motion, is deployed with two paces 
interval between the men, and the men are lying down in the 
open without cover. The range is supposed not to be ac- 
curately known by the troops firing but to be estimated with 
ordinary skill. 

Circumstances which vary from the "standard case" are 
shown in other columns of the table and it will be noticed 
that circumstances which have the effect of increasing the 
rate of loss are placed in columns to the right of the center; 



— 177 - 

while those which diminish the rate of loss are in the columns 
to the left. 

The losses in cases which vary from the standard case are 
obtained by multiplying the loss in the standard case by a 
suitable multiplier (or combination of multipliers) placed in 
the table at the top of each column and it will be observed 
that the multipliers greater than unity are placed in the col- 
umns to the right of the center while multipliers less than 
unity are in the columns to the left. 

Since the processes of multiplication become tedious when 
the varying circumstances are numerous, modified logarithms 
or "points" are used instead of the multipliers themselves, in 
order to abridge the work of computation. When the multi- 
pliers are greater than unity, the "points" which correspond 
to them are added, consequently the "points" in the columns 
to the right of the center have the + (plus) sign; when the 
multipliers are less than unity the corresponding points, in 
the columns to the left of the center, have the — (minus) 
sign. 

These "points" are obtained by taking the common 
logarithms of the numbers immediately above them (the cor- 
responding multipliers), multiplying them by 20, and reject- 
ing the fractions. It is apparent that these "points" are not 
accurate, but they are sufficiently so for our present purposes. 

The assumption is made that if the company, the effect of 
whose fire we are considering, — mentioned in the description 
of the "standard case", and which for the purpose of discus- 
sion we will call Blue, — is reinforced by another Blue com- 
pany the losses of the enemy (Red) per minute will be doubled. 

If the Red company is reinforced by another, which 
merely thickens wifiiout extending the line, it is assumed 
that the rate of the loss of the Reds will be doubled. (This is 
shown in the table by the column "Troops Fired On" — For- 
mation — 1 man per yard — Multiplier 2). 

But if the second Red company prolongs the line of the 
first without thickening it, the assumption is that the rate of 
the Red loss is not changed. 

Of course the moral factor is affected by reinforcements, 
as is shown by another part of the table, but this element is 
left out of consideration for the present. The length of the 
target should, however, be taken into consideration when it 
is less than ^o of the range. In such cases it is supposed that 
a considerable portion of the bullets fall to the right and left 
of the target and a suitable diminution should be made in the 



—178— 

estimated loss, varying directly with the range and inversely 
as the length of the target. This diminution is not shown by 
the table. 

PROBLEMS 

The use of the table can be shown most readily by means 
of examples. In those which follow, the conditions of the 
standard case are assumed to exist except when the contrary 
is stated. 

Problem No. 7 . Six companies (Blue) fire two 
minutes on four companies (Red) on the crest of a 
hill, which return the fire,— distance 700 yards. 
The Blue force marched at double time five min- 
utes immediately before opening fire. Required, 
— the losses on both sides. 

Solution. The disparitj^ of force (3 to 2) is not sufficient 
to affect the morale of either side appreciably,— especially as 
the stronger force is fatigued. 

The losses of the Blues are caused by the fire of four Red 
companies, consequently the normal loss (one man) must be 
multiplied by 4 (corresponding to + 12 points); the fire is 
sustained two minutes, consequently it must be multiplied by 
2 (corresponding to-|-6 points); and the range being 700 yards, 
it must be multiplied by 1.6 (corresponding to +4 points). 
The Blue loss then will be 1X4X2X1-6=12.8. The Red loss 
may be computed in a similar manner (1X6X2X1-6X-6X-4 
=4.628). 

The solution by making use of the points is easier because 
we add instead of multiplying and we then have no fractions 
to deal with. It as as follows: 



BLUE LOSS 


«ED LOSS 


4 Red COS. +12 
2 minutes + 6 
700 yards + 4 

Total +22 
Ans. 12 men 


6 Blue COS. +16 
2 minutes + 6 
700 yards + 4 
Fatigued 

Crest 



Total +26— 12= +14 
Ans. 5 men 

If the multiplier which we wish to use is not found at the 
top of the table, search is made for it in the line below the 
table. To interpret the meaning of the results (+22 and +14) 
search is made for these numbers in the second and in the last 
lines of the table, and the corresponding multijjliers (12 and 5) 
are used to multiply the loss in the standard case (one man). 



- 179- 



Problem No. 2. Three platoons of dismounted cav- 
alry (Blue) advance by rushes over open ground from 
700 to 500 yards' distance against two platoons of dis- 
mounted Red cavalry firing at them from the edge of 
a wood — time consumed ten minutes. The Blue line 
of fire is at an angle of 60° with the front of the Red 
position. What are the losses on both sides? 

Solution. A platoon of cavalry dismounted (eighteen men) 
is roughly one-seventh of a company (128 men). The Blue 
force is taken at three-sevenths of a company and the Red 
force at two-sevenths of a company. The morale factor is in- 
appreciable. 



BLUE LOSS 

f Red Co. +6— 17=- 
10 minutes +20 
600 yards -1-6 



-11 



Total, +26— 11= -f 15 

Ans. 5J (say 6) men 



RED LOSS 

•iBlue Co. + lO— 17=- 7 
10 minutes +20 

600 yards +6 

60° +2 

Wood —6 



Total +28— 13=+15 
Ans. 6 men 



When a number is used as a divisor (as 7 is used in this 
case) look for the points corresponding to it and then use 
them with a negative sign. 

Problem No. 3. A company of Blue infantx'y in 
trenches is fired on ten minutes by two companies of 
Red Infantry at 600 yards' range, and during the same 
time is enfiladed at 30° by a squad of (eight) sharp- 
shooters at 700 yards' range. The Blue company re- 
turns the fire of the two Red companies, which are in 
front of it; but the sharpshooters are not seen and do 
not attract fire. What is the loss of the Blue com- 
pany? 



Solution. 



FIRE OF TWO RED COS. 



FIRE OF SHARPSHOOTERS 



2 COS. 

600 yards 
10 minutes 
Trench 



+6 
+6 
+20 



12 



Total +32 -12= +20 
10 men 



Squad j\ co. 
Sharpshooters 
Under no fire 
700 yards 
10 minutes 
Angle 30° 
Trench 



—24 
+6 

+4 
+4 
+20 
+6 
—12 



Ans. 10+2=12 men. 



Total +40 36= +4 
1.6 (say 2) men. 



Problem No. 4. A Blue company advances by rushes 
in skirmish, line over open ground in thirty minutes 
from 1,000 yards to 700 yards of thirty dismounted Red 



—ISO- 
cavalrymen firing on them from the crest of a hill. 
What is the loss of each? 

Solution. It is assumed that one section of the Blue com- 
pany advances at a time and that three sections are returning 
the fire of the Reds. 



BLUE LOSS 






^Og-i (about) 




-12 


30 minutes 


+30 




(Jav. under fire 3 times 


—5 




+30- 


-17=+13. 




Ans. 


4.5 (say 5) men, 


RED LOSS 






1 CO. 


+10- 


-12 


30 minutes 


+30 




Crest 




-8 


Inf. under less | 


+2 




than equal fire \ 





+42— 20=+22. Ans. 12 men. 
It is apparent that the Reds will be driven from the hill. 
The decisive factor here is the superiority of fire of the Blue 
infantry. The effectiveness of the fire of the Reds is diminished 
( — 5) by the fact that they are under a fire three times as heavy 
as their own, while the effectiveness of the fire of the Blues is 
increased (+2) by the fact that the fire directed upon them is^ 
less than their own. 

Problem No. 5. A troop of Blue cavalry charges as 
foragers from cover at 600 yards a company of Red 
infantry which is deployed and firing. Does the 
charge succeed? 

Solution. It depends on the morale of the infantry; it 
the infantry is surprised the loss of the cavalry will be as 
follows: 

300 yards (average) +12 

Rapid fire + 4 

Cav. skirmishers +18 
Motion charge — 6 

Inf. surprised — 6 

+34— 12=+22. Ans. 12 men. 
But if the infantry is unshaken, the loss of the cavalry is: 
300 yards +12 

Rapid fire -|- 4 

Cav. skirmishers +18 

Motion charge — 6 

Inf. under no fire + 4 

+38— 6= +32. Ans. 40 men. 



—181- 

In the first case the charge would probably succeed; 
the latter it would probably fail. 

Problem No. 6. A Blue company which has marched 
at double time for three minutes up a slope of five de- 
grees in close oi'der and immediately deployed in 
skirmish line (two paces interval) in the edge of a 
wood is, to its surprise, fired on by a Red company in 
a trench 400 yards in its front, deployed at one man 
per yard. Both companies open rapid fire. What are 
the losses at the end of one minute? 

Solution. 



Red CO. rest (trench) -f 2 Fatigued — 6 

Rapid fire + 4 Surprised — 4 

.400 yards +10 Trench —12 

Wood —6 400 yards +10 

Rapid fire +4 

1 man per yard +6 

Total +16— 6= + 10 

Ans. 3 men. Total+20 22=— 2 

Ans. .8 (say 1) man 

The fatigue factor -is changed from — 4 as given in the 
table to — 6 because it is thought that the marching at double 
time up a steep slope would have a very exhausting effect; 
similarly the surprise factor is changed from that given 
in the table because it is thought that the cover of the wood 
prevents any considerable confusion a& the result of the 
unexpected fire. Factors should be used in accordance with 
the circumstances of the case; the table is merely a guide. 
Note that the negative sign of the result ( — 2) merely means 
that the multiplier is a fraction. 

ARTILLERY AND MACHINE GUNS 

The fire of a machine gun is taken to be equal to that of 
a platoon (sixty-four men). In computing the effect of ar- 
tillery fire, the case is considered of a battery of four guns, 
not under effective fire, using direct fire, and firing on a com- 
pany (128 men) range approximately determined. 

The figures given are based on the supposition that the 
fire of a battery at 3,000 yards is about equal to that of a 
company (128 men) at 1,000 yards; and that the effectiveness 
of the battery does not increase rapidly at shorter ranges. 

The factor of vulnerability of artillery in action (10) is 
based on the supposition that the guns have no shields and 
that no other cover has been provided. In the case of ar- 



-182- 

tillery in action protected by shields, the multiplier for 
"trench" (.25) should be introduced; but if the fire is at an 
angle of 60° or less with the front of the battery the pro- 
tection of the shields is not considered. 

Problem No. 7. A battery of field artillery (Red) 
not under effective fire and using direct fire with 
range approximately determined fires one minute 
on a battalion of Blue infantry lying in the open 
at 2500 yards. Required, the loss of the Blue in- 
fantry. 

Sohdion. The only circumstance here varying from the 
standard is that a battalion (4 cos.) is fired on. But since 
nothing is said about the formation or interval, it is presumed 
that the battalion is in one line with the standard interval (2 
paces). Increasing the length of the target is not supposed 
to increase the rate of loss above the standard; though shorten- 
ing the target to less than ]-\) of the i-ange. would lower the 
rate below the standard. 

The loss of the Blue infantry is estimated to be one man. 

Problem No. 8. A battery fires for four minutes 
on two companies on the crest of.a hill. The com- 
panies are deployed one man per yard and the 
range is 3500 yards. What is the loss of the infan- 
try? 

Solution. The length of the target is y'j of the range and 
an estimated allowance of four points is made for bullets fal- 
ling to the right and left of it. 

4 minutes, +12 
Crest, —8 

3500 yards, —6 

1 man per yard, -f 6 - 
Target ^'^ range, — 4 



Total, +18-18=0, Ans. 1 man. 

Problem No. 9. A battalion of infantry leaves 
cover and advances in line in double rank over 
open ground from 2100 to 2000 yards range of a 
hostile battery which has previously ascertained 
the range approximately. The infantry advances 
without halting or firing. The ground is of such 
a nature that they can march only fifty yards per 
minute. The battery opens fire upon them as soon 
as they appear. What are the losses of the in- 
fantry? 

Solution. No allowance is made for the motion of the in- 
fantry—it would be less than one point and make no appreci- 
able difference in the result. 



2000 yards 


+ 2 


2 minutes 


+ 6 


2 ranks 


+16 


Standing 


+16 



-183 



Total: +40, Ans. 100 men 

It sometimes happens that results are obtained which are 
not found among the "points" given in the table. It is to be 
remembered that these "points" are used as logarithms. A 
result in points not in the table can be distributed among 
numbers found in the list of points, and the multipUers cor- 
responding to these numbers multiplied together. 

For example, suppose that we have obtained a result of 
+72; this is not in the table but it can be distributed 
as + 40+32. 

+ 40+32= +72 
100X40=4000 

That is to say, +72 points correspond to the multiplier 
4000. 

The "points" are only approximate logarithms; when 
the results are large the error is sometimes considerable. To 
show their inaccuracy, suppose a result of +60 is obtained. 
If this result is distributed as +40+20 or as +20+20+20 the 
final multiplier is found to be 1000; but if it is distributed as 
+30+30 a multiplier 900 is obtained. 









iOsses 










Mul 
Poir 


LOO 

fl2 


6.00 
+16 


8.00 
+ 18 


10.00 

+20 


16.00 

+ 24 


20.00 
+26 






F 
















I 


300 


200 




100 






Rat< 














b 


Posi 














to 


Inst 














o 


Physii 
















Moi 
















Und 












o 


Angle 














t3 


xVlot 














P4 


For 




2 Ranks 


Cavalry 
skirmishers 


*Artillery 
in action 


Cavalry 
in line 


Artillery 
limbering 


O 

O 
l-i 

H 


Pos 




Standing 










Addition 
Corresp 


alM 
ondin 


jiti 


9 
19 


11 12 

-f21 +22 


13 

+23 + 


18 24 
25 +28 


*Unshe 

30 4( 

+30 +E 


Itered 
) 100 
52 +40 



Table of Multipliers for use in Computing Fire Losses 



Multipliers __ 
Points 


.05 
-26 


.1 
— 20 


.12 
—18 


.16 
—16 


.20 

—14 


.25 

—12 


.30 
—10 


.40 
—8 


.50 
—6 


.60 
-4 


.80 

-2 


1. 00 

o 


1.20 

-1-2 


1.60 

+4 


2.00 

+6 


2.40 

+ 8 


3.00 
+10 


4.00 
+ 12 


6.00 
+ 16 


8.00 

4 18 


10.00 

+20 


16.00 

+ 24 


20.00 
-|2fl 






Field Artillery . 
Rifle 












4000 






3500 


3300 


3000 


2500 


2000 


1500 


1000 


















o 






1800 


1700 


1600 


1500 


1400 


1300 


1200 


1100 


1000 


900 


800 


700 


600 


500 


400 


300 


200 




100 






g 

s 


Rate of Fire . 
Position . _ . . 
























6 per min. 




Rapid 




















b 






















Standing 


Lying 


Rest 






















CO 

Oh 

O 


Instruction _. 
















Recruits 






Average 






Sharpsh'trs 


















H 


Physical Condition . 






- 














Fatigued 




Fresh 


























Morale 


















Surprised 




Shaken 


Unshaken 


























Under Fire _ _ _ 
















4 Times 


Double 




Equal 




None 




















B 
O 


Angle of front 
























90° 


60^ 


45° 


30° 
















Vh 


Motion 












Gallop 
oblique 






Trot or D. 
T. oblique 


Gallop to 
front 


Trot or D 
T. to front 



















Cavalry 
skirmishers 


*Artillery 
in action 






s* 


Formation _ . . 












5 yards 
interval 








2 yards 
interval 




2 paces 
interval 






1 man 
per yard 




1 

Rank 




2 Ranks 


Cavalry 
in line 


Artillery 
limbering 


o 
H 


Positon _ ^ 


Loopholes 










Trencli 




Crest 


Wood 






Lying 






Kneeling 








Standing 











Additional Multipliers .06 .11 .14 .18 .22 .27 

Corresponding Points . . —24 —19 —17 —15 —13 — ll 



.35 



♦Unsheltered 
.45 .55 .70 .90 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.5 4.5 5 5.5 7 9 11 12 13 18 24 30 40 100 
_7 _5 _3 -1 +1 +3 .^5 +7 +9 +ii +13 +14 +15 . + 17 +19 +21 +22 +23 -| 25 +28 | 30 \ ^2 | 40 




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